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ABSTRACT. The vast majority of U.S. international agreements today are made by the
President acting alone. Little noticed and rarely discussed, the agreements are concluded in a
process almost completely hidden from outside view. This state of affairs is the result of a long-
term transformation. Over the course of more than a century, Congress gradually yielded power
to the President to make international agreements. Each individual delegation of authority
relinquished only a small measure of power, while freeing members of Congress to focus on
matters that were more likely to improve their reelection prospects. But the cumulative effect
over time left Congress with little power over international lawmaking. As a result, the President
is now able to make law over an immense array of issues -including issues with significant
domestic ramifications -by concluding binding international agreements on his own. This
imbalance of power violates democratic principles and may even lead to less effective
international agreements.
To correct this imbalance, this Article proposes a comprehensive reform statute that would
normalize U.S. international lawmaking by reorganizing it around two separate tracks.
International agreements that are now made by the President alone would proceed on an
administrative track and would be subject to what might be called the "Administrative Procedure
Act for International Law." This new process would offer greater openness, public participation,
and transparency, but not overburden lawmaking. A legislative track would include two existing
methods for concluding international agreements: Senate-approved Article II treaties and
congressional-executive agreements expressly approved by both houses of Congress. In addition,
it would include an expanded "fast track" process that would permit streamlined congressional
approval of agreements. Together, these proposals promise to create a more balanced, more
democratic, and more effective system for international lawmaking in the United States.
AUTHOR. Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law
School. J.D. Yale Law School. I thank U.C. Berkeley School of Law, where I was a Professor
when I wrote the bulk of this article. For helpful feedback, I thank Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar,
Kenneth Bamberger, Bill Dodge, Kristen Eichensehr, Daniel Esty, Judith Goldstein, Jacob
Hacker, Amy Kapczynski, Harold Hongju Koh, Goodwin Liu, Jerry Mashaw, Jide Nzelibe, Anne
Joseph O'Connell, Eric Posner, Alan Sykes, Carlos VAzquez, and participants in the Yale Law and
Globalization Workshop, the U.C. Berkeley International Law Workshop, the U.C. Berkeley
Faculty Retreat, the Northern California International Law Conference, the Stanford
International Law Workshop, the NYU International Law Colloquium, and the Vanderbilt
International Law Workshop. I also thank Doug Avila, Greta Milligan, Haley Nix, Sara
Aronchick Solow, Teresa Cullen, Teresa Stanton, Richard Hasbany, Marci Hoffman, Edna
Lewis, and Nabilah Siddiquee for outstanding assistance.
ARTICLE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 143
1. THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE UNILATERAL INTERNATIONAL
LAW 148
A. The Scope and Legal Foundation of Executive Agreements 149
B. Ex Ante Congressional-Executive Agreements 155
II. LOOKING BACK: THE HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENT'S POWER OVER
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 167
A The Founding Era Through the New Deal: Setting the Legal and Political
Stage for Transformation 169
B. The Aftermath of World War I: Growing Presidential Unilateralism 181
C. The Revolution of INS v. Chadha: The Triumph of Presidential
Unilateralism 194
III.THE PROPER ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 205
A. The President Is a Necessary but Rarely Sufficient Actor in International
Lawmaking 206
1. The President Is the Sole Voice of the United States on the
International Stage 206
2. The President's Unilateral International Lawmaking Powers and Its
Limits 210
3. Ex Ante Congressional-Executive Agreements Satisfy the Form, but
Not the Function, of Interbranch Cooperation 212
B. Unilateral Presidential Power Threatens Democratic Accountability 215
1. In Defense of Democratic Accountability in International Lawmaking 215
2. International Delegation and Domestic Delegation Compared 219
3. Congressional Control over Appropriations Is Not a Sufficient Check
on Presidential Power 225
C. The False Choice Between Democratic Accountability and Effective
International Lawmaking 230
i. Widespread Political Support Can Lead to More Effective International
Law 231
2. An Unconstrained Negotiator Can Be Weaker, Not Stronger 233
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 119:140 2009
3. Executive Branch Negotiators May Not Have All Relevant Information 237
IV. RESTORING THE BALANCE 239
A. A New Model of Administrative International Lawmaking 241
1. An "APA" for International Law 242
2. Rethinking Delegations of Lawmaking Authority to the President 253
3. Eligibility for the Administrative Track 256
B. An Expanded Model of Legislative International Lawmaking 259
1. Article II Treaties 260
2. Ex Post Congressional-Executive Agreements 260
3. An Expanded "Fast Track" 263
CONCLUSION 266
PRESIDENTIAL POWER OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
Each year, the United States enters hundreds of international agreements
on everything from cooperation in the prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear
and other radioactive material with Latvia,' to the safety of food and feed
imported from China,2 to international air transport with Georgia,3 to the
suppression of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs with Malta.4 But very few of
Agreement for Cooperation in the Prevention of Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other
Radioactive Material, U.S.-Lat., Dec. 3, 2007, Temp. State Dep't No. 08-35, 2007 U.S.T.
LEXIS 69.
2. Agreement on the Safety of Food and Feed, U.S.-P.R.C., June 21, 2007, Temp. State Dep't
No. 08-12, 2007 U.S.T. LEXIS 54.
3. Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-Geor., Dec. 6, 2007, Temp. State Dep't No. o8-o6, 2007
U.S.T. LEXIS 50.
4. Agreement Concerning Cooperation To Suppress Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances by Sea, U.S.-Malta, June 16, 2004, Temp. State Dep't No. o8-24,
2004 U.S.T. LEXIS 166. Another notable sole executive agreement is the recent security
agreement between the United States and Iraq. Agreement on the Withdrawal of United
States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During
Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2009, available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/SE-SOFA.pdf. That agreement,
unlike the others mentioned here, clearly exceeded the President's constitutional authority
to conclude an international agreement on his own. Unlike the vast majority of sole
executive agreements -which pass almost entirely unnoticed -the agreement with Iraq met
with much resistance and prompted a year-long debate. See, e.g., Press Release, Robert P.
Casey, Jr., Robert Byrd, Ted Kennedy, Carl Levin, Hillary Clinton & Jim Webb, Senators,
U.S. Senate, Senators Warn President Bush Against Making Long-Term Security
Commitments to Iraq Without Congressional Consent (Dec. 6, 2007), available at
http://casey.senate.gov/newsroom/press (enter "December" and "2007" under "Press
Releases By Date"; jump to page 2 of 2; follow "Senators warn President Bush..."). I have
participated in some of this debate. See Renewing the United Nations Mandate for Iraq: Plans
and Prospects: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 11oth Cong. 11-20 (2008) (statement of Oona A.
Hathaway, Esq., Professor of Law, Berkeley Law, University of California, Berkeley),
available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/11O/45417.pdf; Declaration and Principles: Future
U.S. Commitments to Iraq: J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Middle East and South Asia
and the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, lioth Cong. 40-44 (2008) (statement of Oona A. Hathaway, Esq.,
Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School); The November 26 Declaration of Principles:
Implications for U.N. Resolutions on Iraq and for Congressional Oversight: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 11oth Cong. 14-19 (2008) (statement of Oona A. Hathaway, Esq., Associate
Professor of Law, Yale Law School); Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, An Agreement
Without Agreement, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyr/content/article/2oo8/o2/15/AR2oo8o215o2539.html; Bruce Ackerman & Oona A.
Hathaway, Bush's Final Illusion, SLATE, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.slate.con/id/22o2771;
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these agreements are reported in the news or discussed in the halls of
Congress. That is because most of them are made by the President alone and
are quietly revealed to Congress and the public months after they have already
entered into force.
These agreements are the product of a little noticed transformation during
the last half-century in the way international law is made in the United States.
Once a duty shared by Congress and the President, the task of concluding
international agreements has come to be borne almost entirely by the President
alone. Today, the vast majority of binding international agreements entered
into by the United States are concluded by the President through what are
referred to as "executive agreements."' During the past decade, the U.S.
Department of State has reported an average of between two and three
hundred executive agreements to Congress each year, touching on nearly every
subject of international law-at times with substantial effect.6 By comparison,
the United States has ratified roughly twenty treaties annually during the same
decade.7
The President has not always had the power to make so much international
law on his own. Indeed, executive agreements were a relative rarity before the
mid-twentieth century. Beginning in the post-World War II era, however,
Congress began granting extensive power to the President to make
international agreements on his own. The statutes that initially granted
Bruce Ackerman & Cona Hathaway, Op-Ed., Into No-Man's Land, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2008,
at A21; Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Op-Ed., The War's Expiration Date,
WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 20o8, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2oo8/o4/o 4/AR2oo80 4o4o2581.html; Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, What Bush
Will Surrender in Iraq, TIME, Sept. 11, 20o8, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/
o,8599,184o274,oo.html; Bill Delahunt & Oona Hathaway, Op-Ed., Bush Should Include
Congress, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2008, at A15 ; Oona A. Hathaway, Congressional Briefing
on U.S.-Iraqi Relations and the Bush-Maliki Agreement (Nov. 8, 20o8) (on file with
author).
5. When used without any modifier, the term "executive agreements" encompasses "sole
executive agreements" - agreements made by the President without any congressional
involvement; "ex ante congressional-executive agreements" - agreements made by the
President using authority granted to him in advance by Congress, usually by statute; and
"ex post congressional-executive agreements" -agreements made by the President and then
approved by both houses of Congress through the normal legislative process.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 17-24.
7. The Library of Congress, Treaties, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/
treaties.htrnl (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Thomas Treaties Database]. An
exception is 2008, the final year of the Bush presidency, during which the President sought
and received Senate advice and consent to ratify eighty-two treaties. Email from Attorney,
U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, to author (Aug. 3, 2009) (on file with
author).
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authority were narrow and carefully constrained. Over time, however, many of
the grants of authority became increasingly vague and open-ended, allowing
the President to negotiate agreements and put them into force without any
further congressional approval. The agreements that the President negotiates
under this advance authority are often referred to as "ex ante" congressional-
executive agreements.
In principle, Congress has the power to revoke these grants of authority by
passing subsequent statutes. In practice, however, the authority to make such
international agreements has proven to be nearly impossible to revoke once
granted- not least because any effort to revoke or even amend a delegation can
be vetoed by the President. Moreover, Congress retains strikingly meager
power to oversee the agreements that are made. After authorizing the President
to make binding international agreements on behalf of the United States,
Congress typically does little to police the exercise of that authority. The
courts, reluctant to weigh in on foreign affairs matters, have done nothing to
correct the imbalance. They have instead granted substantial deference to the
President as to both the substance and the form of international lawmaking. As
a result, ex ante congressional-executive agreements -which today make up
roughly eighty percent of all U.S. international legal commitments-are made
by an almost entirely unfettered President.
This Article traces the key moments since the Founding that have brought
us to this imbalanced moment. It shows that during the first hundred years
after the Founding, the President played a highly constrained role in
international lawmaking. It was extremely rare for the President to make
agreements without express congressional approval. That began to change in
the 189os, when Congress started to give the President independent power to
conclude bilateral trade agreements within strict constraints. The decision in
the 189os to give the President power to conclude trade agreements set the
legal and political stage for a broader transformation in international
lawmaking during the next century. That potential was realized in the period
following World War II. Unilateral presidential power over international law
grew exponentially from then onward, driven first by the passage of an
expansive and unprecedented foreign assistance program, and later by the
Supreme Court's decision to prohibit the use of legislative vetoes. That
decision, and Congress's response to it, eliminated much of the limited power
Congress had until then retained.
Why did Congress delegate so much of its power over international law to
the President? After all, the pattern I describe defies the common expectation
that Congress will jealously guard its already limited prerogatives. In this
Article, I show that Congress acted as it did because of a combination of
institutional myopia and political incentives. Congress gave away its power
slowly over time. Each individual delegation of authority relinquished only a
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small measure of power to the President, while freeing members of Congress to
dedicate themselves to matters that were more likely to improve their prospects
for reelection. The costs of these decisions for Congress's institutional power
took decades to be realized. Not only did the effect of each individual
delegation grow over time, but the cumulative effect of multiple delegations
also became more significant with each additional delegation. Because these
effects were slow to be realized, few of the individual members of Congress
who voted to approve the delegations would still be in office when the
cumulative effects of the delegations came to be felt. At that point, Congress
found itself unable to reclaim what it had lost, in part because of the difficulty
of mobilizing members of Congress around issues of international law that
already had been ceded to the executive branch.
That Congress never intended to give up so much power does not
necessarily mean that it should reclaim the basic authority over international
lawmaking it once shared more fully with the executive branch. It would be
possible to conclude that Congress's decision to give power over to the
President was a good one, even if unintentional. But that would be a mistake.
The imbalance of power over international lawmaking that has emerged over
the past two centuries is, I argue, inconsistent with basic democratic principles
and can lead to less favorable agreements.
The President should be a leading actor in international lawmaking-but
not the sole actor. The absence of genuine cooperation among the branches is
inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers on which our
government relies: a single branch of government should not be able to
unilaterally make law over an immense array of issues simply by concluding
binding international agreements. In fact, the law already recognizes this. Strict
legal limits govern the kinds of agreements that presidents may enter into
under their constitutional authority through so-called sole executive
agreements. And yet such limits are not applied to ex ante congressional-
executive agreements, on the grounds that such agreements inherently embody
interbranch cooperation. As this Article shows, however, ex ante congressional-
executive agreements rarely involve the true sharing of power. Indeed, the very
label applied to such an agreement-"ex ante congressional-executive
agreement" -is misleading, since it suggests a level of cooperation in making
the agreement that rarely exists. In reality, once Congress delegates authority
to the President to make the agreement, it usually plays no further role-
contrary to what the separation of powers requires.
In an era in which international lawmaking increasingly overlaps with
domestic lawmaking, ex ante congressional-executive agreements provide a
means for presidents to bypass the other branches of government in pursuing
core policy aims. This is troubling not merely as an abstract constitutional
matter. It also raises real concerns about the quality of governance and
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representation-concerns that helped prompt the emphasis on a separation of
powers in our lawmaking process at the Founding. One of the key justifications
for the separation of powers among three branches of government is that it
encourages accountability and discourages misbehavior by pitting "ambition
against ambition." Ex ante congressional-executive agreements frustrate this
process by placing most of the power to conclude international agreements in
the hands of a single actor. From a democratic standpoint, this raises a
particular concern because both senators and representatives have a strong
competing claim to carry out the wishes of U.S. citizens. Moreover, because
presidents cannot be reelected more than once, as much as half of their time in
office involves no direct electoral accountability whatsoever.
The argument in favor of unilateral presidential lawmaking rests in part on
a mistaken assumption that less democratic international lawmaking is more
effective international lawmaking. But there is good reason to question this
claim. Effective international lawmaking requires not just an unfettered
negotiator but also widespread political support for the deal the negotiator
strikes. When an agreement is concluded behind closed doors, with little or no
input from Congress or the public at large, it can be difficult to build political
support for the agreement that results.
What is more, an unconstrained negotiator may sometimes be weaker, not
stronger, when it comes to negotiating favorable agreements. Thomas
Schelling observed decades ago that "[i]f the executive branch is free to
negotiate the best arrangement it can, it may be unable to make any position
stick and may end by conceding controversial points because its partners know,
or believe obstinately, that the United States would rather concede than
terminate the negotiations.' 8 If, however, those negotiating on behalf of the
United States can demonstrate to their negotiating partners that they are
constrained by the need to obtain congressional approval, they may be able to
refuse to make concessions that they would otherwise need to make to secure a
deal. At the same time, a more open lawmaking process can give negotiators a
better understanding of the needs and concerns of those who will be directly
affected by the agreement.
For all these reasons, it is time to rethink the way international law is made
in the United States. Below, I outline a comprehensive reform statute that
would normalize U.S. international lawmaking by reorganizing it around two
separate tracks -administrative and legislative. The proposal for a new
administrative track is patterned after the notice and comment model that
currently applies to rulemaking in the domestic context: it is effectively a call
8. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 28 (1980).
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for an Administrative Procedure Act for international law. Bringing agreements
that are regulatory in nature into this new administrative system would serve
to make them both more effective and more legitimate-for example, by
making them available to Congress and the public before, rather than after, they
become law. The process would offer greater openness, more public
participation, and better transparency. Agreements would be eligible for this
administrative track if they were authorized under an express delegation of
authority to the President by Congress in prior legislation, or if they fall within
the President's own constitutional powers.
All other agreements would be subject to a heightened legislative approval
process. The legislative track would include two existing methods for
concluding international agreements: Senate-approved Article II treaties and ex
post congressional-executive agreements approved by both houses of
Congress. In addition, I propose an expanded "fast track" process that would
permit streamlined congressional approval of agreements. By making the
process of obtaining congressional approval less cumbersome, the expansion of
existing fast track procedures would make it more attractive for the President
to submit international agreements for the approval of both houses of
Congress.
This Article begins in Part I by describing the process of international
lawmaking in the United States today. It focuses, in particular, on how much
of international law is made by the President acting alone, using authority
delegated to him by Congress. Part II shows how this process came to be. It
traces ex ante congressional-executive agreements back to their origins and
shows how long-term trends, as well as several crucial events, combined as
Congress became complicit in the loss of much of its power over international
lawmaking to the President. Part III turns to a discussion of the roles the
President and Congress ought to play in international lawmaking and argues
for a more balanced role for each. Finally, Part IV lays out a concrete proposal
for reform.
I. THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE UNILATERAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law in the United States today takes many different forms.
There are, of course, classic Article II treaties-made by the President and
approved by two-thirds of the Senate. In addition, there are what are often
called "ex post congressional-executive agreements" - agreements like the
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North American Free Trade Agreement 9 - that are negotiated by the President
and then submitted to both houses of Congress for a vote up or down.'" There
are, moreover, "sole" executive agreements entered by the President using the
inherent constitutional authority of the office.
Together these three best-known types of international agreements make
up only a small fraction of the international agreements concluded by the
United States every year. Much more common-and almost completely
ignored outside of foreign policy circles -are executive agreements negotiated
by the President using authority delegated in advance by Congress. Such
agreements are not subject to approval by Congress after they are concluded,
but instead may enter into force immediately upon the signature of the
President or his representative. Such agreements -often referred to as "ex ante
congressional-executive agreements"- make up the vast majority of
international agreements in force for the United States today. They are used in
nearly every area of international law, from fisheries to atomic energy to
agriculture to economic cooperation."
My examination proceeds in two stages. I begin by describing the legal
authority under which the President makes most of the United States's
international agreements and the nature and scope of the agreements
concluded under this authority. I show that the vast majority of executive
agreements are concluded under the authority of a congressional statute
delegating authority to the President. Next, I turn to examining the nature of
these grants of authority by Congress. I show that Congress has handed over
unilateral power to the President to make most of our international law. And it
has done so without maintaining any significant ongoing congressional
oversight of the agreements created pursuant to that delegated power. As a
result, there exists today a deep imbalance of power over international
lawmaking in the United States.
A. The Scope and Legal Foundation of Executive Agreements
In 2008, the State Department reported that the United States had entered
over two hundred executive agreements with foreign countries and
9. U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
io. North American Free Trade Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3301-3473 (2006)).
11. Only two out of over a hundred areas of international law-human rights and extradition of
accused criminals to foreign countries-have been entirely insulated from this
transformation. See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1261 (2008).
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organizations. 2 These agreements cover nearly every area of international law,
from defense to employment to education. In both number and scope, they far
overshadow every other form of international agreement entered by the United
States.
In addition to their prevalence, ex ante congressional-executive agreements
and sole executive agreements -which I will refer to here collectively as
"executive agreements" -are distinguished from other types of international
agreements by the unilateral way in which they are created.' Unlike Article II
treaties or ex post congressional-executive agreements, most ex ante and sole
executive agreements are not submitted to Congress for approval. They are
instead negotiated by representatives of the President and enter into force upon
signature by the legal representatives of the state parties. Indeed, few outside
the executive branch even know of their existence until after they have become
binding on the United States. The text of most of these executive agreements is
made public only after they enter into force (indeed, sometimes long after).
In part because they are so easy to create, executive agreements have
become the primary instrument of international lawmaking in the United
States. They far surpass Article II treaties and ex post congressional-executive
agreements in number. Together, there were more than three thousand
executive agreements in total during the two decades between 198o and 2000.14
By contrast, there were 375 Article II treatiesS-about ten percent of the
number of executive agreements-and a small handful of ex post
16congressional-executive agreements.
12. Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, International Agreements Other than
Treaties Transmitted in Accordance with the Provisions of 1 U.S.C. 112(b), as Amended,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/caseact/2oo8/index.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2009) (listing
236 executive agreements). The list includes all executive agreements-both sole executive
agreements and ex ante congressional-executive agreements- reported to Congress in 2008.
It includes some agreements that entered into force in earlier years and excludes some
agreements that were made in 2008 but not reported to Congress until after the end of the
year. It does not include classified executive agreements, which by some reports constitute
roughly ten to fifteen percent of the total number of executive agreements.
13. In this Article, the term "executive agreement(s)" without a modifier refers to sole executive
agreements and ex ante congressional-executive agreements collectively. Although ex post
congressional-executive agreements are also formally "executive agreements," they are not
meant to be included.
14. Hathaway, supra note 11, at 1264-69.
15. Author's calculations from Thomas Treaties Database, supra note 7.
16. I have been able to identify only nine such agreements between 198o and zooo. See Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, io8 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (2006)); North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
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Executive agreements are extensive in scope as well as in number. Between
198o and 2000, there were over one hundred separate recorded subject areas in
which executive agreements were concluded.'7 Table i lists the subject areas in
which executive agreements were most commonly concluded between 198o
and 2000. The five most common subjects of agreements range widely: defense
§§ 3301-3473); United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-499, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112); United
States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-47, 99 Star. 82
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112); Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful
Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 20o6, Pub. L. No. 109-401, 120 Stat. 2726 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.); Support for East European Democracy (SEED)
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-179, 103 Stat. 1298 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
22 U.S.C.) (removing trade restrictions and liberalizing foreign investment between the
United States, Poland, and Hungary); South African Democratic Transition Support Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-149, 107 Stat. 1503 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 and
26 U.S.C.) (lifting antiapartheid sanctions and encouraging U.S. private sector investment
in and trade with South Africa); Act of Dec. 16, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-183, 99 Stat. 1174
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2158) (approving the Agreement for Cooperation
Between the Government of the United States of America and the government of the
People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy); Balanced Budget
Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 201(a), 11o Stat. 26, 34 (1996) (approving the
Global Learning and Observations To Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) agreement and
appropriating funds to the Commerce, Justice, and State Departments and to the judiciary).
This list was compiled through a search of the titles of the agreements in the Statutes at
Large database and an examination of the legislation for language indicating that the act
constituted not simply implementing legislation, but rather formal approval of the
agreement. Though as far as I am aware this is the most comprehensive listing of ex post
congressional-executive agreements during this period, it is almost certainly true that this
list misses several congressional-executive agreements, either because the agreement was not
listed in the Treaties and International Agreements Online (Oceana) database of executive
agreements on which the searches are based or because my assistants and I failed to catch
the agreement in our search of the Statutes at Large. See Treaties and International
Agreements Online, http://www.oceanalaw.com (last visited Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter
Oceana Database].
17. Author's calculations from Oceana Database. See Oceana Database, supra note 16. The
database includes treaties, sole executive agreements, and congressional-executive
agreements. It appears to include about half of the international agreements entered by the
United States in the last century. To calculate the numbers of international agreements
noted here, I dropped all agreements that appeared likely to be sole executive agreements
based on their title (including terms Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of
Agreement, Understanding(s), Declaration(s), Agreed Minute(s), Agreed Record,
Statement, Letter, Exchange of Notes, Joint Communique, Acceptance of the Report,
Administrative Agreement, Administrative Arrangement, Agreement Interpreting,
Arrangement, Implementing Arrangement, and Implementing Procedures) and those that
appeared to be simply amendments or extensions (including terms Amendment, Extension
to Agreement, Agreement Amending, Adjustments, Agreement Modifying, Agreement
Extending, Supplemental, and Supplementary).
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(fourteen percent of all executive agreements during this period), trade (nine
percent), scientific cooperation (six percent), postal matters (six percent), and
debts (six percent).
Table 1.




Scientific Cooperation 247 6%




Atomic Energy 167 4%










Environmental Cooperation 47 1%
Peace Corps 46 1%
is. The table was compiled by calculating the number of agreements between 198o and 2000 in
each major subject matter category. It includes ex ante congressional-executive agreements,
sole executive agreements, and amendments that are separately reported. To the extent
possible, it excludes Article II treaties and ex post congressional-executive agreements. Data
are drawn from the Oceana Database, supra note 16, with corrections based on other
available data sources.
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Space Cooperation 42 1%
Fisheries 39 1%
Judicial Assistance 37 < 1%
Maritime Matters 34 < I%
Health 32 < 1%
Customs 26 < I%
Social Security 25 < I%
Arms Limitation 24 < I%
Satellites 24 < I%
Nuclear Safety 22 < 1%
Other 462 11.92%
Total 3876 100%
Many of these agreements involve mundane topics. In 2008, for example,
the President reported an agreement on "energy-efficiency labeling programs
for office equipment," 19 an air transport agreement, 2° and a Memorandum of
Understanding with Panama on the Fulbright Exchange Program.2 , But many
address issues that are significant to large numbers of Americans and might
have been the subject of close congressional scrutiny had they been made
public before they entered into force. Alongside the more routine agreements
reported in the most recent year were an agreement with China on the safety of
drugs and medical devices, an agreement with Vietnam on the return of
Vietnamese citizens, "3 an agreement to provide up to $150 million in cash
grants to the Palestinian Authority' (which was twice what the United States
ig. Agreement on the Coordination of Energy-Efficiency Labeling Programs for Office
Equipment, U.S.-EU, Dec. 20, 20o6, Temp. State. Dep't No. o8-1o, 20o6 U.S.T. LEXIS
1O9. This agreement, along with all of the nonsecret agreements reported to Congress in
20o8, is available at http://www.state.gov/s//treaty/caseact/20o8/index.htm.
z. Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-Geor., June 21, 2007, Temp. State Dep't No. o8-o6, 2007
U.S.T. LEXIS So.
21. Memorandum of Understanding on the Fulbright Exchange Program, U.S.-Pan., Dec. lo,
2008, Temp. State Dep't No. 08-235, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/12ll37.pdf.
22. Agreement on the Safety of Drugs and Medical Devices, U.S.-P.R.C., Dec. 11, 2007, Temp.
State Dep't No. o8-13, 2007 U.S.T. LEXIS 55.
23. Agreement on the Acceptance of the Return of Vietnamese Citizens, U.S.-Vietnam, Jan. 22,
2008, Temp. State Dep't No. 08-43, 2008 U.S.T. LEXIS lo.
24. Cash Transfer Grant Agreement, U.S. -Palestinian Authority, Mar. 19, 2008, Temp. State
Dep't No. o8-66, 2008 U.S.T. LEXIS 26.
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had provided the prior year), and an agreement that provides for the "transfer
of technical knowledge, advice, skills and resources from [the] United States to
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the areas of critical infrastructure protection
and public security, including border protection, civil defense capabilities, and
coast guard and maritime capabilities.""5
The President entered each of the agreements mentioned above and
outlined in Table 1 without express congressional approval. In each case, the
President relied on one of three distinct sources of legal authority.26 The first
source is a preexisting Article II treaty. Treaties frequently outline the broad
scope of an agreement between states but leave the details to be worked out in
later, usually less formal, agreements between their executives. The second
source is the President's sole or "inherent" constitutional authority-often his
power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This is, for example, the
source of authority for many of the status of forces agreements that the
President has negotiated around the world. The third source-and by far the
most commonly used-is a statute passed by Congress delegating to the
President authority to conclude certain kinds of international agreements. 7
There has been significant attention given in the legal literature to the
second category of executive agreements - "sole executive agreements" entered
by the President on his own inherent constitutional authority. And yet,
25. Technical Cooperation Agreement, U.S.-Saudi Arabia, May 16, 20o8, Temp. State Dep't
No. o8-107, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organizatior/io9344.pdf.
26. The form of each international agreement-and the legal basis for that agreement-is
usually determined in the first instance by the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S.
Department of State. The Department is guided by what has become known as the Circular
175 Procedure. U.S. Dep't of State, Circular 175 Procedure, http://www.state.gov/
sA/treaty/c175 (last visited Sept. 14, 2009). The Circular 175 was a 1955 Department of State
circular that prescribed a process for coordination of approval of treaties and other
international agreements. Though still referred to as the "Circular 175 Procedure," the
requirements now appear at 22 C.F.R. § 181.4 (1999), and in 11 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 720 (20o6). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 303 reporters' note 8 (1987) ("The criteria generally used by the Executive
Branch in selecting the form by which an international agreement should be approved, and
the procedures for consulting with Congress as to the choice made, are set forth in Circular
175 .. "). I discuss the Circular 175 procedure-and the great discretion it grants to the
Department of State- in Hathaway, supra note ii, at 1249-52.
27. Agreements concluded pursuant to a statute are generally referred to as ex ante
congressional-executive agreements. The first two types of agreements are generally referred
to as "executive agreements" and "sole executive agreements," respectively. All three types of
agreements are sometimes referred to as "executive agreements" and all three are made by
the executive acting alone.
28. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REv. 1573
(2007); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlement by the
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agreements concluded on the President's own constitutional authority make up
only a small fraction of the executive agreements concluded every year.
Between 199o and 2000, for example, approximately twenty percent of all
executive agreements were sole executive agreements.29 The remaining eighty
percent were congressional-executive agreements.
The majority of the eighty percent of international agreements, in turn, fell
into the third category outlined above. These agreements -which are the
central focus of this Article-are often referred to as "ex ante congressional-
executive agreements," in part to indicate the interbranch cooperation required
to create the agreements. The appellation is arguably a misnomer. It is true that
the President has the power to enter into the agreements only because
Congress has delegated it to him. Yet, as I show in the next Section, the
cooperation typically ends there.
B. Ex Ante Congressional-Executive Agreements
Congressional-executive agreements made by the President on the basis of
authority granted in advance by Congress are the centerpiece of U.S.
international lawmaking. And yet they are little studied and poorly understood.
This Section aims to demystify these agreements, showing when and how they
are created. What emerges from this simple description is a troubling reality:
Congress has given the President unilateral power to make most of the
country's modern international legal commitments. It has done so without
retaining any significant power to oversee the exercise of that delegated power.
Indeed, Congress has little power to reject agreements currently negotiated in
President, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2003). Whether an agreement falls within these bounds
turns on the constitutional allocation of powers between Congress and the President. See
infra Part III.A.2. for a discussion of the limits on the President's inherent constitutional
powers.
29. This is necessarily a rough calculation, as there is no authoritative source that indicates the
authority under which executive agreements are concluded that is available to the public.
The figure here was determined by calculating the total number of agreements with
designations indicating that they are likely to be sole executive agreements (including the
terms Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of Agreement, Understanding(s),
Declaration(s), Agreed Minute(s), Agreed Record, Statement, Letter, Exchange of Notes,
Joint Communiqu6, Acceptance of the Report, Administrative Agreement, Administrative
Arrangement, Agreement Interpreting, Arrangement, Implementing Arrangement, and
Implementing Procedures) concluded between 199o and 2000 (375), and dividing it by the
total number of agreements during this same period (1747). The sources of data are the
Oceana Database, supra note 16 (with corrections). Other estimates suggest the percentage
of sole executive agreements is even smaller. See infra note 125.
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its name and faces significant impediments to reclaiming the power it once
heedlessly abandoned.
The basic legal foundation for each "ex ante" congressional-executive
agreement is quite simple: Congress passes a statute granting the President the
authority to enter into agreements with other nations, usually on a particular
topic or for a particular purpose. The President may then use this authority to
enter into executive agreements that, in most cases, he would otherwise be
unable to enter.
The agreements are generally negotiated by officials in executive agencies
working with their counterparts in other countries. For example, an official in
the Department of Defense, acting on the basis of a statute granting authority
in advance, might negotiate a cross-servicing agreement with her counterpart
in Mexico. Such agreements become binding once signed by an appropriate
representative of each state party. Though the agency officials involved in
conceiving and negotiating the agreement might choose to consult with
Congress, they usually are not required to do so.
The statutes that grant authority to the President to conclude executive
agreements vary a great deal in their specifics but are similar in their basic
structure. Some specifically authorize the President to "negotiate and carry out
agreements with friendly nations or organizations of friendly nations."3 Many
offer more general language that might be read to encompass authority to enter
an international agreement- stating, for example, that the President is
"authorized to furnish ... assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may
determine., 31
To demonstrate how these statutes function, it is helpful to delve more
deeply into a couple of specific subject areas. Let us start with defense, which
Table 1 shows is the most common subject of ex ante congressional-executive
agreements. This broad category encompasses a large range of different types
of agreements: "cross-servicing" agreements; "mutual logistic support"
agreements; agreements "regarding military assistance under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961;" agreements "regarding the status of United States
military personnel;" "military training" agreements; "security agreements" for
30. Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-48o, § lOl, 68
Stat. 454, 455. The above-quoted text has since been amended. The current text authorizes
the President "to provide for the sale of agricultural commodities to developing countries
and private entities for dollars on credit terms, or for local currencies (including for local
currencies on credit terms)." 7 U.S.C. § 1701 (20o6). As a result, agricultural commodities
agreements are now concluded as contracts, rather than as executive agreements.
31. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, sec. 12(b)(1), § 503(a), 87 Stat. 714, 720
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2311(a)).
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the "protection of classified information;" agreements regarding the "exchange
of research and development information;" and "mutual defense" agreements.
Despite their immense variety, nearly all of these agreements were authorized
by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which has since been amended in
subsequent bills and various provisions of National Defense Authorization
Acts.32
Some of the statutes provide very general authorization. For example, a
provision of the Act for International Development of 1961 provides: "The
President is authorized to furnish military assistance on such terms and
conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or international
organization ...by ...acquiring from any source and providing (by loan,
lease, sale, exchange, grant, or any other means) any defense article or defense
service."33 Others are more specific, such as the authorization to engage in
cooperative research and development agreements: "The Secretary of Defense
may enter into a memorandum of understanding (or other formal agreement)
with one or more countries or organizations ... for the purpose of conducting
cooperative research and development projects on defense equipment and
munitions. '34 This authorization further specifies the countries with which the
agreement may be entered, as well as a reporting requirement and other
substantive restrictions.
32. Authority to enter mutual "military assistance," "statuses of military personnel," and
"mutual defense" agreements originates in the Act for International Development of 1961
(Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 503, 75 Stat. 424, 435 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2311). Authority to enter "military education and training"
agreements is more fully outlined in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § lo6(a), 90 Stat. 729,732-34 (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2347, 2347a-b). "Cross servicing agreements" and "research and development
exchange" agreements and other agreements involving weaponry have authority in several
different sources. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and
1991, Pub. L. No. lO1-189, § 931(a)(2), 103 Stat. 1352, 1531 (1989) (codified as amended at io
U.S.C. § 235oa) (authorizing research and development memoranda of understanding, with
"major allies" or "any other friendly foreign country"); id. § 931(c), 103 Stat. at 1534
(codified at io U.S.C. § 235od) (authorizing cooperative logistic support agreements);
Foreign Military Sales Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, § 3, 82 Stat. 1320, 1322-23 (1968) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2753) (authorizing the President to make sales of military articles
under certain conditions); International Security Assistance Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-92,
§ 15, 93 Stat. 701, 706-08 (originally authorizing "cooperative projects" for research and
development with NATO allies and later expanded to non-NATO members by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 1103(a)(1)(D), ioo
Stat. 3816, 3962 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 27676)(1))).
33. Pub. L. No. 87-195, S 503, 75 Stat. 424, 435 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2311).
34. 10 U.S.C. § 235oa(a).
35. Id. § 235oa.
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The authorizing statutes on agriculture are also fairly typical of ex ante
congressional authorizations to the President. Most executive agreements on
agriculture are authorized by the Agriculture Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as updated and amended by subsequent statutes. 6 The
Act gives the President "authoriz[ation] to negotiate and carry out agreements
with friendly nations or organizations of friendly nations to provide for the sale
of surplus agricultural commodities for foreign currencies. 37 It further permits
the President to enter into agreements for various uses of currencies earned
under commodity arrangements." The Act provides for only very limited
congressional oversight over agreements that are negotiated pursuant to its
grants of authority. The President is required to "make a report to Congress
with respect to the activities carried on under this Act at least once each six
months and at such other times as may be appropriate. 39 These statutes are far
from alone. Table 2 lists several others.4 °
36. Pub. L. No. 83-480, § l1-109, 68 Stat. 454, 455-57 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1691-1715). Agricultural commodities agreements may also be authorized under the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 4203, 102 Stat.
1107, 1392 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 5213) ("The President may enter into an agreement with
any country that has a positive trade balance with the United States under which that
country would purchase United States agricultural commodities or products for use in
agreed-on development activities in developing countries.").
37. § iol, 68 Stat. at 455.
38. Id. § 104, 68 Stat. at 456.
39. Id. § 1o8, 68 Star. at 457. Originally, these sections were authorized for only three years. Id.
§ 1O9, 68 Stat. at 457. Today, the basic authorizations are similar, but there is no longer a
time limit on authorization. The current reporting requirements, first enacted by the Act To
Extend the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 85-128,
§ 5, 71 Star. 345, 345 (1957) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1704a), provide that "[w]ithin sixty days
after any agreement is entered into for the use of any foreign currencies, a full report thereon
shall be made to the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States and to
the Committees on Agriculture and Appropriations thereof."
40. This table is merely illustrative and is far from exhaustive.
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Table 2.
SELECTED AUTHORIZING STATUTES FOR EX ANTE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS
PRIMARY* TO A CT * 
Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 194941
Mutual Security Act of 195442
Act for International
Development of 1961
(Foreign Assistance Act of
1961)
4 3
Foreign Military Sales Act of
196844
International Security
Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 19764S
International Security
Assistance Act of 197946
"The President shall, prior to the furnishing of assistance to any
eligible nation, conclude agreements with such nation, or group
of such nations, which agreements, in addition to such other
provisions as the President deems necessary to effectuate the
policies and purposes of this Act and to safeguard the interests
of the United States ...."
No assistance will be supplied to any nation under the Act
unless such nation "shall have agreed to" a variety of conditions.
"The President is authorized to furnish military assistance, on
such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly
country or international organization, the assisting of which the
President finds will strengthen the security of the United States
and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to
receive such assistance ....
Requires an agreement not to transfer defense articles as a
condition of certain military sales.
"The President is authorized to furnish, on such terms and
conditions consistent with this Act as the President may
determine (but whenever feasible on a reimbursable basis),
military education and training to military and related civilian
personnel of foreign countries."
Amends the Arms Export Control Act to establish conditions for
"cooperative projects," defined as "a project described in an
41. Pub. L. No. 81-329, § 402, 63 Stat. 714, 717 (repealed 1954).
42. Pub. L. No. 83-665, § 141, 142, 68 Stat. 832, 839-40 (repealed 1961).
43. Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 503, 75 Stat. 424, 435 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 2311(a)).
44. Pub. L. No. 90-629, § 3, 82 Stat. 1320, 1322 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2753).
45. Pub. L. No. 94-329, sec. 1O6, § 541, 90 Stat. 729, 732 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2347(a)).
46. Pub. L. No. 96-92, § 15, 93 Stat. 701, 7o6-o8 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2767). The
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83,
§ 115(a), 99 Stat. 19o, 199 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2767), displaced these
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National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 198747
National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 199o and 199148
Trade





agreement" with members of NATO.
"The Secretary of Defense may enter into bilateral or
multilateral Weapon System Partnership Agreements ... with
one or more governments of other member countries of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the purpose of
providing cooperative logistics support for the armed forces of
the countries which are parties to the agreements."
"The Secretary of Defense may enter into a memorandum of
understanding (or other formal agreement) with one or more
major allies of the United States for the purpose of conducting
cooperative research and development projects on defense
equipment and munitions" and may enter into bilateral or
multilateral agreements known as Weapon System Partnership
Agreements with one or more governments of other member
countries of [NATO] .... Any such agreement shall be for the
purpose of providing cooperative logistics support for the armed
forces of the countries which are parties to the agreement."
Authorizes the President to negotiate reciprocal trade
agreements with foreign nations.
Authorizes the President to negotiate reciprocal trade
agreements with foreign nations.
provisions with similar provisions permitting the President to enter "a cooperative project
agreement with [NATO] or with one or more member countries." The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, S 1103(a), loo Stat. 3816, 3962
(1986) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2767), further amended this section by
extending it to non-NATO members.
47. Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 1102(a), loo Stat. 3816, 3961 (1986) (codified at lo U.S.C. § 235o(d)).
A few years later, this provision was struck and replaced by similar previsions. See infra note
48 and accompanying text.
48. Pub. L. No. 1O1-189, § 931(a)(2), 103 Stat. 1352, 1531, 1534 (1989) (codified as amended at lo
U.S.C. 5 235oa(a)).
49. Act of Oct. i, 1890, ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612.
So. Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351). The
authority has been revised, extended, and expanded numerous times, including in the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1951, ch. 141, § 3(a), 65 Stat. 72, 72 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. S 1351); and the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-86, §§ 2-3,
5, 69 Stat. 162, 162-65, 166 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351), which further
extended the President's power to enter into trade agreements under section 350 of the
TariffAct of 193o, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590.
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and Food Assistance Act of
197853





Creates, among other things, the so-called "fast track"
negotiating authority.
"Whenever the President determines that it is important to the
advancement of United States interests and necessary in order to
further the purposes of this title, . . . he is authorized to enter
into agreements committing . . . funds authorized to be
appropriated under this title .. "
Addresses debt-relief agreements.
"The Secretary of State is authorized, in consultation with other
appropriate Government officials, to enter into an Americas
Framework Agreement with any eligible country concerning the
operation and use of the Americas Fund for that country."
Grants the President authority to reduce the amount of debt
owed the United States, to engage in debt-for-nature swaps and
debt buybacks, and to enter into tropical forest agreements with
eligible countries.
51. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 101-103, 105, 151-154, 88 Star. 1978, 1982, 1984, 20Ol-O8 (1975)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). The authority under this act was
extended, among other times, in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573,
§ 307(a), 98 Stat. 2948, 3012, which expanded "the term 'international trade"' to include
"(A) trade in both goods and services, and (B) foreign direct investment by United States
persons, especially if such investment has implications for trade in goods and services;" and
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1101, 93 Stat. 144, 307. The Trade
Act of 20o2 extended and conditioned the fast track authority. Pub. L. No. 107-210, §§ 2103-
2105, 116 Stat. 933, 1004-16 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3803-38o5).
52. Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 202(b), 75 Stat. 424, 426-27 (repealed 1978).
53. Pub. L. No. 95-424, S 6o3(a)(2), 92 Stat. 937, 96o-61 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2395a(2)). Portions of the Act were repealed by the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, 5 734(a), 95 Stat. 1519, 156o, but
section 6o3(a)(2) remains unchanged at 22 U.S.C. § 2395a(2).
S4. Pub. L. No. 102-549, § 602(a), io6 Stat. 3651, 3667 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2430-2430i).
55- Pub. L. No. 105-214, § 1, 112 Stat. 885, 887-93 (1998) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2 4 3 1-24 3 ik)-




















"The Postal Service, with the consent of the President, may
negotiate and conclude postal treaties or conventions, and may
establish the rates of postage or other charges on mail matter
conveyed between the United States and other countries."
Provides the President with authority to, among other things,
"negotiate and carry out agreements with friendly nations ...
for the sale of surplus agricultural commodities."
"The President may enter into an agreement with any country
that has a positive trade balance with the United States under
which that country would purchase United States agricultural
commodities or products for use in agreed-on development
activities in developing countries."
Authorizes the President to recommend international atomic
energy agreements, which would enter into force thirty days
after the President submits the agreement to Congress.
"The President is authorized to furnish assistance on such terms
and conditions as he may determine in order to promote the
economic development of less developed friendly countries and
areas ....
56. Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 2, 84 Stat. 719, 724 (1970) (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 407).
This Act was amended in 1998 and 2006 to add details to the delegation of authority and
shift negotiating authority to the Secretary of State.
57- Pub. L. No. 83-480, §§ l1-109, 68 Stat. 454, 455-57 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
5§ 1701-1715).
58. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 4 20 3 (b), 102 Stat. 1107, 1392 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 5213).
s9. Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 123, 68 Stat. 919, 940 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2153).
Amendments in 1958, 1964, 1974, 1978, and 1985 altered, among other things, the reporting
requirements. The regulations now provide for a waiting period of sixty days during which
Congress may adopt a joint resolution of disapproval. 42 U.S.C. § 215 3 (d).
6o. Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 211(a), 75 Stat. 424, 427-28 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2151t).




















Authorization Act of 19726
"Arrangements may be made by the President with other
countries for reimbursement to the United States Government
or other sharing of the cost of performing such functions."
"The President shall make suitable arrangements for protecting
the interests of the United States Government in connection
with any guaranty issued under section 221(b), including
arrangements with respect to the ownership, use, and
disposition of the currency, credits, assets, or investment on
account of which payment under such guaranty is to be made,
and any right, title, claim, or cause of action existing in
connection therewith."
"The President is authorized to enter into agreements with
foreign governments and international organizations, in
furtherance of the purposes of this Act."
Authorizes funding for the Global Learning and Observations
To Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) program.
"[T]he President is authorized to conclude agreements with
other countries to facilitate control of the production,
processing, transportation, and distribution of narcotic
analgesics ... "
61. Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 62 5(h), 75 Stat. 424, 451 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2385).
62. Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 221, 75 Stat 424, 430. These provisions were omitted by the revisions of
these sections in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175, § 1O5, 83 Stat. 805,
807-18, repealed by Internal Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
424, 92 Stat. 937, which created the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which was in
turn granted authority to make arrangements with foreign governments relating to
insurance for investments abroad. This authority was amended and extended several times.
63. Pub. L. No. 87-256, § 103, 75 Stat. 527, 529 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2453).
64. Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 201(a), 11o Stat. 26, 34-35 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.). This Act provides authorization for the GLOBE program, but the
agreements themselves appear to be authorized through the Mutual Educational and
Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, § 103, 75 Stat. at 529.
65. Pub. L. No. 92-352, § 503, 86 Stat. 489, 496 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(2)).






Act for Fiscal 198767
Environment
International Development
and Food Assistance Act of
681977
Special Foreign Assistance
Act of 1986 69
Fisheries
Fishery Conservation and





Authorizes the President to "enter into, perform, and modify
contracts and agreements and otherwise cooperate with any
agency of the United States Government or of any State or any
subdivision thereof, other governments and departments and
agencies thereof."
"The Secretary of Defense may authorize the Defense Mapping
Agency to exchange or furnish mapping, charting, and geodetic
data, supplies and services to a foreign country or international
organization pursuant to an agreement for the production or
exchange of such data."
"The President is authorized to furnish assistance under this
part for developing and strengthening the capacity of less
developed countries to protect and manage their environment
and natural resources."
"The Administrator of the Agency for International
Development shall ... whenever possible, enter into long-term
agreements in which the recipient country agrees to protect
ecosystems or other wildlife habitats recommended for
protection by relevant governmental or nongovernmental
organizations ......
Authorizes and outlining process for concluding "international
fishery agreements"
"The President may furnish assistance ...to countries and
organizations, including national and regional institutions, in
66. Pub. L. No. 87-293, § lo(a), 75 Stat. 612, 617 (1961) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2509(a)).
67. Pub. L. No. 99-569, § 6o1(a), OO Stat. 3190, 3202 (1986) (codified as amended at 1O U.S.C.
§ 454).
68. Pub. L. No. 95-88, S 113(a), 91 Stat. 533, 538 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 215 1p(b)).
69. Pub. L. No. 99-529, § 302, 1OO Stat. 3010, 3018 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 215iq(g)). In addition, the agreements entered under the GLOBE, a science and education
program, might be considered environmental agreements. See supra note 64.
70. Pub. L. No. 94-265, §§ 202-203, 90 Stat. 331, 339-42 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1822, 1823).




Governance Act of 200072
Customs
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
198673
Maritime Matters




Space Act of 195875
Energy
International Development
and Food Assistance Act of
197576
order to strengthen the administration of justice in countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean."
"The President is authorized to establish programs that combat
corruption, improve transparency and accountability, and
promote other forms of good governance in countries [eligible
to receive aid]."
"The Secretary may by regulation authorize customs officers to
exchange information or documents with foreign customs and
law enforcement agencies if the Secretary reasonably believes the
exchange of information is necessary [for particular listed
purposes]."
"The President is authorized and encouraged to... enter into
negotiations and conclude and execute agreements with
neighboring nations [regarding international vessel traffic and
services]."
"The Administration, under the foreign policy guidance of the
President, may engage in a program of international cooperation
in work done pursuant to this Act .... "
"The President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms
and conditions as he may determine, for [certain technical
assistance, energy, research, reconstruction, and selected
development programs]."
The delegations of authority by Congress to the President to create ex ante
executive agreements vary significantly.77 Yet there are a few common elements
71. Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 712, 99 Stat. 19o, 244 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C 2346c).
72. Pub. L. No. 106-309, 5 205(a), 114 Stat. 1078, 1092 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2152c).
73. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 5 3127, loo Stat. 3207, 3207-89 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1628).
74. Pub. L. No. 95-474, § 2, 92 Stat. 1471, 1477 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 5 1230).
75. Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 205, 72 Stat. 426, 432 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 5 2475).
76. Pub. L. No. 94-161, § 3o6(2), 89 Star. 849, 858-59 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 215 1(d)).
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worth noting. First, the authorizations are often extremely broad and usually
contain no time limits. This is in part due to the nature of the enterprise: the
statutes are intended to authorize agreements that have not yet been created
and hence are understandably kept broad to give negotiators flexibility. As a
result, many of the authorizations provide relatively few specific substantive
limits. Moreover, few contain any time limit or "sunset" provision. As long as
the statute remains in effect, so too does the delegation of authority to the
President.
Second, the authorizations generally provide for little ongoing
congressional oversight over the agreements that result. The statutes rarely
require anything more than a report from the President to Congress containing
the text of an agreement after it has gone into effect. There is a blanket
reporting requirement under a 1972 law known as the Case-Zablocki Act,7
8
which was expressly aimed to "restor[e] a proper working relationship
between the Congress and the executive branch in the field of foreign affairs. ' 79
The Act requires that all international agreements that are not submitted to the
Senate for advice and consent be submitted to Congress no later than sixty
days after they enter into force. 8o Unfortunately, this requirement provides
Congress with little real power over ex ante congressional-executive
agreements. The sixty-day reporting deadline is regularly violated without
consequence, primarily because agencies that initiate agreements fail to report
them to the State Department in sufficient time. Indeed, roughly one-third of
the agreements reported in 2007 were reported late."1 Even if they are reported
77. There are, of course, exceptions to the generalizations I make below. There are some areas in
which Congress closely confines the international lawmaking authority it grants to the
President. Where Congress does so, its power may even be as significant as it is in cases
where it retains the power to approve agreements after the fact.
78. Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972) (codified as amended at i U.S.C. § 112b); see also
Executive Agreements, 28 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 619, 619-21 (1972) (discussing Case-Zablocki
Act and its purposes); Executive Agreements: A Growing Issue in 1972, 28 CONG. Q. ALMANAC
158, 158-6o (1972) (same). Congress was concerned in particular about secret arrangements
for military bases in Spain at the time it passed it passed Case-Zablocki.
79. Executive Agreements, supra note 78, at 621 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-1301 (1972)).
80. 1 U.S.C. S 112b(a).
81. The list of agreements reported to Congress in 2007 under the Case-Zablocki Act is listed on
the website of the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State. Reporting
International Agreements to Congress Under the Case Act (texts of Agreements),
http://www.state.gov/s/I/treaty/caseact/2007 (last visited Oct. 10, 2009) [hereinafter
Reporting International Agreements]. The list includes notations regarding agreements
reported after the reporting deadline.
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on time, agreements are not reported until after they have already entered into
force. 82
Finally, Congress generally has no power-short of passing a law or,
occasionally, a joint resolution -to reject the agreements that are reported to it.
Even if opponents of an agreement were to muster majority votes in both
houses of Congress to overturn an agreement, the result of their efforts would
likely meet with a presidential veto.
In short, for quite some time, Congress has been in the business of giving
away power to the President to create international agreements. Its grants of
authority vary in their specificity but are commonly quite broad. Congress
generally learns of the specifics of the agreements created using its delegated
authority only after the agreements have entered into force. And if Congress
were to object to an agreement, it would have no recourse short of a majority
vote in each house, subject to veto by the President, to undo an international
commitment made using its delegated authority. Even then, Congress would
only be able to render the agreement unenforceable under U.S. domestic law-
the binding international commitment would remain.
All of this raises a deep puzzle about U.S. international lawmaking: why is
power over international lawmaking so imbalanced? Why, in particular, has
Congress relinquished so much power to the President to make nearly all of the
United States's international commitments, unfettered by effective
congressional oversight? To answer these questions, the next Part traces the
growth of executive power over international lawmaking in the United States
during the course of two centuries.
II. LOOKING BACK: THE HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENT'S POWER
OVER INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING IN THE UNITED STATES
The imbalance in international lawmaking just described has not always
existed. It is not an essential or necessary feature of the American legal and
political landscape. The President need not-and did not until recently-
exercise extensive unilateral control over international lawmaking in the United
States. To understand why today's international lawmaking is so imbalanced,
it is, therefore, necessary to understand how and why it has changed over the
more than two hundred years since the country's founding.83
82. As executive agreements, the agreements generally enter into force upon the signature of the
legal representatives of the parties to the agreement.
83. For another perspective on this history, focusing in particular on the evolution of what he
calls the "National Security Constitution" and the interactions among the branches of
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Examining history shows us that the prevalence of executive agreements is
a relatively new phenomenon in U.S. international lawmaking. In the 194os,
the President began making unilateral international law on a scale never before
seen. The collapse of Europe, the creation of the United Nations, and the
newfound leadership of the United States in the world community generated
increased demand for international lawmaking by the United States. In
response, Congress began delegating more and more authority to the President
to make international agreements. Although some in Congress made efforts to
rein in the President's power, those efforts proved to be too little, too late, and
were unable to stem the tide.
The transformation in U.S. international lawmaking may appear to have
taken place over a relatively short period following the Second World War. But
the stage was set decades earlier. This Part shows that over the course of more
than two centuries, Congress incrementally handed over unilateral power to
the President to make most of our international law, while paying little or no
attention to the long-term consequences of its decisions. Individual members
of Congress would have been unlikely to detect the effect of these decisions on
the authority of the institution. Indeed, each decision to cede power had
relatively little impact on its own. And yet the collective effect over the course
of more than two centuries was to erode congressional oversight of
international agreements.
The Supreme Court, moreover, did nothing to halt the slide toward
presidential unilateralism. At every opportunity, it gave the green light to
congressional delegations of authority to the President. Its decision in the early
198os to prohibit the use of the legislative veto deprived Congress of the one
formal mechanism it still possessed for limiting presidential power over
international lawmaking. That decision, together with Congress's resigned
response to it, sealed the transformation that had begun in the 189os and gave
us the imbalance of power in international lawmaking that exists in the United
States today.
government that made the Iran-Contra affair possible, see HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
(1990).
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A. The Founding Era Through the New Deal: Setting the Legal and Political
Stage for Transformation
The New Deal period is often cited as a transformative moment in
domestic law. 84 Less well understood is the transformation of U.S.
international lawmaking during this same period. As others have shown, ex
post congressional-executive agreements are largely an invention of the New
Deal period.8" Even more important, however, is the less noticed emergence of
ex ante congressional-executive agreements as the centerpiece of U.S.
international lawmaking during this period.
To understand how and why the New Deal period changed the way
international law was made in the United States, this Section examines
international law practice leading up to the New Deal. This examination
reveals that during the first one hundred years of the country's existence, the
President's role in international lawmaking was heavily constrained. With very
few exceptions, unilateral international lawmaking by the President was
unheard of. The structural changes that took place during the 1930s and early
1940s made possible the President-centered process of international lawmaking
that we have today. But the transformation did not happen without warning:
the stage was set many decades earlier.
An examination of the early period of U.S. international lawmaking reveals
three key points. First, the way the United States makes international law
today looks nothing like the way it was made in the first one hundred years of
the country's existence. Most of the Founders would have almost certainly been
aghast at the unilateral power wielded by the President today. Second,
although the numbers of ex ante congressional-executive agreements remained
very small up until the New Deal, the legal and political foundation for the
explosive growth in such agreements is found much earlier. Third, Congress
and the Supreme Court are at least as responsible for the growth of unilateral
presidential power as is the President. Congress began the process by
delegating authority to the President to make some limited international
agreements on his own, and the Supreme Court repeatedly rejected challenges
to the delegation. Together, these decisions made possible an expansion of
84. Most notable is Bruce Ackerman's work, especially i BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998);
and, in the area of international lawmaking (in particular, the emergence of ex post
congressional-executive agreements), BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOvE, Is NAFTA
CONSTITUTIONAL? (1995).
85. ACKERMAN &GOLOVE, supra note 84, at 61-96.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
presidential lawmaking authority in the international arena almost half a
century later.
From the Founding of the country through the New Deal period of the
early 1930s, executive agreements were used in only very limited circumstances.
The forms of executive agreement that exist today-agreements entered under
the President's sole executive authority, authorized by treaty, or authorized by
statute-existed during this earliest period, but they were in each case radically
more circumscribed than they are today. Used infrequently, and in only very
limited circumstances, the executive agreement in all its forms was a minor
feature of international lawmaking in the United States. The President was
able to use international agreements outside the Article II treaty process, but
the mechanism for doing so was limited and controlled. As a result, Congress
remained a full and equal player in the international lawmaking process even
when such agreements were used.
An early exchange between Congress and the President over the President's
authority to conclude international agreements on his own authority is telling.
In 1818, President James Monroe concluded an agreement through an exchange
of notes with Great Britain limiting the naval forces that would be maintained
on the Great Lakes. The two countries had exchanged notes agreeing to the
arrangement, but the President had not formally consulted Congress or
obtained its approval of the agreement. Congress had three years earlier passed
a statute allowing the President to remove all "armed vessels" from the lakes.86
On the basis of that statutory authority, the President treated the agreement as
immediately effective and not requiring congressional consent. Recognizing
that his authority to conclude the agreement without the consent of Congress
was tenuous, however, the President shortly thereafter submitted a copy of the
correspondence to the Senate with a note requesting the consideration of
"whether this is such an arrangement as the Executive is competent to enter
into, by the powers vested in it by the Constitution"'s or whether he instead
ought to submit the arrangement to the Senate under the Article II treaty
clause. The Senate responded with a resolution consenting to the arrangement
("two-thirds of the Senators present concurring"), and recommended "that the
same be carried into effect by the President."88 In this way, Congress
86. Act of Feb. 27, 1815, ch. 62, 5 4, 3 Stat. 217, 217 ("[T]he President... is authorized to cause
all the armed vessels thereof on the lakes ... to be sold or laid up, as he may judge most
conducive to the public interest .... ).
87. Letter from James Monroe, President of the United States, to the United States Senate,
reprinted in 3 SENATE ExECUTIVE J. 132 (Apr. 6, 1818).
88. The exchange is detailed in SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND
ENFORCEMENT 85-86 (1904). It is also discussed in detail, and appears with accompanying
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responded to this early attempt by the President to create an executive
agreement by reasserting Congress's power and authority to expressly consent
to such agreements.
Up through the early 19oos, constitutional experts widely agreed that the
President had the power to enter international agreements without the
approval of the Senate under only three limited circumstances 8 : () where the
agreement rested on his power as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of
the army and navy, 9" (2) where the power was delegated to him by the Senate
through an Article II treaty, 9' and (3) where the power was granted him by
documents, in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 645-54 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) [hereinafter TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTS].
89. HUGH EVANDER WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 437-38 (1936); 1
WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 467-
68 (1910).
go. There were two types of agreements concluded by the President on his own authority
during this period: claims settlements and provisional or temporary agreements. The first-
agreements settling particular claims or cases by the United States or a U.S. citizen against a
foreign government or foreign citizen-were the most numerous. There were more than one
hundred such agreements. See 1-9 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note
88; Hathaway, supra note 11, at 1290. Notably, sole executive agreements were used for
claims settlements only when the United States or a U.S. citizen was the recipient of foreign
funds. Agreements in which United States might have to pay money were almost universally
concluded as Article II treaties. See, e.g., Treaty for Final Settlement of Claims of Hudson's
Bay Company and Puget's Sound Agricultural Company, U.S.-Gr. Brit., July 1, 1863, in 8
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 949, 951 (providing that sums
of money awarded "shall be paid by the one Government to the other" and concluded as an
Article II treaty). The second type of agreement concluded by the President on his own
authority during this period was an agreement that created explicitly provisional or
temporary international obligations. There were only two such agreements: (1) Cartel for
the Exchange of Prisoners of War, U.S.-Gr. Brit., May 12, 1813, in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 557 (ratified by Secretary of State James Monroe on
May 14, 1813), a "provisional agreement" that was not submitted to Congress for ratification
but was superseded a year and a half later by the Treaty of Ghent, Treaty of Ghent, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., Dec. 24, 1814, in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 574;
and (2) Joint Occupation of San Juan Island, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Oct. 25, 1859-Mar. 23, 186o, in 8
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 281, which involved an
exchange of letters between representatives of the United States and Great Britain over a
temporary settlement of the question of occupation of San Juan Island. There were several
unsuccessful subsequent attempts at a more permanent agreement. The arrangement finally
came to an end in 1872, when the British withdrew the remaining troops in accordance with
the Treaty of Washington.
91. Between 1789 and 1863, there were six such executive agreements. Adjustment of the Dillon
Case, U.S.-Fr., Aug. 3 and 7, 1855, in 7 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra
note 88, at 147 (relating to adjustment made to address a dispute that arose out of different
interpretations of an earlier consular convention between the two countries); Declaration of
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statute (including, most notably, agreements on postal matters 2 and
agreements with island nations surrounding the United States"3 ). These
Accession to the Stipulations Contained in the Convention with Russia of July 22, 1854,
U.S.-Nicar., June 9, 1855, in 7 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at
139; Declaration of Accession to the Stipulations and Provisions of the Treaty with Hanover
of June io, 1846, U.S.-Germanic Confederation, Mar. 1O, 1847, in 5 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 161; Declaration of the Commissioners Under
Article 6 of the Treaty of Ghent, U.S.-Gr. Brit., June 18, 1822, in 3 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 65; Decision of the Commissioners Under Article 4
of the Treaty of Ghent, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 24, 1817, in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 655 (specifying borders); Declaration of the
Commissioners Under Article 5 of the Jay Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Oct. 25, 1798, in 2 TREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 430 (locating the St. Croix River).
92. Such agreements were primarily used to manage international mail carriage. The first
authorizing legislation, passed by Congress in 1792, provided that "the Postmaster General
may make arrangements with the postmasters in any foreign country for the reciprocal
receipt and delivery of letters and packets, through the post-offices." Act of Feb. zo, 1792, ch.
7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239. This provision remained the foundation of U.S. international law on
postal matters until the Treaty of Berne rendered bilateral postal agreements almost
unnecessary. There appears, moreover, to have been little or no controversy about this
provision, largely because it was regarded as sui generis. In 189 o , for example, then-Solicitor
General William Howard Taft wrote in response to a question about the legality of such an
agreement that,
[f] rom the foundation of the Government to the present day.., the Constitution
has been interpreted to mean that the power vested in the President to make
treaties, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, does not exclude the
right of Congress to vest in the Postmaster-General power to conclude
conventions with foreign governments for the cheaper, safer, and more
convenient carriage of foreign mails.
19 Op. Att'y Gen. 513, 520 (1890).
93. Agreement Made by the Sultan of Sulu at Sooung (Jolo), U.S.-Sulu, Feb. 5, 1842, in 4
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 349 ("for the purpose of
encouraging trade"); Commercial Regulations, U.S.-Fiji, June lo, 1840, in 4 TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 275; Commercial Regulations, U.S.-Samoa,
Nov. 5, 1839, in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 241, 244 ("In
any technical sense it would perhaps not be possible to say that these regulations, signed by
the chiefs of the Samoan Islands, were an international act, although at the time Samoa was
not at all subject to any extrinsic authority .... Strict consistency perhaps would not permit
the inclusion of such a document in this collection; but the historical interest of the paper is
sufficient to warrant the exception, if it be an exception."); Articles of Arrangement with the
King of the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii), U.S.-Haw., Dec. 23, 1826, in 3 TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 269; Articles Agreed on with the King,
Council, and Head Men of Tahiti, U.S.-Tahiti, Sept. 6, 1826, in 3 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 249, 250 ("promoting the commercial intercourse
and friendship subsisting between the respective nations"). These agreements were
generally regarded as morally but not legally binding. See, e.g., Articles of Arrangement with
the King of the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii), supra at 274 (quoting a report noting that
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powers were, moreover, used exceedingly sparingly, perhaps in part because it
was understood that they would "bind only the President and those with
whose approval they were made and not the United States as a whole.
9 4
There were none of the broad, open-ended, time unlimited grants of
authority from Congress to the President that we find today. Indeed, there was
an almost complete absence of legislation delegating authority to the President
to conclude such agreements. The only statutes authorizing the President to
negotiate agreements were those authorizing postal agreements, naval
expeditions to neighboring island nations, the annexation of Texas, and the
resettlement of persons delivered from on board interdicted slave ships.9 As a
result, Article II treaties -which required the formal consent of two-thirds of
the Senate -remained the primary method of international lawmaking by the
United States. The President was unable to make law without the full and
equal participation of Congress. But as the country entered the twentieth
century, that would all begin to change.
The transformation of international lawmaking has its origins in the
McKinley Tariff Act of 1890,96 which was seen by many as a protectionist
measure because it raised tariffs on dutiable imports by just over seven
percent. 97 Little noticed, however, was a new provision that allowed the
President to negotiate reciprocal agreements with foreign nations. That new
provision would become the seed of change in U.S. international lawmaking.
The McKinley Act granted the President a license to negotiate agreements with
foreign countries to reduce tariffs without seeking congressional approval of
the agreements. 98 A slew of agreements followed, as did a challenge to the Act
"although it was never ratified by this Government, certain of its stipulations . .. were
considered morally binding by both parties"). There were only two other congressional-
executive agreements during the period before 1863. Colonization Agreement, U.S.-Den.,
July 19, 1862, in 8 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 833
(authorized by Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 197, 12 Stat. 592, which was later reissued in The
Slave-Trade tit. 7, 1 Rev. Stat. 1082 § 5568-69 (1875), providing for resettlement on St.
Croix of persons seized in the slave trade); Annexation of Texas, U.S.-Tex., Mar. 1-Dec. 29,
1845, in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 88, at 689 (approved by a
joint resolution of Congress on March 1, 1845).
94. WILLIS, supra note 89, at 438. As a consequence, "there was no breach of faith on the part of
the United States when a succeeding President or a secretary of state canceled such
agreements." Id.
95. These statutes are cited supra notes 92-93.
96. Act of Oct. 1, 189o, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567.
97. The bill raised tariffs on dutiable imports from "an average of 45.1 to 48.4 percent," for a
7.3% increase. DAVID A. LAKE, POWER, PROTECTION, AND FREE TRADE: INTERNATIONAL
SOURCES OF U.S. COMMERCIAL STRATEGY, 1887-1939, at 1OO (1988).
98. Id. at loo-ol.
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in court. The challenge eventually reached the Supreme Court, which gave the
Act - and the agreements that stemmed from it - its blessing. The Court agreed
that it was "vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution" that Congress not "delegate legislative power to
the President."99 Yet it disagreed that the McKinley Act did so. "It does not,"
the Court held, "in any real sense, invest the President with the power of
legislation. 00 Rather, the McKinley Act simply required the President to
ascertain the existence of relevant facts and to declare the event upon which
Congress's will would take effect.' °' On these questionable grounds, the Court
concluded that "[n]othing involving the expediency or the just operation of
[the Act] was left to the determination of the President.""1 2
The reciprocity provision-which now had the Supreme Court's blessing-
reappeared again and again in trade legislation. 10 3 In 1934, following the
collapse of world trade, the policy of reciprocity became the new centerpiece of
American foreign trade policy. The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
(RTAA) built on the principle of reciprocity established in the McKinley Act of
189o but it granted far greater authority. Unlike earlier legislation, the RTAA
99. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
loO. Id.
loi. Statutes requiring presidential fact-finding had a long history. In 1815, for example,
Congress passed a statute requiring the President to determine whether foreign nations had
in place duties that discriminated against the United States. When the President found no
discriminatory duties from a foreign nation, he was to issue a proclamation repealing U.S.
duties against vessels from that nation and the products they carried. Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch.
77, 3 Stat. 224; see CRANDALL, supra note 88, at 88-89. This Act and its successors were cited
by the Court as direct precedent for the McKinley Tariff Act of 189o. Field, 143 U.S. at 685-
92.
102. Field, 143 U.S. at 693. The dissenters, Justice Lamar and Chief Justice Fuller, were less
sanguine. They concluded that "the section in question does delegate legislative power to
the executive department, and also commits to that department matters belonging to the
treaty-making power, in violation of . . . the Constitution." Id. at 697 (Lamar, J.,
dissenting). The majority's reasoning in Field v. Clark echoes in the Court's opinion in
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, which involved a challenge to a delegation of power to
the Environmental Protection Agency to promulgate air quality standards. There the Court
stated that the "text [of Article I] permits no delegation of [legislative] powers." 531 U.S.
457, 472 (2001). On this view, when Congress delegates authority to the executive, it does
not delegate "legislative power" at all; it simply "'lay[s] down ... an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform."' Id. (quoting J.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
103. Most notably, the Dingley Act of 1897, which also survived a challenge in the Supreme
Court. See B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
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was not limited to a small set of goods. '°4 It authorized President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt to negotiate executive agreements to reduce tariffs by up to
fifty percent on a wide array of goods - a charge he eagerly took up. By the time
the authority was up for renewal three years later, the country had already
concluded agreements with sixteen countries. '
From the area of trade, the principle of congressionally authorized
executive agreements slowly expanded into other areas of law, beginning with
copyrights and trademark. In the following decades, there emerged statutes
permitting the creation of ex ante congressional-executive agreements on not
only tariffs, but postal matters, copyrights, and trademarks as well.
' 6
Although sole executive agreements and Article II treaties continued to be
made, they were both increasingly eclipsed by ex ante congressional-executive
agreements. 1 o
7
Viewed from the perspective of the early 1930s, Congress's decision to
relinquish immense discretionary power over international trade to the
President is easy to understand. In the immediately preceding years, the
country had fallen into a spiral of increasingly protectionist policies
104. Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (2006)).
Notably, there were some important limits on the President in the Act. There were, to begin
with, opportunities for public comment: "[Full opportunity is given the business
community and the general public to present their views, either orally or in writing, to a
special interdepartmental committee established for that specific purpose .... All interested
persons have opportunity to be heard." Lynn R. Edminster, Chief Econ. Analyst, Div. of
Trade Agreements, The Trade-Agreements Program and Our Foreign Trade, Address at the
Good Neighbor League (July 20, 1936), in 15 DEP'T ST. PRESS RELEASES 49, 50-51 (1936)
(describing grant of authority).
1os. Lynn R. Edminster, Chief Econ. Analyst, Div. of Trade Agreements, The Trade-Agreements
Program in Retrospect and Prospect, Address at the Second Institute on International
Problems (Mar. 13, 1937), in 16 DEP'T ST. PRESS RELEASES 142, 143 (1937). The authority was
subsequently renewed again in 1937, 1940, and 1943.
1o6. These three areas are cited in WILLIS, supra note 89, at 438; and WILLOUGHBY, supra note
89, at 477.
107. Sole executive agreements were used in cases where the agreement was within the
President's sole executive power and in cases where the agreement would be temporary. In
addition, sole executive agreements that laid out the terms of future agreement negotiations
became common. See CRANDAul, supra note 88, at 87-88. It appears that sole executive
agreements continued to be regarded as binding only on the Presidents who made them. As
late as 1920, President Theodore Roosevelt wrote that a treaty was preferable to an executive
agreement created "merely by a direction of the Chief Executive, which would lapse when
that particular executive left office." ACKEvlAN & GOLOVE, supra note 84, at 19 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt). This may help explain the apparent preference for
ex ante congressional-executive agreements, which have always been regarded as continuing
in effect past the conclusion of an individual presidency, during this period.
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culminating in the now-notorious Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930- an Act that
raised tariffs on imported goods to record levels and in the process likely
deepened the Great Depression that followed. °8 The RTAA was a repudiation
of the congressional logrolling that had led to Smoot-Hawley. Congress would
tie itself to the mast by handing relatively unfettered control over international
trade agreements to the President, who was regarded as more insulated from
the protectionist interests that held sway in Congress."°9 Apparently, little
thought was given to the broader long-term effects that the grant of authority
could have on the power of Congress to influence international lawmaking
beyond trade agreements.
The grant of authority from Congress to the President in the RTAA
coincided, moreover, with a broader growth of executive power during the
193os and increasing delegation of authority from Congress to the President.
This broader trend initially met resistance in the courts, which developed what
is often referred to as the nondelegation doctrine. Twice in 1935-the year after
the passage of the RTAA-the Supreme Court struck down a statute as an
unconstitutional delegation.' The first of the two cases involved a delegation
of authority to the President not so different from that found in the RTAA."'
lo8. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Star. 590.
log. Proponents emphasized the special features of the Act to justify the unprecedented
delegation of international lawmaking authority to the President: "In enacting the Trade
Agreements Act the presumption is that Congress was... mindful of the log-rolling process
which makes it almost impossible for Congress itself to revise the tariff in any direction
except upward." Edminster, supra note 104, at 51-52.
11o. Both involved the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA), passed as part of
President Roosevelt's famous first one hundred days in office, and the first of the two
involved a delegation of authority over foreign policymaking. The Act permitted
representatives of labor and management to design codes of "fair competition" in order to
stabilize wages and prices and thereby restore confidence in the economy. Act of 1933, Pub.
L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195, 196-97.
ill. The second-and more famous-case invalidating a statute as an unconstitutional
delegation came only a few months after the first. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, involved a challenge to the "Live Poultry Code," which had been approved by the
President under authority granted to him in the NIRA to approve "codes of fair
competition." 295 U.S. 495, 521-22 (1935). Schechter Poultry challenged the Act on the ground
that it impermissibly delegated authority. The Court agreed, holding that the delegation to
the President of authority to approve the codes was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power: "Instead of prescribing rules of conduct," it explained, the statute
"authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them." Id. at 541. In the process, "the discretion
of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the
government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered." Id. at
542.
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In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,"1 2 the Court invalidated a provision of the
National Industrial Recovery Act that authorized the President to prohibit "the
transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum ... produced
. ..in excess of the amount permitted to be produced... by any state law,.. 3
because it allowed the President to make law outside the constitutional
process. 1
4
Almost as soon as it emerged, however, the nondelegation doctrine began
to fall into disuse, a casualty of the New Deal transformation brought about by
President Roosevelt. A 1937 challenge to the use of executive agreements in
place of Article II treaties as an unconstitutional delegation of congressional
authority reached a newly unsympathetic Supreme Court in the immediate
aftermath of the famous "switch in time that saved nine." ''1 The case, United
States v. Belmont, n 6 involved a challenge to an executive agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union that assigned to the U.S. government all
claims against U.S. nationals as if it were a treaty. The Court answered the
challenge to the agreement by giving its blessing to the agreement. The Court
112. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
113. Id. at 406 (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act, § 9, 48 Stat. at 200).
114. Plaintiffs argued that this portion of the Act constituted an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, because it purported to "authorize the President to pass a prohibitory
law." Id. at 414. The Court held that the delegation established "no criterion to govern the
President's course" and "declares no policy as to the transportation of the excess
production." Id. at 415. It continued, "[s]o far as this section is concerned, it gives to the
President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or
not to lay it down, as he may see fit." Id. Hence it was not simply the delegation of authority
to the President to permit or prohibit the transportation of petroleum that the Court found
inconsistent with the Constitution; it was that the exercise of that delegated authority was
entirely unconstrained and unguided by Congress. In the process of striking down the
delegation as unconstitutional, the Court was careful to distinguish Field v. Clark on the
grounds that the act at issue in that case had severely constrained the authority delegated to
the President. The Court noted that although it had upheld the delegation of authority to
the President in that case, it had "emphatically declared that the principle that 'Congress
cannot delegate legislative power to the President' is 'universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."' Id.
at 425-26 (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)). The Act provided that the
suspension of duty-free importation of certain goods "'was absolutely required when the
President ascertained the existence of a particular fact."' Id. at 426 (quoting Field, 143 U.S. at
693). As such, the President did not have legislative authority; he instead was as the Court
said in Field v. Clark, "'the mere agent of the law-making department."' Id. (quoting Field,
143 U.S. at 693).
115. The "switch in time that saved nine" is often used to refer to the shift by Justice Owen J.
Roberts in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), to uphold a minimum wage
law in the wake of President Roosevelt's announcement of a court-packing bill.
116. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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pointed out that it had earlier upheld the Tariff Act of 1897, which had
authorized the President to conclude commercial agreements with foreign
countries. 17 The decision in Belmont, together with a similar decision a few
years later in United States v. Pink,"8 was read as giving the Court's stamp of
approval to the extensive use of executive agreements. 9 Their legal foundation
firmly in place, executive agreements were poised to become the centerpiece of
international law in the United States.'
20
With the support of a Democratic Congress, President Roosevelt took
advantage of this new and growing authority.12 ' The 1941 Lend-Lease Act
117. Id. at 331 (citing B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912)). The Court
interestingly failed to note an exceedingly important difference between the two cases. The
agreement at issue in Altman had been entered into by the President with the express
advance consent of Congress, whereas the agreement at issue in Belmont was a "sole"
executive agreement entered by the President on his own constitutional authority without
any congressional involvement. The backlash against the nondelegation doctrine is also
strikingly evident in a case decided in 1936, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936), where the Supreme Court held that a joint resolution of Congress
authorizing the President to determine whether to place an embargo on the sale of arms and
munitions to belligerents in Bolivia was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to the President. That case, however, did not involve any international agreements.
118. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
i19. See Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664, 68o-
83 (1944) (criticizing the use of these decisions to justify the broad use of executive
agreements).
12o. The general acceptance of ex ante congressional-executive agreements by the late 1930s is
evident from a discussion of the agreements in the 1937 American Society of International
Law Annual Meeting, where Charles Cheney Hyde explained that "[o]n frequent occasions
the action of the Congress has smoothed the way for the Executive, by enabling him to enter
into arrangements contemplating reciprocal concessions in particular fields." Charles
Cheney Hyde, Constitutional Procedures for International Agreement by the United States, 31 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 45, 49 (1937). He went on to discuss these fields, including trade,
copyright, and loans. Such agreements were not universally believed constitutional. See, e.g.,
Henry S. Fraser, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 31 AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 55 (1937) (arguing that the RTAA is unconstitutional).
121. Roosevelt not only expanded the use of ex ante congressional-executive agreements. He also
entered into executive agreements that did not have advance congressional approval,
including perhaps most notably the "Destroyers for Bases Agreement" between the United
States and the United Kingdom, entered on September 2, 1940, which transferred fifty
destroyers from the United States in exchange for bases. See AMY M. GILBERT, EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES, 1946-1973: FRAMEWORK OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PERIOD
13 (1973); Quincy Wright, The Transfer of Destroyers to Great Britain, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 68o
(1940). Moreover, Roosevelt entered many significant international agreements using ex
post congressional-executive agreements -executive agreements expressly approved by
Congress through majority votes in both houses. For example, Congress authorized the
President to accede to the International Labor Organization using an ex post congressional-
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authorized the President to provide aid to allied nations, specifying that "[t]he
terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any
aid... shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to
the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any
other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory." '22 A
series of bilateral executive agreements followed.'23 The Lend-Lease Act was
important not only because it expanded the use of ex ante congressional-
executive agreements far beyond their traditional scope in ways Congress did
not at the time acknowledge and probably did not recognize. It also set the
pattern that Congress would follow in the large number of foreign aid acts that
came after it. As I show in the next Section, the structure-even the specific
language-of the post-war aid acts was drawn directly from the Lend-Lease
Act.'24
The numbers alone give stark evidence of the transformation of
international law in the years that followed. Over the first fifty years of the
country's existence, there were a total of only twenty-seven executive
agreements. Over the next fifty years (between 1839 and 1889), the numbers
were larger, but still small in comparison with the present, with a total of 238
agreements (nearly the same as the 215 Article 11 treaties over the same period).
The numbers continued to grow as the country entered its second century,
with 917 executive agreements between 1889 and 1939. But it was not until the
early 1940s that the number of executive agreements-most of them ex ante
congressional-executive agreements1 2 5_ began to grow exponentially,
executive agreement. See Joint Resolution ofJune 19, 1934, ch. 676, 48 Stat. 1182; Hathaway,
supra note 11, at 1300 & n.184.
122. An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States (Lend-Lease Act), Pub. L. No. 77-11,
§ 3(b), S5 Stat. 31, 32 (1941).
123. GILBERT, supra note 121, at 14.
124. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 45 (1944) ("[T]he
Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, is the fountainhead of the numerous Mutual Aid
agreements under which our government has to date furnished our allies in the present war
some fifteen billions worth of munitions of war and other supplies."); GILBERT, supra note
121, at 13 ("[T]he famous Lend-Lease Act... was the forerunner of all of the Aid Acts of the
United States from that time to the present.").
125. A study of agreements concluded between 1946 and 1973 found that almost eighty-seven
percent of all international agreements were executive agreements entered by the President
under statutory authority granted by Congress, compared to seven percent sole executive
agreements and six percent Article II treaties. LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE EXECUTIVE 12-13 (1984). The
study found that "the overwhelming proportion of international agreements are based at
least partly upon statutory authority (88.3 percent of agreements reached between 1946 and
1972), followed by treaties (6.2 percent) and agreements based solely on executive authority
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eventually reaching over three hundred per year. During the same period, the
number of Article II treaties remained flat at between five and twenty per year.
Figure i illustrates these trends.
Figure 1.
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and action (5.5 percent)." R. ROGER MAJAK, 95TH CONG., INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES 22 (Comm. Print 1977).
126. The data for 1790 to 193o are based on aggregate data for fifty year periods, provided in
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 39 tbl.II-i (2001)
[hereinafter TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS], which used the average
number of agreements per year during each period for the first year of each period and then
connecting those point estimates with a line-smoothing function. The data for the number
of executive agreements and treaties from 1930 to 1999 are from TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra, at 39 tbl.II-2. Data for the number of executive
agreements from 2000 to 2006 are from Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of State Legal
Adviser, Office of Treaty Affairs, to author (Jan. IS, 2007) (on file with author). The number
of agreements from 2007 is drawn from the executive agreements reported under the Case-

















PRESIDENTIAL POWER OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW
As the New Deal came to a close, the country was poised for a stark
transformation in the way international law would be made. Executive
agreements were on the brink of a period of exponential growth. The move
toward extensive executive unilateralism in international law was well
underway.
B. The Aftermath of World War H: Growing Presidential Unilateralism
In the years following World War II, the transition whose seeds were first
sown more than fifty years earlier began to flower. Pressing this transition
forward was a complex interplay of legal, political, and geopolitical forces. Each
branch had a role to play in the process of change. The President, responsible
for a newly dominant world power engaged in a Cold War standoff, sought to
cement the country's global ties through an increasingly complex web of
international agreements and a generous worldwide foreign aid program. The
Supreme Court, which had in the 189os and early 19oos opened the door to
greater reliance on executive agreements by repeatedly ruling them
constitutional, in the 198os forced Congress to choose (perhaps unwittingly)
between much stronger or much weaker oversight of the authority it had
granted to the President. And Congress, faced with complex international
responsibilities as well as a growing wealth of domestic programs, chose to
delegate the power to make international agreements to the President in a
series of small incremental steps, until it found itself with almost no power
over international lawmaking and no easy means of reclaiming what it had lost.
The interplay between the President and Congress during the postwar era
is of particular interest here. As documented in the last Section, the Supreme
Court played an important role in eliminating the legal barriers to changing the
way international law was made in the United States and would, as the next
Section shows, accelerate that change almost one hundred years later. The
Court thus opened the door to change, but it was Congress and the President
that walked through.
The President's motivation for expanding the use of executive agreements
is perhaps the easiest to explain. An executive agreement concluded using
authority granted in advance by Congress has the weight of congressional
consent behind it (unlike a sole executive agreement). Yet because consent is
granted in advance, it is not necessary for the President to obtain congressional
approval for each individual agreement. The ex ante congressional-executive
agreement process thus allows the President to enjoy the legitimacy of
congressional approval without the hassle. This combination may have become
even more attractive to the President as the differences between Congress and
the President have grown over the postwar period.
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Figures 2 and 3 show that as political differences have grown between the
President and Congress, so too has the number of executive agreements. Figure
2 compares the number of executive agreements reported by the Department of
State to the ideological distance between the President and the median member
of Congress (calculated using the Common Space DW-Nominate Database).
Figure 3 compares the number of executive agreements to the percentage of the
members of each house of Congress that are not of the President's party. In
both cases, the numbers have trended upward since 1940. Although there is no
direct correlation between the number of agreements concluded and the
measures of ideological or political distance between the President and
Congress, there is notable overlap. 27 It is logical that it would be so: a
President faced by a Congress that agrees with him less would naturally look
for ways of obtaining policy goals that do not require additional congressional
approval.
127. The agreements listed in Figures 2 and 3 are those reported by the Department of State. The
figures do not include agreements that are classified, have not been reduced to writing, or
that are nonbinding or otherwise insignificant. Some of the specific ups-and-downs in
reported numbers might be due in part to changes in levels of reporting rather than in the
actual number of agreements. For example, the jump in the number of agreements reported
in the 195os is likely due in part to increased congressional demands for reporting of
executive agreements in the wake of the Bricker Amendment debate, and the uptick in
reported agreements in the late 1970S is likely due to better reporting. See, e.g., JOHNSON,
supra note 125, at 128 (noting that a notice went from the Department of State to agency
heads in 1976 requesting better reporting of agreements). Beginning around 199o, many of
the agreements concluded under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, ch. 469, 68 Stat. 454, were reformulated as contracts, which are not subject to
reporting. Interview with Attorney, U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, in
Washington, D.C. (Apr. 10, 2008). This might partially explain the decline in the number of
agreements reported between 199o and early 2000.
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Figure 2.
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....... Ideological Distance Between President and
Congress
u8. Data for the number of executive agreements from 1940 to 1999 are from TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 126, at 39 tbl.II-2. Data for the number of
executive agreements from 2000 to 2006 are from U.S. Dep't of State, Office of Treaty
Affairs, Treaties and Other International Agreements Concluded During the Year (2007)
(on file with author). The number of agreements from 2007 is drawn from the executive
agreements reported under the Case-Zablocki Act for 2007. See Reporting International
Agreements, supra note 81. The ideological distance between the President and Congress
was determined for each year by calculating the distance between the DW-Nominate score
for the sitting President and the median member of Congress (including all members of the
House and Senate) using Voteview. Royce Caroll et al., "Common Space" DW-Nominate
Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors (Joint House and Senate Scaling),
http://www.voteview.con/dwnomin-joint-house-and senate.htm (last visited Sept. 5,
2009).
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Figure 3.
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It may be logical that the President would seize the opportunity to make
international agreements without the approval of Congress, but why would
Congress make this possible by delegating such sweeping authority to the
President? The answer is a combination of institutional myopia and the
political incentives facing members of Congress. Congress did not give away all
of its power at once. Instead, it gave it away one step at a time. At each turn,
the choice by Congress to delegate authority was perfectly rational for those
taking part. In many cases, Congress made decisions to delegate authority to
129 . Data on executive agreements are from sources described supra note 128. The author
calculated the data for "Senate (Percent Not President's Party)" and "House (Percent Not
President's Party)" as the percent of the members of each house of Congress with a "Party
Code" different from that of the sitting President using the "Common Space" DW-
NOMINATE Database, http://www.voteview.com/dwnomin joint house and senate.htm










PRESIDENTIAL POWER OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW
presidents that held quite similar values and shared party affiliation with the
large majority of members -presidents they trusted to conclude agreements
that largely reflected Congress's views. Those delegations freed members of
Congress to spend their time and energy on matters that were of greater
importance to their constituents. They likely did not fully anticipate that these
same delegations would be used decades later by presidents in a very different
political context to avoid congresses with which they disagreed. At the same
time, each individual delegation on its own diminished Congress's institutional
authority by a small amount -at least at first. The impact of those delegations
grew over time as the need for international agreements increased. Because the
effect of the delegations increased over time, the congresses that delegated were
not the ones that felt the full effects of diminished power -it was the power of
congresses twenty, thirty, and fifty years later that was sacrificed. Individual
members of Congress who approved the delegations either did not know or did
not care that the cumulative effect of the delegations would, over the course of
several decades, leave Congress with little power over international lawmaking.
By the time Congress realized what had happened and began to react, it had no
easy way to reclaim what it had lost. In the end, its response proved to be too
little, too late.
It all begins with the end of the Second World War, and the changes it
brought to the role of the United States in the world, and specifically to the
U.S. foreign aid program. During the immediate post-war period, Congress
incrementally granted authority to the President in order to enable a robust
program aimed at European recovery. Determined to rebuild its allies in
Europe, the United States gave unprecedented amounts of foreign aid. In the
months immediately after the end of the war, the United States sent billions in
aid to Europe. s
The aid program helped stem worsening economic conditions in Europe,
but it was frequently criticized for being unfocused and ineffective.'31 In
response to these concerns, Secretary of State George Marshall formed a plan
to revise the way the United States gave foreign aid. In a commencement
address at Harvard University he declared, "[i]t would be neither fitting nor
efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program
designed to place Europe on its feet economically .... The role of this country
should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of
130. JOHN KILLICK, THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION 1945-1960, at 45-54
(1997).
131. MICHAEL HOGAN, THE MARSHALL PLAN: AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
WESTERN EUROPE, 1947-1952, at 32-35 (1987); KILLICK, supra note 13o, at 65-77.
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later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so.132
The result of this call to action would later be called the "Marshall Plan," and it
offered emergency assistance to the countries of Europe that had been
devastated by war. The plan was put into effect through the passage of the
Economic Cooperation Act in the spring of 1948.133
Largely unnoticed by commentators then or since was a major delegation of
authority in the Act to the Secretary of State, one patterned on a similar
delegation in the earlier Lend-Lease Act discussed above.'3 The Economic
Cooperation Act gave the Secretary the power to conclude executive
agreements to assist in carrying out the aims of the legislation.'3 s The
agreements would outline the terms under which the aid would be provided to
recipient states and would be signed by donor and recipient alike. 136 By the
time the plan ended in mid-19 51, the United States had sent more than thirteen
billion dollars in aid, the economies of all of the participating states except
Germany had exceeded pre-war levels, and the United States had entered into
executive agreements with every country receiving aid in Europe. 137
With the end of the Marshall Plan in sight, Congress passed a series of acts
that expanded the U.S. foreign aid program beyond Europe to include much of
the rest of the world. Beginning in 1949, legislation passed by Congress offered
extensive foreign aid aimed at providing economic, political, and social
assistance in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas. 13' Like the Lend-Lease Act
and the Economic Cooperation Act before them, the acts included expansive
grants of authority to the President to conclude executive agreements. The
first, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, not only permitted, but
132. George C. Marshall, Sec'y of State, Commencement Address at Harvard University, June 5,
1947, http ://www.usaid.gov/multimedia/video/marshall/marshallspeech.html.
133. Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, ch. 169, 62 Stat. 137.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 121-124.
135. "The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Administrator, is authorized to conclude,
with individual participating countries or any number of such countries or with an
organization representing any such countries, agreements in furtherance of the purposes of
this title." § i15(a), 62 Stat. at i5o.
136. See, e.g., Economic Cooperation Agreement, U.S.-Austria, Feb. 2o, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 145;
Economic Cooperation Agreement, U.S.-Turk., July 4, 1948, 62 Stat. 2566; Economic
Cooperation Agreement, U.S.-Fr., June 28, 1948, 62 Stat. 2223.
137. Some of this history is told in GILBERT, supra note 121, at 18-26; and USAID, USAID
History, http://www.usaid.gov/about-usaid/usaidhist.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
138. Pub. L. No. 82-165, 65 Star. 373. The Mutual Security Act of 1954 introduced development
assistance, security assistance, private investment guarantees, and food aid, among other
things. Pub. L. No. 83-665, 68 Stat. 832. The Mutual Security Act of 1957 led to the creation
of the Development Loan Fund. Pub. L. No. 85-141, § 6, 71 Stat. 355, 357 (repealed 1961).
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required, the President to enter into executive agreements to "effectuate the
policies and purposes" of the Act.'39
This seemed to offer an ideal arrangement. Although the foreign aid acts of
the late 1940s and 195os included broad grants of authority to the President to
conclude international agreements, they also included strict sunset provisions.
This limited the delegation of international lawmaking authority from
Congress to the President.' 40 Congress, in short, retained control of the
programs because it had to reauthorize them every few years. The President,
for his part, was able to use the authority granted to obtain assurances from aid
recipients about the use of aid without committing the United States to any
long-term obligations. By 196o, the United States had entered such executive
agreements on military assistance, defense support, technical cooperation, and
other special assistance with more than forty countries.'
4
'
139. Pub. L. No. 81-329, § 402, 63 Stat. 714, 717 ("The President shall, prior to the furnishing of
assistance to any eligible nation, conclude agreements with such nation, or group of such
nations, which agreements, in addition to such other provisions as the President deems
necessary to effectuate the policies and purposes of this Act and to safeguard the interests of
the United States .... "). A few legislators seem to have been concerned about the extent of
the authority granted by Congress to the President. In a Senate Foreign Relations hearing in
1953, for example, Senators Hickenlooper, Taft, Humphrey, and Knowland all expressed
concern about the legal force of executive agreements. 5 EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 175-99 (1977). For example, Senator Hickenlooper noted
in a colloquy with Secretary of State Dulles,
Now, that is the one thing that concerns me about this, whether this language can
be -where we admit that these people were representatives of the United States
and then we say that certain agreements or understandings were entered into-
whether that can be successfully interpreted, from a legal standpoint as a
ratification of everything that was done by any representative of the United States
where agreements or understandings were entered into with regard to the final
disposition of the country or its people, or with the final disposition of their
political liberties or political situations. That worries me.
Id. at 176.
140. For example, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 provided, "After June 30, 1954, or after the date
of the passage of a concurrent resolution by the two houses of Congress before such date,
none of the authority conferred by this Act or by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,
as amended ... may be exercised." § 530, 65 Stat. at 386.
141. GILBERT, supra note 121, at 44-45. For a comprehensive set of agreements entered in the
1950s, see 1-i1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS (TIAS) (1951-196o). For a more extesnsive discussion of the postwar debate
over international law, including the Bricker Amendment, see Hathaway, supra note ii, at
1302-o6. See also CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRzE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944-1955 (2003) (discussing the
relationship between the Civil Rights struggle in the United States and debates over
international law).
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But the arrangement created structural difficulties as well. In arguing for
revising the system of foreign aid, President John Kennedy explained that
because the legislative authority for the program and for funding was short-
term, aid was generally granted in short bursts rather than through long-term
programs. 142 Successful development programs, he argued, generally require
longer-term commitments. As he put it, "Money spent to meet crisis situations
or short-term political objectives while helping to maintain national integrity
and independence has rarely moved the recipient nation toward greater
economic stability.' 43
In the election of 1960, President Kennedy made clear that creation of a
new foreign assistance program would be a top priority for his new
administration. And once elected, he made good on that promise. The 1961
Foreign Assistance Act provided for a large scale reorganization of U.S. foreign
aid programs. The bill aimed, a Senate report explained, to "give vigor,
purpose, and new direction to the foreign aid program."'" It would provide
more continuity to programs by allowing funds to be used until expended,
rather than requiring that unused funds be returned to the Treasury and new
funds be appropriated each year. It also shifted programs to a five-year
borrowing authority, which allowed for longer-term planning among aid
agencies. 14 Moreover, the program reflected a shift from a focus on Western
Europe toward the Southern Hemisphere - particularly Latin America. 146
142. Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid, 1961 PUB. PAPERS 204 (Mar. 22, 1961)
("[U]neven and undependable short-term financing has weakened the incentive for the
long-term planning and self-help by the recipient nations which are essential to serious
economic development."). For an example of such practices see, Mutual Security Act of 1951,
§ 530, 65 Stat. at 386-87, which provided for shorter-term commitments than the 1961
Foreign Assistance Act.
143. Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid, supra note 142.
144. S. REP. No. 87-612, at 1 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2472, 2473.
145. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2474 (explaining that funds were to remain
available until expended "to discourage the practice of hastily obligating funds near the end
of the fiscal year in order to place aid administrators in a stronger position to seek further
appropriations").
146. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2475-76. The nations of Western Europe had by
this point gone from being recipients of aid to being contributors. The same year the U.S.
foreign assistance program was reorganized, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) was founded to help member countries "achieve sustainable
economic growth and employment and to raise the standard of living in member countries
while maintaining financial stability -all this in order to contribute to the development of
the world economy." Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, History,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/o,3417,en_36734o52_36761863-1-1i--l,oo.html (last visited
Sept. 14, 2009). It, too, had originally been founded in the aftermath of World War II to
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The new program was not motivated purely by a generous spirit of giving.
It was, indeed, viewed as an integral part of the Cold War and the fight against
communism. A Senate Report explained that the program was "dictated by the
hard logic of the cold war and by a moral responsibility resulting from poverty,
hunger, disease, ignorance, feudalism, strife, revolution, chronic instability and
life without hope."'47 Foreign aid was a tool that could be used as a weapon to
win the hearts and minds of the rest of the world.
Whatever the motivation, the new foreign aid program had clear results. It
created the largest and arguably most successful foreign aid program in the
world. Yet in solving the earlier problem of using short-term funding to
address long-term problems, the new foreign aid act also succeeded in ceding
unprecedented power to the President. In omitting strict sunset provisions
from earlier bills but retaining the broad grants of authority, the legislation
handed immense power to the President to conclude unilateral international
agreements. This power was tempered only by a legislative veto embedded in
the legislation that permitted Congress to terminate assistance under any
provision of the Act by concurrent resolution.14
The shift of authority did not generate significant concern or debate in
Congress. Both houses of Congress and the presidency were firmly under
Democratic control, with sixty percent of the House and sixty-four percent of
the Senate in Democratic hands. A few members of the minority party
expressed concern, however, about the transfer of authority to the President. In
a report of "Additional Views" following the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Report on the 1961 legislation, two Republican members of the committee
sounded a cautionary note:
Year after year Congress has continued to delegate to the executive
branch more and more authority to spend ever-increasing amounts of
money. This year the increased delegation of power to the Executive is
administer American and Canadian aid under the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of
Europe. Id. The reformed OECD aimed instead to "coordinate the assistance programs of
the Western Powers and Japan." S. REp. No. 87-612, at 4, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2472, 2476.
147. S. REP. No. 87-612, at 14, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2475. In addition, the report
discusses the Soviet foreign aid effort in justifying the change in borrowing authority under
the act. Id. at 11, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2483.
148. Act for International Development of 1961 (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), Pub. L. No. 87-
195, § 617, 75 Stat. 424, 444 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 2367 (2006)) ("Assistance
under any provision of this Act may, unless sooner terminated by the President, be
terminated by concurrent resolution."). As detailed in Section II.C. below, that limitation
would prove fleeting.
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greater than ever before and goes far beyond what is necessary... In
this bill there are 51 grants of discretionary power to the President and
18 authorizations to disregard other laws which apply to foreign aid.
While many of these grants of power have been in previous foreign aid
legislation, in one form or another, it must be taken into consideration
that heretofore the authorization has been limited to 1 year.
[A]lthough the defects of the bill are many, transcending all
others is the relinquishment of congressional control over the program.
The trend in the past has been for the executive branch to request, and
to receive, ever greater flexibility; but now the Congress is requested
abjectly to abdicate its powers and to grant a blank check to be cashed
wherever, by whomever, and in whatever amounts as are designated by
those in charge of the foreign aid program.' 49
There is no evidence that Democratic members of Congress were moved by
such objections. They appear to have felt that the legislative veto, combined
with Congress's continued control over annual appropriations, would be
sufficient to retain the necessary congressional oversight. A conference
committee report noted, for example, that "[t]he Executive has authority to
enter into agreements committing the United States to participate in
development programs of foreign nations for a period of up to 5 years," and
that "such commitments" were "subject only to the regular annual or
supplemental appropriations of funds."' s That continuing power over funds,
along with a requirement that the agreements be reported to the relevant
committees in Congress would, the report explained, assure that Congress
would "be kept currently informed and have an opportunity to revise and
adjust the program in the light of future developments through the normal
legislative procedures."'.'
By the late 196os, however, confidence in the power of the appropriations
process to control unilateral lawmaking by the President had waned. Senator J.
William Fulbright, then-chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
149. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1961: REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON H.R. 8400, H.R. REP. NO. 87-851, at 1o8-o9 (1961).
15o. H.R. REP. No. 87-1o88, at 48 (1961) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2530.
There was some debate over this matter, with some advocating five-year treasury financing.
The result was a compromise: the administration could make long-term commitments, but
each year's appropriations would come before Congress. Congressman Morris K. Udall,
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: A Special Report 6 (1961),
http ://www.library.arizona.edu/exhibits/udalVspecial/foreign.htnml.
isi. H.R. REP. NO. 87-1o88, at 48, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2530.
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Relations, began to reflect on "institutional problems" created by the 1964 Gulf
of Tonkin resolution and the U.S. intervention in Vietnam in 1965. Is2 In 1967,
he proposed a resolution stating that a U.S. national commitment should result
"from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the
U.S. Government through means of a treaty, convention, or other legislative
instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment.' '15 3 In
introducing the resolution, Senator Fulbright explained, "The authority of
Congress in foreign policy has been eroding steadily since 1940, the year of
America's emergence as a major and permanent participant in world affairs,
and the erosion has created a significant constitutional imbalance."' 4 He
continued, "New devices have been invented which have the appearance but
not the reality of Congressional participation in the making of foreign
policy."55 The resolution he proposed was meant to address this imbalance by
requiring greater congressional participation in the making of international
legal commitments. The resolution met with a chorus of favorable reviews in
the major papers of the time.' s6
Fulbright's proposal did not gain traction, however, until 1969, when an
eight-year period of unified Democratic control over government came to an
end and President Richard Nixon entered office. The Vietnam War was
entering its fourth year with combat troops on the ground, and the new
Republican President found himself increasingly at odds with the Democratic
Congress. The Senate issued a resolution based on those proposed by
Fulbright two years earlier.5 7 Two related resolutions followed.'l 8
152. U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers: Hearings on S. Res. 151 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 9oth Cong. 1 (1967) (statement of Sen. J.W. Fulbright, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations).
153. S. Res. 151, 9oth Cong., 113 CONG. REC. 20,702 (1967).
154. 113 CONG. REC. 20,702-03 (statement of Sen. Fulbright) (discussing S. Res. 151). The
remainder of Senator Fulbright's statement offers extensive support for the arguments
offered here. See id. Senator Fulbright made a similar argument in J. William Fulbright,
American Foreign Policy in the 2oth Century Under an 18th-Century Constitution, 47 CORNELL
L.Q. 1 (1961).
155. 113 CONG. REC. 20,703.
156. United States Commitments to Foreign Powers: Hearing on S. 151 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 9oth Cong. 4-8 (1967) (reprinting newspaper statements). Senate Resolution 151
was later reintroduced in modified form as Senate Resolution 187. A Senate report on the
modified resolution was published later that same year. See J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, S. REP. No. 90-797 (1967).
157. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 115 CONG. REC. 17,241 (1969); see LAWRENCE MARGOLIS, EXEcUTIVE
AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN FOREIGN POLICY 86-87 (1986). For an interesting
assessment of the issues surrounding Senate Resolution 85, see Ellen C. Collier, The
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These resolutions failed to stem the tide of executive agreements,
prompting Congress to enact the Case-Zablocki Act of 1972."59 The Act was
expressly aimed at "restoring a proper working relationship between the
Congress and the executive branch in the field of foreign affairs. ' '16O It required
that international agreements not submitted to the Senate for advice and
consent be submitted to Congress no later than sixty days after they entered
into force. 6 ' A subsequent Senate resolution added the requirement that "in
determining whether a particular international agreement should be submitted
as a treaty, the President should have the timely advice of the Committee on
Foreign Relations through agreed procedures established with the Secretary of
State.' ,, 62 Though the Case-Zablocki Act did lead to better reporting of
international agreements to Congress, it was quickly apparent that significant
National Commitments Resolution of 1969: Background and Issues, Cong. Research Serv.
Report No. 70-112 (1970).
iS8. Those were S. Res. 469, 91st Cong., 116 CONG. REc. 32,990 (1970), which expressed the
Senate's opinion that nothing in an executive agreement with Spain was to be deemed a
national commitment by the United States, and S. Res. 214, 92d Cong., 118 CONG. REC.
6870 (1972), which stated that any agreement with Portugal or Bahrain for "military bases
or foreign assistance should be submitted as a treaty to the Senate for advice and consent."
See MARGOLIS, supra note 157, at 87.
1S9. Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972) (codified as amended at i U.S.C. § 112b (20o6)); see
Executive Agreements, supra note 78, at 619-21; Executive Agreements: A Growing Issue in 1972,
supra note 78, at 158-6o.
16o. House Committee Backs Senate on Foreign Agreements, 30 CONG. Q. 2009 (1972) (quoting
House Report).
161. 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) ("The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any
international agreement . ..other than a treaty . .. as soon as practicable after such
agreement has entered into force with respect to the United States but in no event later than
sixty days thereafter."). The Act requires both the House and the Senate be informed of
international agreements other than treaties. See 22 C.F.R. § 181.7(a) (20o8) ("International
agreements other than treaties shall be transmitted ... to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives as soon as practicable after the entry into force of
such agreements, but in no event later than 6o days thereafter."). This Act was the latest
event in a long chain of events that began with the Supreme Court's determination in United
States v. Belmont, that the President's power to conclude international agreements without
the Senate's approval "may not be doubted." 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937). This decision was
reaffirmed in United States v. Pink, which upheld an executive agreement entered into by the
President without congressional consent. 315 U.S. 203, 222-26 (1942).
16z. International Agreements Consultation Resolution, S. Res. 536, 9 5th Cong. (1978); see S.
REP. No. 95-1171, at 2-3 (1978) (accompanying S. Res. 536). This resolution formalized an
agreement entered earlier that year in which Congress and the State Department agreed that
the State Department would furnish the House Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate
Foreign Relations Committees with a periodic list of significant international agreements
that have been cleared for negotiation, accompanied by an explanation of the expected form
the agreement would take. S. REP. No. 95-1171, at 2-3.
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oversight problems remained. On the one hand, the agreements submitted to
Congress by the State Department went largely unnoticed. As one frustrated
State Department staff member put it a few years after the Act went into effect,
"They just get filed away in drawers.' ', 63 At the same time, congressional staff
complained that reports were filed so late that they had "to rely on contacts and
leaks in the executive branch to find out when really important negotiations are
underway. ''1 64 Moreover, the "sketchy background statements accompanying
the agreements" proved to be "practically useless for someone trying to figure
out the anticipated effect of the commitments.'
' 6
,
When President Jimmy Carter entered office at the start of 1977 (thus
briefly restoring unified Democratic Party control over government), he took
aim at the explosive growth in executive agreements. He issued an
unprecedented memorandum demanding more accountability. It required that
"[a]ll proposals beyond or in addition to approved budgets to foreign
governments or international organizations . . . be submitted to me [the
President] for approval . . . before any commitment, formal or informal, is
made.' 66 Moreover, in 1978, Congress further strengthened the reporting
rules by requiring oral agreements to be reduced to writing and reported, the
President to explain the reasons for the late transmittal of agreements reported
to Congress, and agencies to consult with the Secretary of State before
concluding an international agreement. 
6
,
This resistance to the growth of executive lawmaking would prove to be
short-lived. The election of President Ronald Reagan in a strong victory over
President Carter, and the capture of the Senate by Republicans for the first
time in twenty-five years, put an end to debates about the grant of excessive
authority over international lawmaking to the President.
This examination of the New Deal and the several decades following shows
how the seeds first planted in the 189os began to flower. During the New Deal,
the President, with the blessing of the Supreme Court, took the new form of
international agreement from the 189o Trade Act and expanded it across the
163. Loch Johnson & James M. McCormick, Foreign Policy by Executive Fiat, 28 FOREIGN POL'Y
117, 125 (1977) (quoting State Department official).
164. Id. (quoting Senate staff aide). Another study by a Senate staff aide found that thirty-nine
percent of the agreements reported in 1976 were reported late. See JOHNSON, supra note 125,
at 123. For more nearly contemporary critiques of the Case-Zablocki Act, see Johnson &
McCormick, supra note 163, at 125-28.
165. Johnson & McCormick, supra note 163, at 125 (quoting Senate staff aide).
166. JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 129 (quoting memorandum).
167. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, S 7o8(b)-(c), 92
Stat. 963, 993 (1978).
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international legal arena. As the United States became more engaged in the
world in the years following the Second World War, this new form of
agreement stood ready to meet pressing needs. It allowed a rapid expansion of
international commitments without the cumbersome political process of
Article II treaties. This process of transformation in the way the country made
its international commitments changed even more after the Foreign Affairs Act
of 1961, passed in order to ease foreign aid and foreign relations, unwittingly
set the stage for increasing delegation of authority to the President over new
international agreements. At the same time, growing polarization between the
President and Congress made unilateral lawmaking by the President more
attractive. As we shall see in the next Section, a 1983 Supreme Court decision-
and Congress's response to it-would soon seal this transition to unilateral
international lawmaking.
C. The Revolution of INS v. Chadha: The Triumph of Presidential
Unilateralism
In the early 198os, what weak oversight Congress still had was undermined
by the Supreme Court. The Court began by expanding the permissible scope of
congressional delegation of international lawmaking authority to the President,
holding in Dames & Moore v. Regan that even implicit congressional approval
was sufficient.' 68 Shortly afterwards, the Court eliminated the legislative veto
in INS v. Chadha.'6v That decision is not usually cited for its effect on foreign
affairs, but it was immensely consequential. In eliminating the legislative veto,
the Court eliminated the single most significant control over ex ante
congressional-executive agreements that Congress possessed. This forced
Congress to choose between examining and approving each agreement
individually or instead delegating even more unprecedented authority to the
President (which it now could do thanks to the Court's decision in Dames &
Moore). 7' As we shall see, it chose the latter.
168. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). In the case, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the President to
nullify judicial attachments, transfer frozen assets, and suspend private commercial claims in
a sole executive agreement. As Harold Koh puts it, in this case and others on issues of
foreign policy, "the Supreme Court has intervened consistently across the spectrum of
United States foreign policy interests to tip the balance of foreign-policy-making power in
favor of the president." KOH, supra note 83, at 134.
16g. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
170. Harold Koh was one of the first to make this connection. He noted that, together with
Dames & Moore, Chadha played an important role in reducing the restrictions on executive
power. KOH, supra note 83, at 138-44.
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The stage for the revolution of INS v. Chadha was set on the very day that
President Reagan took office in early 1981. On that day, President Reagan
announced that an airplane carrying the fifty-two Americans that had been
held hostage at the Iranian embassy for 444 days was on its way back to the
United States. 7 ' The deal that had brought the crisis to an end was concluded
in an executive agreement between the United States and Iran. The agreement
became the subject of a lawsuit that made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court in
the spring of 1981. In the suit, Dames & Moore, a multinational engineering
and construction company, claimed that it was owed approximately $3.5
million for services it had performed before the Ayatollah Khomeini renounced
all contracts with American companies- a claim that it argued was wrongfully
nullified by the executive agreement.'72
The Supreme Court upheld the executive agreement against this challenge
in Dames & Moore v. Regan. In doing so, it placed significant emphasis on the
prior implicit approval of Congress. It acknowledged that it could not conclude
that prior legislation "directly authorizes" the President's suspension of claims
in the executive agreement, but it concluded that the circumstances showed
that the President was acting "with the acceptance of Congress.' 1 73 It was
enough, the Court concluded, that Congress had enacted "legislation closely
related to the question of the President's authority ... which evinces legislative
intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to 'invite'
'measures on independent presidential responsibility.""'74 As long as "there is
no contrary indication of legislative intent" and there is "a history of
congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President,"
the Court would defer. 75 If the point was not clear, the Court emphasized,
"Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly
approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement. This is best
171. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 664-65 (providing factual background for the dispute before
the Court); Reagan Takes Oath as 4oth President; Promises an 'Era of National Renewal'-
Minutes Later, 52 Hostages in Iran Fly to Freedom After 444-Day Ordeal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1981, at Ai.
172. 453 U.S. at 664-65.
173. Id. at 678.
174. Id. at 678 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
175. Id. at 678-79. It is worth noting that the type of agreement at issue in Dames & Moore- an
agreement settling individual claims -is one of only two types of agreements in which there
is a nearly two-hundred-year-long history of sole executive agreements. This suggests that
the Court might have meant implicit congressional authorization to be applied much more
narrowly than is commonly assumed.
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demonstrated by Congress' enactment of the International Claims Settlement
Act of 1949 .. .
This decision expanded the scope of congressional delegation of authority
to the President to conclude executive agreements, thus expanding the
permissible scope of ex ante congressional-executive agreements. The Court
made clear that as long as there is "closely related" legislation, coupled with "a
history of congressional acquiescence," then the President would be permitted
to conclude executive agreements that went beyond his own independent
powers.1
77
Two years after Dames & Moore loosened Congress's ex ante control over
unilateral presidential international lawmaking, INS v. Chadha almost entirely
eliminated Congress's ex post control. At issue in INS v. Chadha was the
legality of the "legislative veto" -a procedure that allows one or both houses of
Congress to nullify (or "veto") an administrative regulation or action. ' 78 The
specific provision at issue in Chadha allowed either house of Congress to veto
the Attorney General's decision to suspend deportation of an alien in cases
where "deportation would . . . result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship."179 The House had exercised this veto power to reject the Attorney
General's suspension of deportation for Jagdish Rai Chadha, who had
overstayed his student visa.
The Court held that the one-house veto of executive actions violated the
separation of powers. The legislative power, the Court explained, is vested in
the "Senate and House of Representatives." '' 8 The presidential veto is an
essential check on this legislative power.' It assures that a national perspective
will be "grafted on the legislative process," ' 2 because the President-who is
elected by all the people-is "rather more representative of them all than are
the members of either body of the Legislature whose constituencies are local
and not countrywide."' 8 That power, however, is in turn checked by the power
of two-thirds of both houses of Congress to overrule a veto, "thereby
176. Id. at 68o. For a nice discussion of the import of the Dames & Moore decision, see KOH, supra
note 83, at 138-40.
177. 453 U.S. at 678.
178. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983).
179. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244(a)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952)
(repealed 1996).
18o. 462 U.S. at 945 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § i).
181. Id. at 947-48.
182. Id. at 948.
183. Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926)).
196
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precluding final arbitrary action of one person. '' 84 Together, the Court
explained, these interlocking powers represent a "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedure. ',,ss The one-house legislative veto-which
does away with both bicameralism and with presentment -upsets this delicate
balance.
Congress, the Court pointed out, "made a deliberate choice to delegate to
the Executive branch ... the authority to allow deportable aliens to remain in
this country in certain specified circumstances. 81 Such a delegation can only
be made through Article I legislation. Moreover, once it has made that
decision, "Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that
delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. '' ' 87 Individual determinations of
policy- such as the decision to deport Chadha- are just as much subject to the
constitutional requirements of bicameral passage followed by presentment to
the President as is the original decision to delegate authority to the President.
The Court's decision in Chadha upended foreign relations law in the
United States to an extent rarely appreciated. Justice White's dissent in Chadha
noted fifty-six separate legislative veto provisions across fifteen major foreign
affairs laws. 88 Among them were several legislative authorizations to the
184. Id. at 951.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 954.
187. Id. at 955.
188. Id. at 1003-13 (White, J., dissenting) (reprinting statutes from the Brief for the United States
Senate). Those laws included the following: Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat.
1978 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered volumes of U.S.C. (2006)); Act for
International Development of 1961 (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75
Stat. 424 (codified as amended in scattered volumes of U.S.C.); Department of Defense
Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-155, 87 Stat. 605 (1973) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 42, and So U.S.C.); International Development and
Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, 89 Stat. 849 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 12, 22, and 33 U.S.C.); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 19, 26, 42, and 45 U.S.C.);
Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-365, 88 Star.
399 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of lo U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C. app.);
Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-646, 88 Stat. 2333 (1975)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 63Sd-635g); International Security Assistance Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-92, 91 Stat. 614 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.); International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.); Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Star. 120 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 22 and 42 U.S.C.); International Navigational Rules Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-75, 91 Stat. 308 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 16oi-16o8); National
Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered
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President to enter into international agreements. Yet this list of fifty-six
provisions just scratched the surface. A recent search of the United States Code
Annotated revealed ninety-nine separate provisions that are expressly flagged
as containing or having once contained legislative veto provisions similar to
those found unconstitutional in Chadha.189 Forty-two of these ninety-nine have
some foreign or international aspect.1 90
At the time it was ruled unconstitutional, the legislative veto had only
rarely been exercised. Between 1932 and 1984, the veto had been exercised only
125 times. 9 In only thirty-five instances did Congress veto an agency
regulation, project, or decision. Nonetheless, those who have examined the
veto have concluded that "the threat of a veto as well as the application of veto
reviews by Congress have had a potent influence on policy decisions.
'192
sections of 5o U.S.C.); Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5o U.S.C. and 5o U.S.C. app.); and War Powers
Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 55S (1973) (codified as amended at 5o U.S.C.
§§ 1541-1548).
i8g. Author performed search of Westlaw's "U.S.C.A." database for the phrases
"Unconstitutionality of Legislative Veto Provisions" and "See similar provisions." This
search, performed on August 25, 20o8, turned up ninety-nine separate entries. An
example is 16 U.S.C.A. S 1823 (West 20o6), which includes a note entitled
"UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATIVE VETO PROVISIONS" stating:
The provisions of former section 1254(c) (2) of Title 8, which authorized a House
of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate an action of the Executive Branch, were
declared unconstitutional in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
1983, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 457 U.S. 830, 73 L.Ed.2d 418. See similar provisions in this
section.
19o. This was determined by altering the search described above, supra note 189, to include "and
(foreign or international)." Even this may underestimate the number of congressional
vetoes that were invalidated. An article examining the impact of Chadha estimates that the
decision invalidated "virtually every variety of more than 200 congressional vetoes enacted
over the span of 5o years." Robert S. Gilmour & Barbara Hinkson Craig, After the
Congressional Veto: Assessing the Alternatives, 3 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 373, 373 (1984).
191. Gilmour & Craig, supra note 19o, at 374. E. Donald Elliott comes to the same conclusion. He
writes:
The true significance of the legislative veto cannot be measured by the
infrequency with which it has been used. The legislative veto creates the most
effective kind of power, the kind that does not have to be used to be effective. It is
no exaggeration to say that "the main benefit of the congressional veto is that it
exists. Its very existence will sensitize the bureaucracy and make it more
responsive."
E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the
Legislative Veto, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 125, 152 (quoting 129 CONG. REC. H933 (daily ed. Mar. 8,
1983) (statement of Rep. Levitas)).
192. Gilmour & Craig, supra note 19o, at 374.
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Indeed, the mere fact that the veto was not regularly exercised does not indicate
it has little impact. The presidential veto, too, is only rarely exercised. President
George W. Bush, for example, went the first five-and-a-half years of his
presidency without once exercising the presidential veto. Yet it would be
unreasonable to say that the veto had no effect on the lawmaking process
during this time.'93
To see the impact of the legislative veto on the policy process, it is necessary
instead to examine whether policy decisions were demonstrably altered as a
result of the possibility of veto. Study after study of the legislative veto
suggests that they have. To take just one example, the veto provision over arms
sales was never used to reject proposed sales. Instead, the threat of the veto led
the President "to make proposals more acceptable [to Congress] by adjusting
numbers, eliminating components, or attaching stipulations on use of the
weapons.' 94 The veto thus helped to foster a "consultation and negotiations
process between the president and Congress."'9'
The elimination of the legislative veto had a significant and direct effect on
executive agreements. The legislative veto and executive agreement have
always been deeply intertwined. They emerged onto the American legal and
political scene at roughly the same time. The first legislative veto provision was
enacted into law in the Legislative Appropriations Act of 1932196- at nearly the
same time executive agreements began to emerge as a major tool of
international lawmaking. It did not become commonly used, however, until
World War II, when it was used to provide some limitation on the delegation
of broad emergency powers to the executive branch.' 97 This was precisely the
same point at which executive agreements began their exponential rise. Indeed,
the Lend-Lease Act described above-on which much of the legislation
delegating the power to make executive agreements was patterned-was
among the most prominent of these laws. It granted significant authority to the
193. I make a similar argument in Hathaway, supra note ii, at 1314, noting: "Strategic actors look
ahead, and when they see an insurmountable hurdle, they are not likely to continue on their
present path."
194. Gilmour & Craig, supra note 19o, at 375.
195. Id.; see also Elliott, supra note 191, at 158 ("The real significance of the legislative veto,
however, is found less in the instances in which it is invoked than in the way that its
existence alters the working relationship between agency and subcommittee staff .... The
threat of congressional review by means other than legislative veto is less likely to produce
the advance negotiations between agencies and congressional committee staffs that are the
hallmark of legislative vetoes.").
196. Act of June 30, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-212, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414.
197. See H. Lee Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63
CAL. L. REv. 983, 1o89-9o (1975).
199
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President to provide military supplies to U.S. allies, but allowed Congress to
repeal the delegation by a concurrent resolution."'8 That Act helped launch
both the legislative veto and the executive agreement into the forefront of
American foreign policymaking.
Many experts anticipated that Congress would respond to Chadha by
placing the President on a "short leash," granting him legislative authorization
only on a case-by-case basis. 99 Quite the opposite happened. In many cases
where Congress revised statutory authorizations in response to Chadha, it did
so by expanding, not contracting, the authority granted. Faced with a choice
between the overwhelming prospect of rewriting perhaps as many as one
hundred laws to provide for greater case-by-case oversight or delegating even
greater authority to the President, Congress chose to delegate.
One common way in which it did so was by replacing provisions that
provided that Congress could reject a negotiated agreement through a
concurrent resolution with a provision that permitted rejection through a joint
resolution. This change seems minor on the surface-and, indeed, most
members likely did not see any practical difference, given how infrequently
they had used the legislative veto -but it has profound consequences for the
balance of power between the branches. That is because a concurrent
resolution requires merely a majority vote in each house of Congress, whereas a
joint resolution requires majority votes in both houses and presentment to the
President for signature or veto (which may, in turn, be overridden by two-
thirds votes in both houses of Congress). Switching from a concurrent
resolution to a joint resolution thus expands presidential power, as the
President gains the right to veto congressional action. In nearly every case, this
change had the effect of increasing the President's power and decreasing
Congress's power. In the many cases in which the concurrent resolution was
the only tool retained by Congress to control authority granted to the President
to enter into unilateral international lawmaking, the change turned out to be
the difference between Congress retaining control and not retaining control.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, for example, contained a broad
legislative veto provision that effectively permitted Congress to repeal any
198. An Act To Promote the Defense of the United States, ch. 11, S 3(c), 55 Stat. 31, 32 (1941)
("After... the passage of a concurrent resolution by the two Houses... which declares that
the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote
the defense of the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or
agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) .... ").
199. See Thomas M. Franck & Clifford A. Bob, The Return of Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations
LawAfier the Chadha Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 912, 912 (1985).
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provision of the Act by concurrent resolution."° This placed an important
limitation on the extensive authority granted to the President in the Act to
conclude executive agreements on a wide array of topics. That limitation,
however, was wiped away by the Court's decision in Chadha. As Thomas
Franck and Clifford A. Bob noted shortly after the Chadha decision was issued,
the statute fell "squarely within the prohibitions established by the Chadha
opinion.,2
01
The Foreign Assistance Act was far from alone. In statute after statute, a
legislative veto provision that was put in place to constrain lawmaking
authority granted to the President fell to the new prohibition on legislative
vetoes. Congress responded in most cases either by eliminating the veto
provision altogether, as it had in the case of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
or by rewriting it to require the full legislative process in place of the veto.
Consider, for example, the Trade Act of 1974. It contained a provision allowing
Congress to overturn, by concurrent resolution, the President's decision not to
provide import relief pursuant to a recommendation of the International Trade
Commission in cases of "serious injury, or the threat thereof, to a domestic
industry."2 The President is granted authority to provide relief, including
authority to "negotiate, conclude, and carry out agreements with foreign
countries limiting the export from foreign countries and the import into the
United States of such article." ' 3 In 1984, in response to Chadha, Congress
amended the provision allowing Congress to override the President's decision
to not provide import relief. Now the President's decision could be overridden
only by enactment of a joint resolution.0 4 By making the congressional
2oo. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 617, 75 Stat. 424, 444 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C. (2006)) ("Assistance under any provision of this
Act may, unless sooner terminated by the President, be terminated by concurrent
resolution."); see Franck & Bob, supra note 199, at 921 (noting in 1985 that the Act's
legislative veto provision "effectively allows the repeal of any and all provisions of that very
extensive law by concurrent resolution of both Houses").
2o. Franck & Bob, supra note 199, at 924. It took Congress until 2ooo to formally eliminate the
legislative veto provision, though it fell into disuse well before then, perhaps in recognition
of its legal vulnerability. The legislative veto provision was replaced with new language
relating to termination of expenses. See Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. iO6-264, § 302, 114 Stat. 748, 760 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2367).
202. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(1)(A).
203. Id. § 2253(a)(3)(E).
204. Id. § 2253(c)(2). The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 248, 98 Stat. 2948,
2998 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252), substituted a provision that the
action recommended by the Commission would take effect upon enactment of a joint
resolution described in 19 U.S.C. § 2192(a)(1)(A) for a provision that the action
recommended by the Commission would take effect upon the adoption by both houses of
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override subject to the President's veto, this small change in wording
effectively eliminated Congress's ability to override the President.
Similar changes were made to the Arms Export Control Act. The Act
authorizes the President to enter agreements to provide defense articles to
foreign countries or international organizations. °" The Act originally
permitted Congress to reject an agreement proposed by the President by
passing a concurrent resolution objecting to it. In 1986, however, the
congressional override was changed to require a joint resolution.2°6 As a result,
an effort by Congress to reject an agreement negotiated by the President under
authority granted in the Act is now subject to presentment to the President. As
a result, it must either receive the President's signature-which is highly
unlikely, given that the agreement would have been recently negotiated and
proposed by the President -or Congress must muster enough votes to override
a veto from the President-which is, needless to say, unlikely as well.
In these latter two cases-as in many just like them-the change from
requiring a concurrent resolution to reject presidential action to requiring a
joint resolution instead not only makes congressional oversight more difficult.
It also renders the express oversight provisions largely irrelevant. A provision
that allows Congress to undo an executive agreement through a joint
resolution gives Congress no more power than it already possesses. Any time
that a President has entered a binding executive agreement with another
nation, the last-in-time rule applies so that a conflicting law enacted by
Congress (with majority votes in both houses, followed by presentment to the
Congress, by an affirmative vote of a majority of the Members of each house present and
voting under the procedures set forth in section 2192, of a concurrent resolution
disapproving the action taken by the President or his determination not to provide import
relief under 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)(A).
205. 22 U.S.C. § 2311(a) ("The President is authorized to furnish military assistance, on such
terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or international
organization, the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the security of the
United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive such
assistance....").
2o6. Act of Feb. 12, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-247, § (d)(1), loo Star. 9, 9, substituted "enacts a joint
resolution prohibiting" for "adopts a concurrent resolution stating that it objects to" in 22
U.S.C. § 2796b(a)(1). It now reads: "[I]n the case of any agreement involving the lease
under this subchapter, or the loan under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, to any foreign country or international organization for a period of one year or longer
of any defense articles . . . , the agreement may not be entered into or renewed if the
Congress, within the 15-day or 30-day period specified in section 2796a(c)(1) or (2) of this
title, as the case may be, enacts a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed lease or loan." 22
U.S.C. § 2796b(a)(1) (citation omitted).
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President) after the conclusion of the agreement renders the agreement invalid
under domestic law.
What makes the Chadha case so important to international lawmaking,
however, is not simply that it makes oversight by Congress much more
difficult or that it renders express oversight provisions redundant. What makes
it so important is that it upset long-standing expectations about the kind of
continuing oversight Congress could exercise. Congress delegated significant
authority to the President to engage in a variety of international lawmaking
and foreign policymaking decisions on the understanding that it could retain
some power to oversee and control the exercise of that delegated authority
through legislative veto provisions.20 7 When Chadha upset that expectation, it
fundamentally changed the calculus Congress faced when it decided to
delegate.2" 8
Congress bears significant responsibility, however, for the diminution of its
own power after Chadha. It could have responded to the decision by placing the
President on the proverbial "short leash," which, as already noted, many
expected. Instead, Congress frequently chose to alter the oversight provision of
the statute to conform with Chadha without shortening the leash on the
President's delegation. Congress retained the broad delegations originally
granted in a world in which it could use the legislative veto to control the
exercise of that delegation. But it eliminated the legislative veto on which that
original delegation was in part premised. Moreover, by significantly diluting
Congress's formal oversight powers, the decision and legislative changes made
in response to the decision led to less informal oversight as well. With
Congress less likely to object to a decision or an agreement, the executive
branch was less likely to seek informal feedback and input from Congress than
it might have otherwise.
Why did Congress respond as it did? Despite their importance for
international law, the changes detailed above appear to have been almost
entirely uncontroversial and received little focused attention from members of
Congress. Perhaps the most plausible explanation for Congress's response,
therefore, is that the issue simply slipped below the radar screen of members of
207. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 191, at 154 ("A second set of objections, in its simplest form, is
that the legislative veto encourages Congress to make broad delegations of power to
administrative decisionmakers.").
2o8. It is worth noting that while Chadha had a significant impact on ex ante congressional-
executive agreements, significantly diluting Congress's oversight capacity, it did not affect
ex post congressional-executive agreements -agreements approved by Congress after, not
before, they are negotiated. That is because ex post congressional-executive agreements are
approved by both houses of Congress and are subject to presentment to the President.
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Congress, who approved in piecemeal form what they believed were minor
changes to preexisting legislation necessitated by the Supreme Court's decision
in Chadha without fully recognizing the consequences of the wholesale shift in
power these "minor" changes-when added together-would bring about.
Moreover, the legislative veto had not been used very frequently. Failing to
recognize that the presence of the veto changed the type of agreements
negotiated by the President and the informal consultation he engaged in before
concluding agreements, members of Congress may have assumed eliminating
the veto would make relatively little difference.
To the extent members of Congress noticed the issue, their choice to
delegate authority was a predictable response to what appeared to be a limited
set of options.2 °9 The Chadha case presented Congress with a stark choice: stop
delegating authority to the President and retain power over individual
agreements, or keep delegating authority and relinquish nearly all power to
oversee individual agreements. At the time, the country was concluding
executive agreements at a rate of almost one per day.21° The House was in
Republican hands (with fifty-six percent of the seats) while the Senate was in
Democratic hands (with over sixty percent of the seats). 11 Treaties (which
require cooperation between the President and two-thirds of the Senate) were
being approved in small numbers, hovering around twenty per year.2 ' With
this degree of division within Congress, it was impossible for Congress to
approve nearly three hundred separate agreements per year even if it were to
treat them as congressional-executive agreements rather than as Article II
treaties. As a consequence, those members of Congress for whom international
law was important must have realized that requiring individual congressional
approval of executive agreements would have effectively halted U.S.
participation in the international legal community and hence would have
supported the elimination of the legislative veto without any shortening of the
leash of delegation. Those for whom international law was unimportant, on
the other hand, would likely have been happy to place full responsibility for the
agreements in the President's hands. 213
2og. I say appeared to be, because other less obvious options were and are available, as described
in Part III of this Article.
21o. TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONALAGREEMENTS, supra note 126, at 39 tbl.II-i.
211. Calculated by author from Nominate-DW database, supra note 129.
212. There were twenty-three treaties concluded in 1983, fifteen in 1984, and eight in 1985.
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 126, at 39 tbl.II-2.
213. A Senate statement about executive agreements supports this view. It states:
The difficulty in obtaining a two-thirds vote was one of the motivating forces
behind the vast increase in executive agreements after World War II .... The
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The final step toward presidential unilateralism in international lawmaking
came about as the result of a decision that many believed would do just the
opposite. Rather than restore the balance in power between the branches by
encouraging Congress to engage in greater oversight over international
lawmaking, the decision led Congress to relinquish the one lever it had left-
the legislative veto -without any compensating changes in the delegation the
veto was meant to control. Hence presidential unilateralism came to dominate
U.S. international lawmaking, but not through a presidential power grab.
Perhaps ironically, it took all three branches, working in concert (intentionally
or, more likely, not), to give rise to the unilateral system that now governs.
The twentieth century saw the emergence and eventual triumph of
presidential unilateralism over international lawmaking. The question facing
the United States as it begins the twenty-first century is whether this
unilateralism should continue. The next Part grapples with this question.
III.THE PROPER ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT IN INTERNATIONAL
LAWMAKING
Today nearly all of U.S. international law is made by the President acting
alone with little oversight by Congress or the U.S. public. The previous Part of
this Article demonstrated that such unfettered presidential power has not
always been a feature of the American legal landscape. It is, instead, of
relatively recent vintage and forged in response to specific historical events and
challenges. The question thus emerges whether this relatively new
development is a good one. Should the President exercise such broad unilateral
power or should he not?
In an effort to begin to answer this question, this Part examines the power
of the President over international lawmaking from expressly legal and
normative perspectives. It argues that reform is necessary for at least three
reasons. First, the President is a necessary actor in international lawmaking,
but is only rarely sufficient under our constitutional system. Second, the
current process of international lawmaking has undermined democratic
growth in executive agreements is also attributable to the sheer volume of
business and contacts between the United States and other countries, coupled
with the already heavy workload of the Senate. Many international agreements
are of relatively minor importance and would needlessly overburden the Senate if
they were submitted to it as treaties for advice and consent.
U.S. Senate, Origins & Development, Powers & Procedures, Treaties,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/rreaties.htm (last visited
Sept. 14, 2009).
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accountability. And third, there is no necessary tradeoff between democratic
accountability and desirable policy outcomes: more democratic international
lawmaking can lead to more effective international law.
In arguing for more oversight of presidential international lawmaking by
Congress and the U.S. public, I do not mean to sentimentalize Congress or
suggest that it is without flaws. Quite the contrary. The story I have told
indicates just how dysfunctional and myopic Congress can be.214 What I intend
to argue instead, is that these two imperfect institutions -Congress and the
presidency - can produce together law that is better in a variety of respects than
that which either would produce alone. At the same time, greater transparency
can make possible informal oversight that can be as powerful and effective as
more formal systems of approval.
A. The President Is a Necessary but Rarely Sufficient Actor in International
Lawmaking
The President plays a distinctive role in foreign affairs in the United States.
The President is the voice of the nation on the international stage as well as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. As a result, the President is an
essential player in international lawmaking. Without the President's support,
new law cannot be created. Yet the basic principles that underlie the American
constitutional order are not suspended in foreign affairs. While the President is
necessary to making international law, his unilateral support is not sufficient
except in limited circumstances. Here I pause to outline the distinctive powers
of the President in international lawmaking and the limits on those powers. I
conclude by showing how ex ante congressional-executive agreements
sometimes test and perhaps even stretch beyond these limits.
1. The President Is the Sole Voice of the United States on the International
Stage
The President is the sole actor charged with representing the United States
on the international stage. This important and distinctive role has been read on
214. For more on the flaws of Congress, see, for example, JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF
CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2005), which examines the failure of the American political system-including Congress-
to accurately reflect the interests and preferences of the public; and THOMAS E. MANN &
NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: How CONGRESS Is FAILING AMERICA AND
How To GET IT BACK ON TRACK (20o6), which examines how and why "Congress is failing
America."
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occasion to mean that the President has extensive unilateral power in foreign
affairs."I This reading is overbroad. The President's role as the sole legal
representative of the United States makes him an essential player in the
international lawmaking process. But it does not make him the only player.
Instead, the Constitution makes clear that even the President's power to
communicate on behalf of the nation is limited by the constitutional rights and
responsibilities of the other branches of government.
The President possesses unilateral power to negotiate an agreement with a
foreign party. This has been true from the earliest days of the United States.
The Constitution provides that the Senate must offer "advice and consent" to
an Article II treaty. Yet as early as the presidency of George Washington, the
"advice and consent" of the Senate was effectively reduced to "consent. ''2 '6
The unique presidential role does not end with negotiations, however. It
extends to the entire process of communicating with foreign nations. Indeed,
throughout U.S. history, presidents of all political persuasions have defended
the institution's role as the sole means of communication with foreign nations.
While serving as Secretary of State, Jefferson informed the French Minister to
the United States that the President is "the only channel of communication
between this country and foreign nations."21 7 In 1877, Congress passed two
joint resolutions congratulating the Argentine Republic and Republic of
Pretoria on having established a republican form of government and directing
the Secretary of State to communicate with the two countries. The President
vetoed both resolutions2 '8 In 1920, President Wilson refused to give notice of
21s. This view appears most strikingly in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.: "[T]he
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes
treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of
negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it." 299
U.S. 304, 319 (1936). For further discussion of this issue, see Hathaway, supra note 11, at
133o n.278.
216. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 177 (2d ed. 1996).
217. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFARS: AN ESSAY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 53 (2002). A more complete quote is as follows: "[The
President] being the only channel of communication between this country and foreign
nations, it is from him alone that foreign nations or their agents are to learn what is or has
been the will of the nation ...." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond C. Genet (Nov.
22, 1793), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1895).
218. 1 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 89, § 199 (1910). Twenty years later, a congressional committee
echoed the presidential view: in 1897, the Committee on Foreign Relations concluded that
"[t] he executive branch is the sole mouthpiece of the nation in communication with foreign
sovereignties." EDWARD S. CORWIN, 1787-1984, at 219 (1984) (quoting the Committee on
Foreign Relations).
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the termination of treaties despite being "authorized and directed" to do so by
Congress. He responded that the direction was not "an exercise of any
constitutional power possessed by Congress."2 '9
The principle of executive control over communication with foreign
governments was further entrenched with the Supreme Court's holding in
1936 in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that "the President alone
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes
treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into
the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it." ' The Court repeated the oft-cited statement by John
Marshall in the House of Representatives on March 7, 18oo, that, "[t]he
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations." 1 This sweeping language has since then
been frequently cited to support claims of executive power to act without
congressional authorization in foreign affairs.
Yet to say that the President has the "power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation" or that he is the "sole organ" of the federal
government in international relations does not mean that the President has
exclusive authority over the nation's foreign affairs. The power to
communicate does not of necessity imply a unilateral power to make foreign
policy.2 Instead, it means something quite a bit more limited: the President is
empowered to act as the formal legal representative of the United States and is
therefore uniquely empowered to speak with foreign entities on behalf of the
United States.
It is important, moreover, to note not simply the powers the Constitution
grants to the President alone, but also those it does not. Although the President
has the power to communicate on behalf of the nation, even this power is not
entirely unfettered. While the President may receive ambassadors from foreign
states on his own, he may not appoint ambassadors to represent the United
States abroad without first obtaining the consent of the Senate. This constraint
219. CORWIN, supra note 218, at 220.
220. 299 U.S. at 319.
221. Id. (quoting lo ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (18oo) (statement of Rep. Marshall)).
222. As Louis Henkin points out, the quote from Marshall supports the more limited reading:
"Marshall was justifying an extradition to Great Britain of Jonathan Robbins, assumed to be
a U.S. citizen . . . ." Because a request for extradition involved a "national demand made
upon the nation," it could only be made by the President because he was the sole channel of
communication. HENKIN, supra note 216, at 339-40 n.19 (quoting Ruth Wedgwood, The
Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, ioo YALE L.J. 229 (199o)). Indeed, Jefferson's
letter to the French Minister reflects this view. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 217.
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was quite intentional and serves as one of several indications that the Founders
did not intend to give the President the authority over foreign affairs then
possessed by the English King (who could both receive and appoint
ambassadors without the assent of Parliament).223
Nonetheless, the sole power to communicate on behalf of the nation on the
international stage is not to be underestimated. It is, indeed, extremely
important. It carries with it an absolute veto power over international
lawmaking. If the President is the sole means of communication on the
international stage, then the President and only the President can communicate
the country's consent to an international agreement. Hence, even if Congress
fully supports an international agreement, that agreement cannot be made
unless and until the President communicates the country's assent. Congress
cannot force an unwilling President to consent to an agreement2 4 The
President may refuse to negotiate with a foreign country, decline to submit an
Article II treaty to the Senate for its "advice and consent," or even refuse to
ratify a treaty after the Senate has approved it.22 The power to communicate
on behalf of the United States arguably also entails the sole power to withdraw
from international agreements226
But the proposition that the President is solely empowered to speak on
behalf of the United States in foreign affairs does not require the conclusion
that the President is the only relevant actor in foreign affairs. It simply means
that the power to represent the nation is granted exclusively to the President.
Even that power of communication, however, is constrained in important ways
by the Constitution and, through it, by the actions of the other political
223. There are three other important instances in which the Founders gave Congress powers that
were unfettered executive prerogatives of the English King. First, although the President is
Commander-in-Chief of the army, it is Congress that has the power to declare war. Second,
the Constitution grants Congress the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal. Third,
the President must obtain the consent of two-thirds of the Senate in order to make a treaty.
In each case, the Founders intentionally departed from English precedent that had granted
unilateral power to the King. See Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign
Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527, 530-34
(1974)-
224. See CORWIN, supra note 218, at 219-23; 1 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 89, at 468 ("[I]t is, of
course, improper for the Senate or any other organ of the Federal Government, by
resolution or otherwise, to attempt to communicate with a foreign power except through the
President."); H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 546-49 (1999) (discussing the President's
role as the "Constitutional Representative" of the United States abroad).
225. For similar points, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERIcA's CONSTITUION: A BIOGRAPHY 192
(2005).
226. See Hathaway, supra note ii, at 1323-38.
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branches. What may be communicated, and when, is at least in part dictated by
the allocation of powers outlined in the Constitution. For example, it is widely
agreed that the President may not bind the United States to an Article II treaty
unless two-thirds of the Senate consents to it. Had President George W. Bush,
for example, "communicated" the United States's ratification of the Law of the
Sea Convention (which has been submitted to the Senate as an Article II treaty
but has not been approved), that action would have been universally viewed as
patently unconstitutional and hence invalid both as a matter of international
and domestic law.227 Similarly, were the President to conclude an executive
agreement with another nation to jointly abolish the countries' judiciaries, that
agreement would be unquestionably unconstitutional and hence invalid.
These extreme examples may not be plausible (one hopes), but they serve
to make an important point: the President has a unilateral, but not
unconstrained, power to communicate with foreign nations. The question is not
whether there are limits on the President's power to communicate and hence to
make international legal commitments, but what they are. The answer must
come from a close examination of the allocation of powers among the
President, Congress, and the courts. The next Subsection begins this inquiry
by examining constitutional limits on the President's unilateral international
lawmaking power.
2. The President's Unilateral International Lawmaking Powers and Its
Limits
The President has the power to make international agreements entirely on
his own inherent constitutional authority. Yet that power is not unlimited. The
limits are supplied not by international law-which has nothing to say about
the internal process nations use to determine whether to consent to
international legal commitments-but by domestic law. In the United States,
227. It would be invalid as a matter of domestic law because the agreement would not meet the
requirements necessary to make the agreement a "treaty" that must be treated as the
"Supreme law of the land." U.S. CONST. arts. II, VI. It would be invalid as a matter of
international law because the violation of U.S. internal law would be "manifest" under the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, which provides that a State may "invoke the fact
that its consent to be bound by a treaty... has been expressed in violation of a provision of
its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent" to a
treaty if "that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental
importance." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 46, § i, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331. The treaty further defines a "manifest" violation as follows: "A violation is
manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in
accordance with normal practice and in good faith." Id. art. 46, § 2.
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the central source to which we must turn is the U.S. Constitution, which is the
source of both the President's unilateral international lawmaking authority and
the limits thereon.
As detailed above, the President is an absolutely necessary and essential
actor in international lawmaking. Yet the fact that the President's approval is
necessary to create international legal commitments does not mean that his
approval is sufficient to create international legal commitments. In fact, the
President's approval is only sufficient, by itself, in those limited cases in which
the President acts within his own constitutional authority.228 As Justice Jackson
explained in Youngstown, when the President "acts in absence of either a
constitutional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers."229 In other words, any time the President acts beyond
his own independent powers (including when he concludes ex ante
congressional-executive agreements), genuine collaboration between Congress
and the President is necessary.
The term "sole executive agreement" is used in many different contexts.
For the moment, I wish to focus on just one: where the President concludes an
agreement without any prior approval by Congress or the Senate through prior
legislation or a prior treaty obligation. Such agreements rest entirely on the
President's sole constitutional powers and are limited to the bounds of that
authority. As the Restatement puts it, "the President, on his own authority, may
make an international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his
independent powers under the Constitution." 3' The question that has to be
asked in determining whether an agreement may be rightfully concluded as a
sole executive agreement, therefore, is whether the agreement may properly
rest on that authority alone. That, in turn, depends on the allocation of powers
between the President and Congress in the U.S. Constitution.
To see why the President's power to make sole executive agreements is
limited to commitments that are within the President's own constitutional
powers, consider a sole executive agreement that commits the United States to
spend money. Such an agreement would require the appropriation of money in
order for the United States to comply. Yet the power to appropriate money
belongs not to the President alone but first and foremost to Congress, which
possesses the unique constitutional "spending power." 3' The President may
228. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 303(4) (1987).
229. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
230. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 303(4).
231. The Constitution provides that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imports and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
propose budgets and may veto proposed appropriations (a veto that may be
overridden), but the President may not commit funds without Congress's
participation and approval. To take another example, the President may not
conclude a sole executive agreement that commits the United States to go to
war. Once again, that is because although the President is Commander-in-
Chief, it is Congress, not the President, who has the constitutional power "to
declare war."232
Another way to put the limitation is as follows: the President may not
commit the United States to an international agreement on his own if he would
be unable to carry out the obligations created by the agreement on his own in
the absence of an agreement. Hence, the President cannot enter an agreement
that requires the appropriation of funds or declares war without congressional
approval of the agreement, because the President cannot take these actions in
the absence of an agreement. The President may not use a sole executive
agreement with another nation, in other words, to expand his powers beyond
those granted to him in the Constitution.
In part as a result of these strict limitations, there have been relatively few
sole executive agreements over the past twenty years. It appears that fewer than
ten percent of international agreements by the United States were concluded
on the President's sole constitutional authority.233 The vast majority of
agreements were instead concluded as ex ante congressional-executive
agreements. As I shall argue in the next Subsection, these agreements may
satisfy the formal requirement of interbranch cooperation but they fall short of
satisfying the spirit of, or rationale for, the requirement.
3. Ex Ante Congressional-Executive Agreements Satisfy the Form, but Not
the Function, oflnterbranch Cooperation
As shown in Part I above, most executive agreements are not concluded on
the President's constitutional authority alone, but are instead ex ante
congressional-executive agreements - agreements entered by the President
pursuant to prior congressional statutory authorization. These agreements,
therefore, rely upon the shared constitutional authority of Congress and the
welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 1. Indeed, spending bills must
originate in the House. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. I ("All bills for raising revenue shall originate in
the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as
on other bills.").
232. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. ii.
233. Author's calculations from Oceana Database. My findings are roughly similar to those of a
study prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. See supra note 125.
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President, and are not limited to the bounds that constrain sole executive
agreements. Although the agreements rely on the two branches' joint
authority, most ex ante congressional-executive agreements involve very little
true interbranch cooperation. Once Congress grants authority to the President
to conclude an agreement, it has little or no involvement in the agreement-
making process. Congressional-executive agreements possess the form of
congressional-executive cooperation without the true collaboration that it
implies.
As noted above, when the President acts alone (as, for example, when he
concludes a sole executive agreement), he is limited to the actions that are
within his own independent powers. Yet "[w]hen the President acts pursuant
to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate."2 4 Hence, the President's authority is markedly
strengthened when his or her actions have the approval of Congress.23 A sole
executive agreement -particularly a controversial one relating to an issue of
intense domestic political debate - does not carry the same force.
Congressional-executive agreements also have much greater preemptive
power than do sole executive agreements. Sole executive agreements, which are
concluded by the President alone, carry force only so long as they are not
inconsistent with a federal statute. In a clash between ordinary federal
legislation and a sole executive agreement, the legislation is given primacy
unless the sole executive agreement was expressly intended to effect a treaty
obligation, in which case the last-in-time rule is applied.236 Moreover, a sole
executive agreement that exceeds the President's own constitutional authority
is also likely to be found unenforceable in domestic court. It is as yet not
entirely settled whether an ex ante congressional-executive agreement that
conflicts with an earlier statute is similarly unenforceable. Many, however,
argue that ex ante congressional-executive agreements have the force of federal
234. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
235. Jackson wrote: "In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may
be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty." Id. at 635-36.
236. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953) (finding that an executive
agreement contravening provisions of import statute was unenforceable), affd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 &
cmt. c (1987) ("[A]n executive agreement pursuant to a treaty derives its authority from that
treaty and has the same effect as the treaty to supersede an earlier inconsistent federal statute
(or an earlier United States agreement) in United States law." (internal cross-references
omitted)).
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law.237 That means that if such an agreement conflicts with an earlier statute,
the later-in-time agreement will likely take precedence.
When Congress authorizes the President in advance to conclude an
executive agreement, that authorization expands the permissible scope and the
legal force of the agreement. And yet, as we have seen, true congressional
participation is minimal. Many agreements today are concluded under broad ex
ante authority granted to the President by Congress four or five decades earlier
in a vastly different context. Indeed, the label given to the agreements-
"congressional-executive agreements" -suggests a collaboration in making the
agreement that does not really exist. Even though the agreements have been
"approved" by Congress in the narrow legal sense, there is little genuine
cooperation between the President and Congress in the process of creating the
agreements.
As a result, most ex ante congressional-executive agreements, while
narrowly legal, are inconsistent with the basic underlying principles of the U.S.
constitutional order. At a minimum, they evade the central purpose of the
constitutional separation of powers among the branches. The separation of
powers requires interbranch cooperation to govern and allows each branch to
"check and balance" the others. Most significant acts of governance require the
separate branches to work together. In this way, the Constitution facilitates a
degree of specialization, provides for government policy that reflects a variety
of constituencies, and protects the public from a single bad decision or
wayward institution.238 Congressional-executive agreements upset this delicate
balance. When Congress gives away very broad international lawmaking
237. There are conflicting views on the issue. On the one hand, David Golove writes, "The
longstanding majority view, and the settled practice, is that treaties and congressional-
executive agreements, whether ex ante or ex post, are wholly interchangeable." David M.
Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1791, 1799 (1998). Yet the sources
cited in support of this proposition focus on ex post congressional-executive agreements,
rather than ex ante congressional-executive agreements. The Restatement offers a somewhat
more qualified view: "A Congressional-Executive agreement draws its authority from the
joint powers of the President and Congress and supersedes any prior inconsistent federal
legislation (or United States agreement). However, Congressional authorization to make an
executive agreement that would supersede federal law is not to be inferred lightly."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 cmt. c (1987) (internal cross-
references omitted). Louis Henkin, for his part, acknowledges that a congressional-executive
agreement approved by a simple majority of both houses is equivalent to a treaty and hence
can supersede an earlier treaty or statute, HENKIN, supra note 216, at 215-18, but he is not
clear about the relative legal status of a congressional-executive agreement authorized by
Congress in advance.
238. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 84, at 230-322; AMAR, supra note 225, at 64; Bruce Ackerman,
The New Separation of Powers, 113 MARv. L. REv. 633 (2000).
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authority to the President, the agreements that result are rarely a product of
interbranch cooperation. Once it has given away the power to conclude
agreements on a given topic, Congress generally has no involvement in shaping
the agreements and is nearly powerless to prevent an agreement with which it
disagrees from becoming law.
The absence of genuine cooperation between the branches of government
in creating the agreements is not simply inconsistent with abstract
constitutional principles. It also gives rise to two concrete problems. The first is
the absence of democratic accountability that results when law on a wide range
of issues - some bearing on important issues of national interest - is made by a
single branch of government. The second is that the agreements that result
from this lopsided process may in fact serve the national interest less well than
they would were Congress more involved in the international lawmaking
process. I turn now to outlining each of these concerns in more detail.
B. Unilateral Presidential Power Threatens Democratic Accountability
This Article has aimed to demonstrate that the President currently exercises
unilateral power over most international lawmaking in the United States. The
previous Section argued that this unilateralism is contrary to the system
established by the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution grants the President a
distinctive, indeed central, role in international lawmaking, but not an
unlimited one. Ex ante congressional-executive agreements test and even
stretch beyond these constitutional limits.
It is well established that these limits exist. However, little attention has
been paid to the reasons for these limits - and hence what is lost when they are
exceeded. Why are there limits on the President's authority over international
lawmaking? One answer that I examine in this Section is that limits on
presidential unilateralism in international lawmaking promote democratic
accountability. I also explain why this is not a challenge to the modern
administrative state-why, that is, delegations of authority over international
lawmaking raise concerns that have been largely addressed in the context of
domestic delegations. Finally, I argue that congressional control over
appropriations is not, by itself, a sufficient check on presidential power over
international lawmaking.
1. In Defense of Democratic Accountability in International Lawmaking
The separation of powers among the branches of government is often cited
as the unique genius of the U.S. Constitution. In James Madison's vision, "the
interior structure of the government" would be "so contriv[ed] . . .as that its
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several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of
keeping each other in their proper places." '239 The system of government
created by the Constitution would rely on competition between the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches to police the institutional boundaries of each
and thereby prevent tyranny by any. This system of "balances and checks" 4
would harness "[a] mbition... to counteract ambition." 4
As many have pointed out in recent years, the system never worked
precisely as intended. "42 The rise of political parties, in particular, was not
anticipated by the Founders and did not fit well with the system they had
designed. 43 Cross-branch alliances between members of the same party served
to dampen the interbranch competition that was to drive the system.
Particularly in times of unified government, Congress has shown itself much
less likely to hold the President accountable, and the President has been less
likely to challenge the actions of Congress by, for example, vetoing its
decisions.
And yet there remains an important function for the existence of rivalrous
branches of government with incentives to monitor one another's behavior.
The division of governing power into two separate institutions creates, as
Levinson and Pildes once put it, a form of "intragovernmental" accountability
that "allows government officials not just to report each other's bad behavior to
the electorate, but also to preempt it through the exercise of constitutional
powers."'  Thus even critics of the Founding vision seem largely to agree that
the separation of powers among the branches serves to encourage government
accountability and discourage misbehavior."5
239. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
240. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72 (Alexander Hamilton).
241. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 239, at 322.
242. E.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARv. L.
REv. 2311 (2006).
243. Id. Levinson and Pildes not only claim that the Founders failed to anticipate the rise of
parties, they argue that "[a]s competition between the legislative and executive branches
was displaced by competition between two major parties, the machine that was supposed to
go of itself stopped running." Id. at 2313. The history traced in Part II largely supports this
claim and even deepens it by adding an inter-temporal feature: power delegated by
Congress to the President during times of unified government can undermine Congress's
ability to check the exercise of presidential power even in subsequent periods of divided
power.
244. Id. at 2343.
245. To be sure, the Constitution has been criticized as insufficiently democratic more than once.
See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2001);
SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
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Ex ante congressional-executive agreements frustrate this process by
placing most of the power to conclude international agreements in a single,
unmonitored branch of government. Congress, having granted authority to the
President to conclude agreements for more than one hundred different topics
(usually during periods of unified government when suspicion of the President
was low), now finds itself entirely disempowered. Even its last tool for
encouraging some degree of cooperation-the legislative veto-is no longer
available to it. Only by passing a new law may Congress reject an agreement or
undo a grant of lawmaking authority. But even then the President holds the
upper hand, as he possesses the power to veto these changes.
Some would argue that this is appropriate in the field of international law,
that checks and balances only apply to governmental actions insofar as they
have domestic effects. John Yoo, for example, has argued that the Constitution
grants the President "the leading role in foreign affairs." 6 As a result, he has
argued, the separation of powers that applies in the domestic context does not
apply to the same extent when the President makes or enforces international
legal obligations."
There is little support for this view in the law. As noted above, the
President has the unilateral power to communicate with foreign governments,
but this power does not require or imply unilateral power over all foreign
affairs. Indeed, the Supreme Court decisively rejected the claim that the
Youngstown framework does not apply to matters involving international law in
its decision in Medellin v. Texas.' 8 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts
applied the separation of powers framework first outlined in Youngstown to the
international law issues before it. The Court concluded that while the foreign
GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). My claim is simply that
the system as it currently operates is much more successful at securing democratic
accountability in the domestic context than in the international one.
246. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 102-03
(2006); see also John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REv. 851, 874-75 (2001) (reviewing FRANCES
FITZGERALD, WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, STAR WARS AND THE END OF THE COLD
WAR (2000)) [hereinafter Yoo, Politics as Law] (discussing "the President's constitutional
and structural superiority in conducting foreign affairs," and the "overwhelming executive
dominance in foreign affairs"). Supporters of this view generally turn to the Supreme
Court's decisions in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1963),
which recognizes "the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations," and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 68o (1981), to support
their view. In so doing, they usually pointedly ignore Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
247. Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 246, at 868-76.
248. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
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policy interests of the President were "plainly compelling," they "do not allow
us to set aside first principles." 49 Instead, it explained, "Justice Jackson's
familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating
executive action in this area. '20 Applying this framework, the Court concluded
that the President had exceeded his constitutional power. 25'
The claim that separation of powers over international law is somehow
unimportant is not only wrong as a matter of law. It also reflects an
understanding of international lawmaking that is rooted in the past, in a time
when international law and domestic law could be more easily disentangled.
Those days are quickly receding. Today the line between international and
domestic law is increasingly blurry. For example, in 2008, the United States
concluded an agreement with Mexico on cooperation in science and technology
for homeland security matters. In it, the two countries agreed to establish a
framework to encourage cooperative activity for the "prevention and detection
of homeland security threats," "the forensics and attribution of terrorist
threats," "the protection of critical infrastructure," and "crisis response and
consequence management and mitigation for high consequence events." '
Around the same time, the United States entered an agreement with France for
249. Id. at 1368. The more complete quote is as follows:
The United States maintains that the President's constitutional role
"uniquely qualifies" him to resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions that bear
on compliance with an [International Court of Justice] decision and "to do so
expeditiously." . .. In this case, the President seeks to vindicate United States
interests in ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention,
protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating commitment
to the role of international law. These interests are plainly compelling.
Such considerations, however, do not allow us to set aside first principles.
The President's authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power,
"must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."
Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite scheme [from Youngstown] provides the
accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.
Id. at 1367-68 (citing Youngstown, 342 U.S. at 585) (some internal citations omitted).
250. Id. at 1368.
251. The restrictions on presidential power over international law far predate Medellin. In 1974,
Arthur Bestor persuasively argued that the Founders prescribed "[a] system of checks and
balances... as explicitly for the conduct of foreign relations as for the handling of domestic
matters, even though the precise allocations of power are different in detail." Bestor, supra
note 223, at 531.
2S2. Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology for Homeland Security Matters,
U.S.-Mex., Apr. 21, 2o8, Temp. State Dep't No. o8-141, 2oo8 U.S.T. LEXIS 67.
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the exchange of engineers and scientists.5 3 These are just two typical examples
of the many agreements entered in 2008 in which it is difficult, if not
impossible, to separate the domestic and international effects. Hence concerns
about democratic accountability cannot simply be dismissed as inapplicable to
international law.
I have argued here that limits on presidential unilateralism in international
lawmaking can promote democratic accountability. A natural question follows:
if limits on presidential unilateralism are needed in the context of international
lawmaking, then are these same limits necessary for domestic lawmaking? In
other words, is this simply the familiar critique of the modern administrative
state, applied this time to international law? In the next Subsection, I explain
why it is not-why international delegations and domestic delegations are
different and why, therefore, the call offered here for new limits on presidential
power over international law does not require (or preclude) new limits on
presidential power over lawmaking and rulemaking that is primarily domestic
in character.
2. International Delegation and Domestic Delegation Compared
A close observer of the debates over democratic accountability in U.S.
administrative law during the past half-century will undoubtedly detect echoes
of that debate in the foregoing discussion. Many complaints similar to those
made above have been made regarding the modern administrative state. In part
in response to such concerns, the period since the New Deal has seen the
emergence of a wealth of both formal and informal administrative mechanisms
that aim to secure accountability in the domestic context. While far from
perfect, they have succeeded to a significant extent. But few of these
mechanisms for maintaining accountability exist in the international
lawmaking context. In short, delegations in the domestic and international
context raise similar accountability issues, yet those issues have been at least
partly addressed in the domestic context while almost entirely ignored in the
international context.
Richard Stewart famously struggled with the effort to "reconcile the
discretionary power enjoyed by agencies with the basic premise of the liberal
state that the only legitimate intrusions into private liberty and property
253. Agreement Regarding the Exchange of Engineers and Scientists, U.S.-Fr., Jan. 29, 20o8,
Temp. State Dep't No. o8-45, 20o8 U.S.T. LEXIS 11.
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interests are those consented to through the legislative process."2 4 Theodore
Lowi, too, criticized the "conversion of delegation from necessity to virtue,"2
s
documenting the growth during the period after World War II of government
through delegation to administrative agencies captured by interest groups." 6
The concerns that Stewart, Lowi and others before and after them have raised
regarding delegation in the domestic context have served as grist for several
generations of administrative law scholars. Yet as real as these concerns may
remain, they have been addressed at least to a degree through the development
of both formal and informal mechanisms of oversight.2 7
254. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1669 (1975).
255. THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC
AUTHORITY 145 (1969); see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 12 (1938)
(arguing that when government seeks to regulate business it "vests the necessary powers
with the administrative authority it creates, not too greatly concerned with the extent to
which such action does violence to the traditional tripartite theory of governmental
organization"); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (arguing that delegation of rulemaking
authority to agencies is antithetical to democratic accountability); Robert G. Dixon, Jr.,
Congress, Shared Administration, and Executive Privilege, in CONGRESS AGAINST THE
PRESIDENT 125, 125 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr. ed., 1975) ("The history of legislative-
executive relationships has been marked by a steady pressure from Congress to adopt
measures and procedures conceptually closer to a regime of shared powers than to the
separation the framers envisaged. The executive has lately responded with theories of
absolute discretion."); Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A
Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1134 (1954) ("Much of what the agencies do is the
expectable consequence of their broad and ill-defined regulatory power."). But see Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U.
L. REV. 391, 392 (1987) (critiquing Lowi's call to resurrect the nondelegation doctrine); Peter
H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
775, 783-90 (1999) (responding to Schoenbrod by examining ways in which agencies are
held democratically accountable).
256. Lowi's work was immensely influential and led a generation of political scientists to examine
the relationship between administrative agencies and interest groups. In recent years,
however, some scholars have turned Lowi's observations on their head, examining how
interest groups can play a role in monitoring agency actions and hence improve governance
and accountability. Some of this work is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes
266-269.
257. There is an extensive and ongoing debate over whether agencies are sufficiently accountable
to Congress. Compare Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control
of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 481-82 (1989) (concluding that Congress "can provide
effective control over agency decisions" by placing ex ante procedural constraints on them),
with Terry M. Moe, The Politics ofBureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN?
267, 327-29 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (arguing that agencies have been
largely successful at resisting congressional efforts to assert control over them). I do not
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Chief among the formal mechanisms is the Administrative Procedure Act of
19462"' (APA), sometimes referred to as the "bill of rights for the new
regulatory state."'2 9 The APA requires that administrative agencies follow set
procedures for giving public notice of and opportunity to comment on
proposed regulations. The APA requires publication of a notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register. The notice must include "(1) a statement of
the time, place and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to
the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms
or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues
involved. "126' The Act also sets out a process for federal courts to review directly
agency decisions. This judicial review of agency decisions serves to ensure
compliance with agency rules and operates as a check on the exercise of agency
discretion and unilateral power. 6' Courts may find, for example, that rules
extend beyond the statutory authority granted to the agency by Congress.
Together, these provisions are meant to ensure that the public remains
informed of the procedures and rules that govern agency action, the public is
afforded an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process, there are
uniform standards for formal rulemaking and adjudication, and the scope of
judicial review of agency decisions is well defined.
The APA applies extensively to nearly every agency decision, but it
expressly exempts foreign affairs. 62 Hence, international agreements are not
subject to the same notice and comment rulemaking procedures that apply to
nearly every other administrative rule and regulation issued by the U.S.
government. 63 Moreover, no alternative oversight mechanism stands in its
place. As a result, the public is neither well informed about the executive
attempt to resolve that here. My argument is simply that there are mechanisms that have
had some measure of success at securing accountability- and that these mechanisms do not
extend to international lawmaking.
258. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006).
259. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New
Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1557, 1558 (1996).
26o. 5 U.S.C. § 55().
261. See Stewart, supra note 254, at 1674-76 (noting that in the traditional model of
administrative law (which he questions), judicial review operates to ensure agency
compliance with decisional procedures and with rules set out by the legislature).
262. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (stating that the rulemaking requirements do not apply to "a military or
foreign affairs function of the United States").
263. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) defines an "agency" as "each authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency," with the
exception of several enumerated authorities, including the U.S. Congress, U.S. courts, and
governments of territories or possessions of the United States.
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agreements that are concluded, nor does the public have an opportunity to
participate in the process of making the agreements. Indeed, most agreements
are usually not made public until well after they have been concluded and
entered into effect. Until fairly recently, the text of many executive agreements
was not available until at least a year after they were concluded. Moreover, the
courts frequently defer to the President over questions involving international
lawmaking.264 This lies in contrast with direct review of domestic agency
decisions under the APA. Indeed, in the international arena, judicial review
rarely operates as a check on the exercise of presidential authority, because
courts have proven extremely wary of questioning executive exercise of
discretion in the foreign affairs context.
In addition to the formal rules of the APA, there are a variety of ex ante and
ex post controls available to Congress to oversee agencies' exercise of delegated
authority. Congress can exert ex ante control by enacting statutory language
that narrowly circumscribes the scope of agency authority and discretion.
Congress can then exercise ex post control through oversight by congressional
committees. The effectiveness of these mechanisms in the domestic context is a
matter of intense debate.26s Regardless of their effectiveness or lack thereof in
the domestic context, however, it is clear that they have been largely ineffective
in the international context. As we have seen, statutory grants of authority to
negotiate executive agreements tend to be extremely broad, providing few
substantive constraints on the agreements the President may negotiate. At the
same time, congressional committee oversight has been negligible, in large part
because the committees generally become aware of agreements only after they
have already entered into effect and because Congress is effectively unable to
reject or modify agreements with which it disagrees.
In addition to the more formal mechanisms for monitoring agency
decisions in the domestic context, there are extensive informal mechanisms as
well. Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, for example, identified what they called
"tripartism" 
-empowering public interest groups to participate in
monitoring-as a mechanism for addressing the problem of capture and
corruption in government regulation of business.266 Abram Chayes, Charles
264. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892), and its progeny.
265. For a discussion of the debate and a critique of these ex ante and ex post oversight
mechanisms, see J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition To Control
Delegated Power, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2003), which notes that Congress relies on
statutory language limiting agency discretion and on oversight by congressional committees
to control its grant of delegated power-both of which the authors maintain are a gamble.
z66. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 54-100 (1992).
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Sabel, and William Simon have emphasized "public law litigation" - public
interest advocacy that serves as an instrument of democratic accountability.26 7
And Jody Freeman has explored the essential role of private actors in securing
the legitimacy and accountability of institutions of public governance. 68 They
and others have argued that monitoring by affected interests provides an
important limitation on the exercise of authority delegated to agencies in the
domestic context.269 As the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia once put
it, "the concept that public participation in decisions which involve the public
interest is not only valuable but indispensable has gained increasing
support."
70
Once again, however, the informal mechanisms do not operate in the same
way in the international context. The informal oversight by private actors and
public interest groups depends in significant part on the advance disclosure
requirements established by the APA.2 71 In the international context, affected
267. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284,
1288-89 (1976) (arguing that the application of rule-of-law principles to the modern welfare
state had produced a new form of litigation he called "public law litigation"); Charles F.
Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARv. L. REv. iO16, 1020 (2004) (introducing the concept of "destabilization rights," which
are "claims to unsettle and open up public institutions that have chronically failed to meet
their obligations and that are substantially insulated from the normal processes of political
accountability").
268. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) (arguing
that private actors may be regulatory resources, capable of producing greater accountability
of public institutions).
269. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 254, at 176o-70. The "civic republican" defense of the regulatory
state similarly depends on interest groups organized around private interests to monitor the
state. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 1o5
AL-ARV. L. REv. 1511, 1541 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on
Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000); Note,
Civic Republican Administrative Theory: Bureaucrats as Deliberative Democrats, 107 HARv. L.
REV. 1401 (1994). Others have argued for a collaborative or cooperative approach to
administrative governance, one that sees private regulated actors not as adversaries, but as
partners in the administrative process. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in
the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1997); Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative
Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 535 (1996). For more on various
forms of oversight of agencies in the domestic context, see, for example, JOEL D. ABERBACH,
KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 88 (1990), which
details numerous ways in which Congress keeps track of the executive branch's activities,
including by reading newspapers and magazines, holding hearings, entertaining complaints
and criticisms about an agency, and reviewing information from other sources.
270. Office of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d 519, 527 (D.C. Cit.
1972).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 266-270.
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interests have neither the information nor the access necessary to monitor
international lawmaking. As noted earlier, agreements are usually not made
public until after they have been concluded and entered into effect. At the same
time, the interests that are affected are often diffuse (for example, an agreement
to engage in cooperative activities on atomic energy may affect the long-term
national security of the entire country). Not only are those in the public who
might be affected not informed about pending agreements and often not well
organized, but they also have no opportunity to express their views to those
responsible for making the agreements. There is no notice and comment
process for congressional-executive agreements or any other similar official
means by which interested actors can influence the decisionmaking process.
And the courts have proven uniformly inhospitable to challenges to
presidential action in foreign affairs. Hence, even if affected groups knew of an
agreement before it was concluded and were sufficiently well organized to be
able to intervene in the international lawmaking process, there would be no
way in which they could do so effectively.
One might argue that this problem is solved by the accountability of the
President himself. The existence of broad delegations from Congress to the
President to enter into executive agreements might be justified on democratic
grounds, "as a device for facilitating responsiveness to voter preferences
expressed in presidential elections." '272 In theory, if the voters do not like the
agreements the President concludes, they will vote him out office and those
agreements will change as a consequence. The central problem with this
defense, however, is that it assumes that voters know what agreements are
concluded. Because the agreements are not publicized, that assumption is
unlikely to be accurate. Even if the electorate were informed about executive
agreements, however, a presidential election is an extremely blunt tool for
accountability. The voters may disagree with the international lawmaking of a
President, but vote for him because they approve of his handling of, say, the
economy- an issue on which they hold more intense preferences.
Another common response to the concerns raised here is that Congress
retains sufficient control over the lawmaking process even where it has
delegated substantial control because it retains power over appropriations. I
turn next to a brief consideration of this claim.
272. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, i J.L.
ECON. &ORG. 81, 95-96 (1985).
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3. Congressional Control over Appropriations Is Not a Sufficient Check on
Presidential Power
The Constitution grants Congress the power of the purse: "No Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law . . 73 This power is generally regarded as one of Congress's most
potent powers, for it means that the federal government may not spend money
to achieve its goals without Congress's blessing. As potent as it may be,
however, Congress's power to appropriate funds does not render direct
congressional approval superfluous. This is all the more true in the context of
international lawmaking.
Some have argued that the spending power is so strong that it is sufficient,
by itself, to protect congressional prerogatives when the President acts
unilaterally.274 This argument has been made frequently in the context of
military action. Some have argued that the Constitution grants the President
the power to initiate war, allowing Congress to express its opposition by
exercising its powers over funding and impeachment. 7 Congress "has total
control over funding and the size and equipment of the military. If it does not
agree with a war or a strategy, it can cut off funds, reduce the size of units, or
refuse to provide material for it."2 76 Similarly, the Office of Legal Counsel
273- U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7.
274. For an excellent discussion of the congressional spending power, see Kate Stith, Congress'
Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988).
275. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding
of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167 (1996). The argument goes as follows: the President has
been granted all foreign affairs powers not expressly granted to Congress by virtue of the
Vesting Clause. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America."). Though it may appear that the "Declare War
Clause," id. art. I, § 8, cl. ii, gives Congress the power to initiate war, in fact it does not.
Because the power to initiate war has not been expressly assigned to Congress, it must rest
with the President (by virtue of the Vesting Clause). Congress therefore retains a check on
warmaking only through its spending and impeachment powers. See Yoo, supra. For a
similar account, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, ill YALE L.J. 231, 252-54 (2001). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S.
Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004)
(critiquing this argument as based on uncertain textual interpretation and faulty historical
assumptions about the political theory of the Founders).
276. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Katz and the War on Terrorism, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1219, 1253
(2008) (internal citations omitted). There are several scholars who do not share this view of
executive power and yet agree that statutes, including defense appropriation acts, can serve
as the basis for the constitutional commitment of U.S. forces. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY,
WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 30-
37 (1993); Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility:
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under President Clinton claimed that congressional appropriations for military
operations constituted sufficient authorization for continuing hostilities after
the expiration of the sixty day period specified in the War Powers
Resolution.277  Both argue that congressional appropriations render
unnecessary any direct congressional approval of presidential action.
Using similar reasoning, one might argue that unilateral international
lawmaking by the President is not a serious concern. Congress can, after all,
refuse to fund the agreements and thereby exercise some measure of control
over the agreement. There are several flaws in this argument. To begin with,
the broader claim on which it relies -that congressional appropriations may
substitute for direct congressional approval -is incorrect. The Supreme Court
has held that substantive enactments and appropriations measures are not
interchangeable.271 It has acknowledged that "both are 'Acts of Congress,"' but
has explained that "the latter have the limited and specific purpose of providing
funds for authorized programs. '2 79 It has further explained:
When voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to
operate under the assumption that the funds will be devoted to
purposes which are lawful and not for any purpose forbidden. Without
such an assurance, every appropriations measure would be pregnant
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1364, 1392 (1994)
("One consequence of this analysis is that statutes- defense appropriation acts, defense
authorizations -can serve as the basis on which the President may validly commit U.S.
forces without further returning to Congress for fresh mandates beyond those given by
statute."). There is extensive back-and-forth between scholars over whether Congress or the
President possesses the power to make war-and hence to what degree any use of the
military abroad must be approved by Congress. There is also debate over the further
question of whether appropriations statutes are sufficient to signal congressional approval.
The weight of authority rests with those who argue it is not sufficient. Compare KOH, supra
note 83, at 75 (explaining that the Framers granted "Congress, not the president, . . . the
dominant role" in foreign affairs, including "all manner of powers regarding raising,
supporting, maintaining, and regulating the army, navy, and militia, which could be
exercised both domestically and abroad"), 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-6, at 662-65 (3d ed. 2000) (arguing that "the Constitution
mandates a major role for Congress in supervising executive military operations" on the
grounds that the Framers "tied the military power to Congress' control of the public purse"
and that the Constitution "gives Congress a host of other military-related powers"), and
ELY, supra, with Yoo, supra note 275.
277. See Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
the Attorney Gen. (Dec. 19, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/final.htm.
278. The Court held that "repeals by implication are not favored" and, therefore, "the intention
of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest." Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 189 (1978) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974)).
279. Id. at 19o.
119:140 2009
PRESIDENTIAL POWER OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW
with prospects of altering substantive legislation, repealing by
implication any prior statute which might prohibit the expenditure.
Not only would this lead to the absurd result of requiring Members to
review exhaustively the background of every authorization before
voting on an appropriation, but it would flout the very rules the
Congress carefully adopted to avoid this need.28 °
Though the issue before the Supreme Court when it penned these words
was not whether appropriations constitute congressional approval of unilateral
executive agreements-the Court instead focused on whether later-in-time
appropriations effectively amended earlier statutes-the reasoning and
conclusion of that case are nonetheless instructive. The Court made clear that,
in its view, appropriations measures are not intended to stand in for legislative
enactments. It is inappropriate to regard appropriations measures as a
substitute for direct and explicit congressional approval-or as an adequate
means of correcting policy decisions after the fact.
Not only are appropriations measures not interchangeable with substantive
enactments as a matter of law, they are also not interchangeable as a matter of
practical effect. The congressional spending power is an extremely blunt -and
sometimes entirely ineffective- tool for guiding public policy. An exhaustive
study of the history of Congress's spending power from the Founding period
through the New Deal concluded that "Congress has not now, and has never
had, any practical means of ascertaining after the event whether its financial
authority has been respected or infringed.,2 81 This is true, the study maintains,
both of efforts to control spending in advance28 and after the fact.283 In other
28o. Id. at 190-92 ("No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation bill, or be in
order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized by law,
unless in continuation of appropriations for such public works as are already in progress.
Nor shall any provision in any such bill or amendment thereto changing existing law be in
order." (quoting House Rule XXI(2))). The Court held that the Endangered Species Act
prohibited placing into operation a dam that threatened an endangered species of fish,
despite the fact that Congress had made appropriations for the dam project after enacting
the Endangered Species Act. In so doing, it strengthened a canon of statutory interpretation
disfavoring implied repeals in appropriations bills. The Court explained, "In practical terms,
this 'cardinal rule' [that repeals by implication are not favored] means that '[i]n the absence
of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a
repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable."' Id. at 19o
(alterations in original) (citation omitted).
281. LucIus WILMERDING, JR., THE SPENDING POWER: A HISTORY OF THE EFFORTS OF CONGRESS
To CONTROL EXPENDITURES 307 (2d ed. 1971).
,82. Wilmerding writes:
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words, there is ample evidence that any effort to control public policy through
narrow limits on appropriations -for example, denying funds to carry out a
particular executive agreement -is very likely destined to fail.2
84
Presidents, moreover, have been much more aggressive in recent years in
pressing back against congressional efforts to condition appropriations. The
Bush Administration made well-publicized use of signing statements to reject
congressional conditions on the use of funds. 8s It argued that the President
possesses the right not to execute elements of the law that he believes to be
Step by step [the foregoing chapters] trace the increasing specification of
appropriations .... Step by step they trace the accompanying development,
inside and outside the law, of those compensatory devices which give the
Executive in practice a latitude which Congress would deny it in theory. The
whole story leads to the conclusion that the multiplication of appropriations, far
from securing to Congress that completeness of financial control which is, so to
speak, its constitutional birthright, has served only to make the law less certain
and to satisfy Congress with the name, rather than the substance, of power.
Id. at 195.
283. The study concludes that "the attempts of Congress to arm itself with the machinery of
retrospective control [through limits on appropriations] have altogether miscarried.
Congress has not yet succeeded in devising a system of procedure stringent enough to
render efficacious its unquestioned right to control the public expenditure." Id. at 3o8.
284. There are legal questions about whether Congress may use the spending power to guide-
some might say micromanage -the affairs of government. There are questions in particular
about whether Congress may defund minor elements in a broader package or impose
conditions on the use of appropriated funds. In my view, to the extent Congress may choose
not to appropriate any funds at all, it almost always possesses the lesser-included power to
fund some activities and not others. Congress may also impose significant conditions on the
use of those funds. However, this view is likely not without its critics. Whatever the legal
merits of micromanaging policy through appropriations, it is difficult if not impossible to
do so given modern governance structures. Under the framework established by the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 21, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
31 U.S.C. (2006)), the President authors the first draft of the federal budget and thus sets
the template for what follows. Individual appropriations bills, moreover, generally bundle
multiple appropriations into a single deal that must then be approved or rejected by
Congress and signed by the President in order to enter into effect. This makes it close to
impossible to achieve narrow policy objectives-such as defunding a particular executive
agreement -through the appropriations process.
285. See The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the judiciary,
lo9th Cong. (20o6), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/signing.pdf;
Am. BAR Assoc., TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE RECOMMENDATION (20o6), available at
http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/abafinal signingstatements_
recommendation-report_7-24-o6.pdf.; Anthony M. Bottenfield, Congressional Creativity: The
Post-Chadha Srrugglefor Agency Control in the Era of Presidential Signing Statements, 112 PENN
ST. L. REv. 1125, 1158-59 (20O8).
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unconstitutional. Presidential resistance to the exercise of congressional control
through the spending power was not new to President Bush, nor did it stop
when he left office.286 Presidents have long objected to efforts by Congress to
condition the granting of funds, particularly in cases involving military
actions.287 Although he has used signing statements less frequently than his
predecessor, President Obama has continued to use them. 
8 8
Whatever merits there may be to the argument that the spending power is
an adequate check on presidential power in domestic law, the merits are
significantly weaker when it comes to international legal commitments. That is
because requiring Congress to rely on the spending power to check an exercise
of unilateral presidential lawmaking puts it in an untenable position. When
faced with an agreement it does not support, Congress must choose between
two unacceptable options: (i) it may exercise its constitutional power over
spending and refuse to fund the executive agreement, thereby placing the
United States in violation of an international legal obligation; or (2) it may
honor the international legal obligation of the United States by providing
funding to carry out the executive agreement, but in the process relinquish its
constitutional power to exercise an independent judgment over spending.289
286. Indeed, Bush's predecessor defended the practice. Under President Bill Clinton, Walter
Dellinger wrote: "[W]e do not believe that a President is limited to choosing between
vetoing, for example, the Defense Appropriations Act and executing an unconstitutional
provision in it. In our view, the President has the authority to sign legislation containing
desirable elements while refusing to execute a constitutionally defective provision."
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the
Honorable Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, Presidential Authority To Decline To
Execute Unconstitutional Statutes (Nov. 2, 1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
nonexcut.htm.
287. Consider two examples: President Nixon signed a 1971 military authorization bill, but
objected to a provision in it (the Mansfield Amendment), which set a final date for the
withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Indochina, as being "without binding force or effect."
Statement on Signing the Military Appropriations Authorization Bill, 360 PUB. PAPERS 1114
(Nov. 17, 1971). Similarly, President Ford signed the Defense Appropriation in 1976, but
objected to a provision that restricted the President's ability to obligate funds for certain
purposes without first obtaining approval from congressional committees. He stated that he
could not "concur in this legislative encroachment," and that he would treat the restriction
"as a complete nullity." Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriation
Act, 1976, 1 PUB. PAPERS 241,242 (Feb. lO, 1976).
288. Charlie Savage, Obama Looks To Limit Impact of Tactic Bush Used To Sidestep New Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/o3/1O/US/politics/
iosigning.html.
289. It is just this kind of untenable conflict that led to the development of the longstanding
custom that funding required to carry out an Article II treaty must receive approval from
both houses of Congress before the treaty is presented to the Senate for consent (or,
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For these reasons, relying on Congress's power of the purse to control
unilateral international lawmaking by the President is neither legally nor
practically sufficient.
In this Section, I have argued that Congress's delegation of unilateral
power over international lawmaking to the President has undermined
democratic accountability. I have further claimed that while delegations in the
domestic and international context raise similar accountability issues, those
issues have been largely addressed in the domestic context while almost
entirely ignored in the international context. And, finally, I have argued that
congressional control over appropriations is not a sufficient control. Those
seeking to defend the current system might respond to these charges in one of
two ways. First, they might dispute the system's accuracy. Second, they might
respond by arguing that the deficit can be justified by reference to other goals.
A democratic deficit is justified, one might argue, if it produces more efficient
and effective policy outcomes. The next Section examines this second response,
and shows that it is premised on a false tradeoff between democratic
accountability and effective lawmaking. More balanced international
lawmaking can in fact lead to better international agreements. And in those few
instances where there is a true tradeoff between democratic accountability and
effective international lawmaking, it is possible to achieve a better balance
between the two goals than under the present system.
C. The False Choice Between Democratic Accountability and Effective
International Lawmaking
There are many who believe that international lawmaking is best left to the
President alone. Congress, they argue, is not well suited to the business of
making international legal commitments. The country needs strong, consistent
leadership in foreign affairs, and continuity in foreign policy. The person
representing the United States at the negotiating table must have the
experience and respect of those across the table, and must have the power to
negotiate an agreement that will not be amended and second-guessed. Indeed,
unilateral presidential power over international lawmaking is best for the
national interest. For these reasons, the President should be granted supremacy
in the field of foreign affairs and especially in international law.290
alternatively, the Senate's vote of consent is made conditional on the subsequent passage of
implementing legislation).
29o. ROBERT A. DAHL, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 97-99 (195o) (discussing the "case for
presidential supremacy"). One might also argue that the President is a better representative
of the national interest in foreign affairs than Congress because the President has a national
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This argument claims too much and ignores contravening pressures that
may moderate or even sometimes overcome the presumed advantages of
President-led international lawmaking. First, it fails to recognize that effective
international law requires not simply an effective negotiator, but sufficient
political support to carry out the international commitments that have been
made. Second, it ignores basic rules of diplomatic strategy that tell us that an
unconstrained negotiator can at times be weaker, not stronger, when it comes
to negotiating an agreement that is in the nation's best interests. Third, and
finally, it fails to recognize that executive actors negotiating in secret may not
have all of the information they need in order to conclude agreements that best
satisfy the interests of those back home.
1. Widespread Political Support Can Lead to More Effective International
Law
Those who claim unilateral presidential power is the key to effective
international lawmaking tend to have a myopic focus on the process of
negotiating international law. The President, the argument goes, will be much
more effective at concluding an international agreement if he is unencumbered
by the need to obtain the consent of Congress. This claim is clearly true in one
respect: the President will indeed find it easier to conclude an international
agreement if he does not have to persuade Congress to support the results. But,
such an agreement may also be less likely to be observed and enforced.
The process for creating a sole executive agreement or an ex ante
congressional-executive agreement is relatively simple. The State Department
or an agency must follow internal rules and processes (most notably the so-
called Circular 175 Procedure and attendant regulations).291 Once these internal
constituency and is better able to pursue long-term goals than, in particular, the House of
Representatives, whose members have small constituencies and two-year terms. A full
assessment of this argument is beyond the scope of this Article. It is important to bear in
mind, however, that the comparative advantages of Congress and the President vary across
issue areas. What is true of trade may not be true of food safety, for example. Moreover,
because the President may only be reelected once, the President spends, at most, one term
with direct electoral accountability.
291. 22 C.F.R. § 181.4 (1999). As part of the Circular 175 process, the State Department may
consult with Congress and interested agencies. The extent to which this occurs is difficult to
assess from the outside. Not surprisingly, I have received differing reports from staff
members in Congress and the Department of State regarding the extent of such informal
consultations. If the State Department consults informally with Congress more thoroughly
in cases where congressional support is required for implementation of the agreement -as
would seem rational-then some of the enforcement concerns noted below would be
addressed, at least in part. Nonetheless, to the extent informal consultation of this type is
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processes are satisfied, the agency may negotiate, and an authorized
representative may sign, an agreement with a foreign representative without
consulting or seeking the approval of any member of another branch of
government. The agreement generally goes into effect upon the signature of
both parties to the agreement. Though the agreement must be reported to
Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act, Congress has no power to reject the
agreement short of passing a joint resolution or statute (subject to presidential
veto). Unless implementing legislation is required to carry out the agreement,
there is little incentive even for informal consultation with members of
Congress.
The process for creating an ex post congressional-executive agreement or
Article II treaty is much more cumbersome. It requires seeking the approval of
both houses of Congress or a supermajority of the Senate. Such a process is
time-consuming, burdensome, and can be exceedingly difficult. Moreover,
there is no guarantee that the agreement-even once negotiated-will be
approved, for the President cannot always gain support for the agreements he
proposes.
The result of this more cumbersome process is an agreement that has
widespread political support and is, therefore, more likely to be observed. By
contrast, an agreement concluded without congressional approval (either a sole
executive agreement or an ex ante congressional-executive agreement) enjoys
much weaker political support and may therefore be less likely to be observed.
It is less likely to be followed, for example, by a subsequent administration. A
President that did not make the agreement himself will likely feel less
compunction about abandoning an agreement created by a predecessor who
acted entirely on his own. If an agreement was made with congressional
consent, however, a succeeding President is likely to be more cautious about
withdrawing from or failing to observe the agreement.
Moreover, an international agreement that requires the cooperation of
Congress to carry out is much more likely to be honored if Congress played a
role in creating that agreement. If Congress has approved an agreement, it is
likely to regard itself as responsible for taking the actions necessary to carry it
out. (Indeed, ex post congressional-executive agreements are usually approved
by Congress through statutes that also contain any necessary implementing
legislation.) If, however, Congress had little or no role in making the
agreement (or its role was limited to authorizing the agreement's creation
several decades earlier), Congress is less likely to regard itself as bound to take
neither required nor as extensive as a more formal process would likely be, these concerns
remain. Moreover, because informal consultation does not require Congress to take a public
position, congressional support may be less reliable than if the process were more formal.
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part in meeting the obligations the agreement creates. Congress, after all, has
had no opportunity to express its dissatisfaction with the agreement and hence
might regard the agreement as an improper infringement on the exercise of its
constitutional rights and responsibilities.
Strong and effective international agreements require widespread political
support. Though an agreement negotiated by the President alone is easier to
conclude, it can be more difficult to honor. When we focus attention not
simply on the negotiating stage of international law but also at what comes
after, we see that international law that is more difficult to make can in fact be
much more effective -precisely because it requires more widespread political
support to be made.
An advocate of presidential unilateralism in international lawmaking might
concede that international law that has congressional support is more likely to
be observed than international law created by the President alone. Yet he might
argue that the necessity of obtaining congressional support weakens the hand
of the negotiator sitting at the table. Why would our partners deal with us if
they cannot be sure that we will sign the agreement we negotiate?
The answer should be obvious. No one is more interested in creating an
agreement that the United States will live up to than the other parties to the
agreement. Creating an agreement from which a new President will withdraw
or an agreement that does not have sufficient public support to be observed by
the United States does not serve the interests of our international law partners.
Nor does it serve the United States's own broader interests in a well-
functioning international legal system.
2. An Unconstrained Negotiator Can Be Weaker, Not Stronger
An assumption often made by advocates of unilateral presidential power in
international lawmaking is that the stronger the President is at home, the
stronger he will be at the negotiating table. Yet that assumption ignores basic
diplomatic dynamics. An unconstrained negotiator may be weaker, not
stronger, when it comes to negotiating an agreement that achieves the best
outcome for the nation.
In what has become known as the "Schelling conjecture," Thomas
Schelling observed in 196o that "the power of a negotiator often rests on a
manifest inability to make concessions and to meet demands." '92 In particular,
he noted, "[i]f the executive branch is free to negotiate the best arrangement it
can, it may be unable to make any position stick and may end by conceding
292. SCHELLING,supra note 8, at 19.
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controversial points because its partners know, or believe obstinately, that the
United States would rather concede than terminate the negotiations."293 If,
however, the executive is constrained by Congress, "then the executive branch
has a firm position that is visible to its negotiating partners. 294
Robert Putnam built on Schelling's observations in his seminal work on
diplomacy and domestic politics. Putnam imagined the relationship between
international and domestic politics as a "two-level game.""'5 At the national
level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to
adopt their favored policies, and politicians seek power and influence by
constructing coalitions among these groups. At the international level,
governments aim to maximize their ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while
at the same time seeking to avoid adverse foreign developments.9 6 These two
worlds meet at the negotiating table. A negotiator constrained by the need to
obtain the support of Congress may be able to achieve a better outcome in
negotiations-by reducing the "win set" and thereby achieving a more
favorable outcome. As Putnam put it: "[t]he difficulties of winning
congressional ratification are often exploited by American negotiators.
2 97
During negotiations over the Panama Canal Treaty, for example, President
Carter wrote a letter to Torrijos warning that "further concessions by the
United States would seriously threaten chances for Senate ratification.
''
,98
If they are right, the implications of Schelling's and Putnam's work for
international law are clear. When the President is unconstrained by other
domestic players-because he is negotiating an agreement as a sole executive
agreement or an ex ante congressional-executive agreement-the actors on the
other side of the negotiating table know (or believe) that there is little
preventing the President from making concessions. Those negotiating on
293. Id. at 28.
294. Id.
295. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L
ORG. 427 (1988); see also DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND
DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds., 1993)
(building on the two-level game insight in a variety of contexts).
296. Putnam quotes a negotiator for the United States during the Tokyo Round GATT trade
negotiations saying: "'I spent as much time negotiating with domestic constituents (both
industry and labor) and members of the U.S. Congress as I did negotiating with our foreign
trading partners."' Putnam, supra note 295, at 433 (quoting Robert S. Strauss, Foreword to
JOAN E. TWIGGS, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: A CASE
STUDY IN BUILDING DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR DIPLOMACY, at vii (1987)).
297. Id. at 440.
298. Id. (quoting W. MARK HABEEB & I. WILLAM ZARTMAN, THE PANAMA CANAL NEGOTIATIONS
40,42 (1986))-
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behalf of the President are unable to point to the need to obtain congressional
support as a reason for insisting on a better deal for the United States, because
everyone involved knows that Congress is unable to reject even a
disadvantageous deal. If the other party is informed and rational, therefore, it
will insist on making the agreement that is most advantageous to it (and least
advantageous to the United States) that will not lead the President to walk
away from the agreement (or retaliate in other ways). This leads to the perhaps
counterintuitive proposition with which this Subsection began: an
unconstrained negotiator may be weaker, not stronger, when it comes to
negotiating an agreement that is best for the nation.
This work thus indicates that in order to negotiate more advantageous
agreements, the President should sometimes be more, not less, constrained.
The exact shape the constraints on the President should take will be addressed
in more detail in the next Part. I will simply note here that there are two
possible types of constraints: the President's authority could be limited in
advance, through narrower delegations of negotiating authority, or it could be
limited after the fact. The ex post constraints may, in turn, take two forms:
Congress may be required to approve the agreement or there may be some
form of administrative review after an agreement is negotiated. Advance
constraints can provide hard limits to the type of agreement that can be
negotiated. They give a clear signal to the other party that the President cannot
make concessions outside certain limits. Ex post constraints offer more
flexibility but can make the outcome less predictable. For a skilled negotiator,
ex post constraints might allow negotiation of an even more favorable
agreement. But if the negotiator misjudges the ex post constraints, the
agreement may never enter into effect.
This suggests an important consequence of imposing greater constraints on
the President's power to make international agreements. Constraining the set
of agreements that are acceptable to the United States by, for example,
requiring congressional approval of an agreement (reducing the United States's
"win set," as Putnam would put it) might result in fewer agreements. It is
possible that an agreement that would satisfy the U.S. Congress would not be
acceptable to the United States's negotiating partner. This is not necessarily a
negative consequence of requiring congressional approval. Rather, it can
sometimes be yet another argument in its favor. If an agreement fails because
negotiators were unable to conclude an agreement that has the support of
Congress, then that agreement might be best left unmade. Not only may it be
worse for the country as a whole than no agreement at all, it may be destined to
go unenforced. An agreement that cannot muster political support at the
approval stage might fail to garner that support when it comes time to enforce
the agreement. This would lead to what Putnam calls "involuntary defection,"
which is, he rightly notes, "just as fatal to prospects for cooperation as
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voluntary defection."2 99 It can also undermine the United States's reputation as
a country that can be trusted to follow through on its international law
commitments.
This is not to say that more constraints on the President are always better.
An entirely unconstrained President is unlikely to negotiate the best possible
international agreements. But an excessively constrained President will be just
as unable to pursue the national interest at the negotiating table. A President
who, for example, has little power to deliver an agreement will quickly find
other countries unwilling to enter into negotiations, for they will not wish to
waste time negotiating an agreement that will not be approved. It is also
possible that placing constraints on the President will slow the negotiation
process and thereby frustrate some efforts to create agreements even where
there are congruent preferences between the parties. Finally, the positive effect
of domestic constraints can be squandered by an uninformed executive. There
is evidence, for example, that a constrained negotiator who does not know the
other party's constraints (even though the other party knows both parties'
constraints) will, perhaps unsurprisingly, do worse in negotiations."' 0
The central proposition remains that a President who has unconstrained
unilateral power to conclude international agreements may find himself in a
weaker negotiating position than if he faced limited, but real, constraints. The
claim that a President whose actions are not subject to any oversight by
Congress is always better able to pursue the national interest on the
international stage is therefore incorrect. Within limits, the presence of
constraints on a President has the potential to make him stronger, not weaker,
at the bargaining table-and better able to strike the best deal for U.S. national
interests.
299. Id. at 439.
300. Political scientists have taken some tentative steps toward better understanding the
Schelling conjecture. Helen Milner, for example, has modeled the ratification process and
argues that it shows that in situations of asymmetric information, more divided government
(that is, greater distance between the "ideal points" of Congress and the President) does not
always lead to better outcomes for the President (that is, a result closer to the President's
ideal point) -a result she interprets as casting some doubt on the Schelling conjecture.
HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 92-93 (1997); see also Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff,
Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as
Constraints on Trade Liberalization, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 141 (1997) (considering the
Schelling conjecture in cases of divided government); Ahmer Tarar, International Bargaining
with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints, 45 J. CONFLICT R.SOL. 320 (2001) (examining the
Schelling conjecture in a situation in which both negotiators are constrained and finding
that asymmetric information sometimes eliminates the advantage that otherwise comes
from having a constrained negotiator).
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3. Executive Branch Negotiators May Not Have All Relevant Information
Those who advocate unilateral presidential power over international
lawmaking assume that the executive possesses all the information necessary to
conclude the best agreement. And yet there are cases in which information may
not be made available to the President and his representatives that could be
helpful in the negotiation process because those with relevant information are
not informed about the pending agreement -or may know of the agreement
but may have no opportunity to communicate relevant information to those
engaged in negotiations.
For example, the United States recently negotiated an Agreement on the
Safety of Food and Feed.3" ' The agreement provided for collaboration between
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and China's General
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine regarding
the safety of food and feed exported from one country to the other (though
phrased as a two-way arrangement, the intent was clearly to address U.S.
consumer fears regarding the safety of food imported from China to the United
States). The agreement set out a plan for regulatory cooperation and set up a
structure for ongoing collaboration on issues relating to food safety.
The Agreement became public on the day it was signed by the parties and
entered into force. The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy later assessed
the terms of the agreement and questioned the capacity for enforcing the
agreement both in the United States and in China.30 2 It noted that consumer
organizations had criticized the agreement for excluding products like apple
juice that had a history of food safety violations.30 3 It also pointed out that the
on-site inspection of food processing export establishments provided for in the
agreement was likely to be insufficient.30 4 Moreover, the Institute noted that
while products may be refused entry due to inspection or testing results, the
Agreement does not indicate whether information on the rate of refusal or
inspection and testing data will be made public. It commented, "[t] his review
will apparently involve only government officials with no opportunity for non-
governmental comment or reporting."3"'
301. Agreement on the Safety of Food and Feed, U.S.-P.R.C., Dec. 11, 2007, Temp. State Dep't
No. o8-12, 2007 U.S.T. LEXIS 54.
302. See STEVE SUPPAN, INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY, U.S.-CHINA AGREEMENT ON FOOD
SAFETY: TERMS AND ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY (20o8).
303. Id. at 4.
304. Id. at 6.
305. Id. at 7.
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Whether or not these critiques are well founded, there is no doubt that the
current system for making international agreements does not provide a forum
in which such criticisms may be heard by policymakers during the drafting
process. This stands in stark contrast to the domestic process for issuing
agency rules and regulations. If these commitments had been made by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) through domestic
regulations instead of an international agreement, they would have been
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and comment procedures.
This process would have allowed interested parties to be informed of the
pending arrangement and to make comments that would have informed those
in a position to change the agreement. Because the commitments were made in
an international agreement, however, there was no such process for soliciting
responses from the public. The agreement was therefore drafted without any
formal opportunity for public input.
One might object that in foreign affairs, quick and flexible decisionmaking
is necessary. The cumbersome process of obtaining congressional support so
slows decisions that it is ultimately self-defeating, even if it does produce more
information. But this argument ignores several important points. First, the
subject of this discussion is international agreements. These agreements do not
as a rule require the rapid decisionmaking sometimes involved in military
actions or pressing international crises. Second, it has long been recognized
that presidents may enter into temporary or interim agreements in cases of
pressing need where it is not possible to consult Congress. Once the immediate
crisis has passed, however, the rationale for unilateral action passes with it.
Finally, individual congressional approval of every international agreement is
not necessary to correct the imbalance identified here. As I discuss in Part IV
below, there are several measures that would maintain flexibility and yet
significantly improve oversight and accountability- and the ability of
negotiators to obtain information relevant to the agreement-in the
international lawmaking process.
This Part has argued that the case for unilateral international lawmaking
power for the President rests on normative and positive claims that threaten to
crumble upon closer inspection. First, while it is true that the President is an
essential actor in the process of U.S. international lawmaking, presidential
support is only rarely sufficient as a matter of U.S. constitutional law. Second,
the delegation of power by Congress to the President to make international law
has led to weak democratic accountability. Third, and finally, international
agreements made by the President on his own are not only not necessarily
better, they may sometimes even be worse.
The argument for unilateral presidential power over international law rests
on a false proposition about the necessary relationship between democratic
accountability and effectiveness in international lawmaking. The twin aims of
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democracy and effectiveness can lie in tension, but they can also be mutually
reinforcing. Restoring balance to the lawmaking process by allowing Congress
and the public greater influence can, as noted above, give the President more
broad-based political support to carry out international agreements, a stronger
negotiating position, and better access to information that will allow more
informed agreements. But it is important to be aware, as well, that there is a
lurking danger of overcorrection. Some reforms that would make the
international lawmaking process more democratic could also cause it to become
overburdened to the point of collapse. Any reform that undermines the ability
of the system to operate effectively and efficiently will ultimately be harmful,
not helpful.
In the next Part, I propose a two-track system for international lawmaking
that offers a way to more effectively balance these aims. This reform promises
to restore a role for Congress and the American people in the process of making
international law while at the same time making even more effective
international lawmaking possible.
IV. RESTORING THE BALANCE
The balance of power over international law has been eroding for more
than two centuries. That gradual process of erosion-which gathered steam in
the post-World War II era-has led to a system of lawmaking in which
presidential unilateralism is deeply entrenched. Restoring balance to U.S.
international lawmaking will therefore require a fundamental reorganization of
the system.
Here I propose reorganizing international lawmaking into two separate
tracks: administrative and legislative. This would make explicit what is already
implicit- that there are two kinds of international law which require different
levels of congressional involvement and which in turn should be given
different legal status. It also promises to normalize international lawmaking,
bringing it within familiar structures of administrative rulemaking and
legislation. Doing so will not only make it easier to integrate international U.S.
legal commitments into domestic law, but also allow lawmakers and
administrators to harness knowledge gained in the domestic context to
strengthen and improve the international lawmaking process. And it will allow
informal mechanisms of oversight that operate in the domestic arena to play a
more significant role in the international arena as well.
One might reasonably ask whether a proposal of this kind is realistic, given
the repeated failure of Congress to assert authority over the international
lawmaking process, as documented extensively in Part II of this Article. There
are several reasons to believe that the proposal can, indeed, succeed. First,
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Congress has failed to act in the past in part because its loss of power has been
incremental and largely hidden. It is my hope that by revealing the extent of
the problem, this Article will help create an impetus for reform that might
otherwise not exist.3" 6 Moreover, the plan offered here allows Congress to
address the entire problem in one step; rather than requiring Congress to
reverse each individual delegation of authority in each individual statute, this
proposal allows Congress to put in place an overarching system of oversight
that applies to every instance in which Congress has delegated international
lawmaking authority to the President.
A second reason to think that this reform proposal can be enacted is that it
offers Congress an option not previously on the table. Up until now, Congress
has been reluctant to address the imbalance of power in international
lawmaking in part because the only apparent alternatives were a full vote in
both the House and Senate or a two-thirds vote in the Senate alone. Obtaining
that level of support is impractical-if not impossible-for the more than three-
hundred executive agreements entered by the United States each year. The
administrative track proposed here gives Congress an intermediate option,
allowing it to exercise more effective oversight that is not excessively
burdensome.
Finally, many of the proposed reforms offered here can be put in place even
in the absence of legislation. The State Department's Office of the Legal
Adviser has the power to make significant changes in the way international law
is made on its own -for example, it could provide much greater transparency
in the lawmaking process even if Congress does not require it. In the
discussion below, I outline the unilateral steps that the Office of the Legal
Adviser could take to begin to restore the balance of power in the process of
international lawmaking.
The remainder of this Part is devoted to detailing the two tracks more
thoroughly. The first Section outlines a new administrative track. I argue that
most of the current sole executive agreements and ex ante congressional-
executive agreements should be approved under this track, which should be
patterned in part on the notice and comment model that applies to legislative
rulemaking in the domestic context under the Administrative Procedure Act.
The proposal for this new system is founded on the basic principle that
Congress and the American people should be informed about international
agreements before-not after-they become law. And they should have an
opportunity to offer feedback on proposed agreements. This formalization of
306. Congress has shown that it can and will act when faced with evidence of excessive
presidential unilateralism in international lawmaking, as it did in passing the important
Case-Zablocki Act in the early 1970s. See supra text accompanying note 159.
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administrative international lawmaking should be coupled, I argue, with
narrower statutory grants of international lawmaking authority and more
frequent use of sunset provisions in any new delegations.
The second Section details the proposed legislative track of international
lawmaking. The Article II Senate-approved treaty and the ex post
congressional-executive agreement would remain legislative options. Indeed, I
have argued elsewhere that ex post congressional-executive agreements hold
many advantages over all the alternative modes of international lawmaking and
that they should be used much more extensively than they are at present.3 °7 I
argue here for expanding the menu of available legislative options by offering a
streamlined process for congressional approval of executive agreements
patterned on the "fast track" process for trade agreements. Such a process will
allow for greater involvement by Congress while not overburdening the system
or unduly slowing the process of approval.
These proposals are necessarily broad outlines. They point the way toward
greater transparency and opportunity for public and congressional
participation in order to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the lawmaking
system. But they also seek to account for the need to maintain-and even
enhance -an effective negotiating process not overly burdened by the presence
of too many voices or excessive revisions to proposed agreements. This
discussion thus aims to offer ways to think about reform, to introduce new
ideas that can improve the international lawmaking process, and above all, to
begin a conversation about how best to achieve the multiple and sometimes
conflicting goals of the international lawmaking system.
A. A New Model ofAdministrative International Lawmaking
International lawmaking escaped the administrative law revolution of the
194os.3, 8 All foreign affairs matters-including the process of making
307. See Hathaway, supra note 11, at 1307-57.
308. Absent the exemption, it is clear that executive agreements and ex ante congressional-
executive agreements would be considered "rules" subject to the strictures of the APA. See 5
U.S.C. 5 551(4) (2006) (defining "rule"). In particular, they would be considered "legislative
rules" - that is rules that have the same binding legal effect as a statute. They would
therefore be subject to the notice and comment rulemaking requirements that apply to all
such rules. For more on the distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules, see, for
example, William Funk, Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023 (2004);
William Funk, When Is a "Rule" a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative
Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN L. REv. 659 (2002); and John F. Manning,
Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 893, 914-27 (2004). For more on "interpretive
rules," see Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy
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international law-were exempted from the Administrative Procedure Act,
which was the linchpin of the modern regulatory state that emerged after
World War 11.309 Yet the same demands for expanded regulatory authority
were as present for foreign affairs as for other areas of executive authority
during the post-World War II era. As a result, there was an exponential
increase in international agreements, most of them regulatory in nature. But
unlike in the domestic arena, there has never been any system in place to allow
effective external oversight.
It is time for that to change. A system built on the basic insights of the
legislative rulemaking process outlined in the APA can and should be put in
place.31 ° The reforms proposed here thus begin with a new model of
administrative international lawmaking patterned in part on the domestic
rulemaking process. International agreements currently approved as executive
agreements under the President's sole constitutional authority or under
authority delegated to the President by Congress would be approved instead
through this new administrative process.3" ' This reform would bring greater
transparency to the international lawmaking process and an opportunity for
the public and Congress to play a more significant role in shaping the
agreements. At the same time, it would allow for efficient and effective
lawmaking that is not subject to excess delays and endless revisions.
Below, I begin by outlining the proposal for an administrative international
lawmaking process patterned on the Administrative Procedure Act's domestic
rulemaking process. Next, I argue that the creation of a new administrative
track should be coupled with more careful delegations of international
lawmaking authority to the President. Finally, I outline the standards that will
determine which international agreements are eligible for approval through the
administrative track and which must instead be approved through the more
formal legislative process.
i. An "APA"for International Law
The administrative track for international lawmaking proposed here is self-
consciously patterned on the Administrative Procedure Act, which is generally
considered the linchpin of the modern regulatory state. The APA's basic insight
Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 520, 542 (1977); Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74
U. CHI. L. REv. 1705 (2007); and Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative
Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DuKE L.J. 346, 352.
309. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(i)(A), 553 (a)(), 554(a)(4).
310. I focus here in particular on the rules that apply to "notice and comment" rulemaking.
311. I say more in Subsection TV.A.3. about when the administrative track is appropriate.
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is simple but powerful: Congress cannot manage the regulatory demands of
the modern state on its own. Yet executive agencies must not exercise
unfettered control over rules that have the force of law. The APA offers a
compromise that allows Congress to delegate the authority to make binding
rules to executive agencies. At the same time, the APA retains a check on the
exercise of that delegated authority through notice and comment rulemaking,
which is in turn monitored through judicial review.
Before discussing the outline of the modified rules that I argue should
apply to international agreements, let me first explain why I do not advocate
what may initially appear to be the simplest solution: removing the exemption
of foreign affairs from the APA and subjecting foreign affairs to the full
strictures of "notice and comment rulemaking" that apply in the domestic
context. There is at least one key structural difference between the domestic
and international rulemaking context that leads to necessary differences in the
way comments can be solicited, received, addressed, and reviewed: an
executive agreement, unlike a domestic regulation, involves a foreign party.31
This means that changes to proposed agreements cannot be made without the
consent of the other party to the agreement. In fact, extensive revisions to the
text may lead the other party to abandon the agreement altogether.
Furthermore, a cumbersome and time-consuming process for concluding
executive agreements may serve as a disincentive to enter into negotiations
with the United States in the first place. For these reasons, I recommend a
reform based on the central insights of the domestic rulemaking process, but
modified in significant ways to fit the particular needs of the international
context.
Instead of simply subjecting international agreements to the APA, a new
administrative system based on the APA should be put in place. This system
should involve first and foremost a modified "notice and comment" procedure
for executive agreements. In particular, the single most essential reform would
312. Another key difference, as noted earlier and addressed in more detail below, is that judicial
review does not function in the same way in the field of foreign affairs as it does in domestic
law. None of these reasons were explicitly discussed on the record during the debate over
the APA at the time of its original passage. Indeed, the exemption of foreign affairs received
little attention. It was at several points referred to simply as "self-explanatory." See, e.g.,
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79 th Cong. (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in STAFF OF
S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, 79TH CONG., 1944-46, at 15, 17 (1946). A more complete explanation of the
exemption appears in the congressional record of the House proceedings: "The exemption
of military and naval functions needs no explanation here. The exempted foreign affairs are
those diplomatic functions of high importance which do not lend themselves to public
procedures and with which the general public is ordinarily not directly concerned." 92
CONG. REC. 565o (1946) (statement of Mr. Walter).
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be to increase the transparency of the international lawmaking process through
earlier and more effective "notice" of international lawmaking. As it currently
stands, Congress and the public are unable to learn much, if anything, about
executive agreements until well after they have already entered into effect. As a
result, they are unable to perform any checking function or even provide
information that might prove helpful in the process of creating the agreements.
The introduction of greater transparency into the process will serve as a
necessary precursor to opening the international lawmaking process up for
broader political debate.
The first step toward reform would be a simple revision to the Case-
Zablocki Act. Instead of requiring agreements to be reported to Congress
within sixty days after entering into effect, it would make reporting of an
agreement to Congress a prerequisite for an agreement to enter into effect.
Specifically, the amendment could provide that no executive agreement may go
into effect until thirty or sixty days after the agreement is reported to
Congress." 3 This modest revision alone has the potential to increase
congressional oversight by permitting Congress to examine agreements before
they become law. This would, by itself, play an important role in improving
the transparency of the lawmaking process and give Congress an opportunity
to raise objections to an ill-conceived agreement before it becomes a fait
accompli. It would also likely lead to significant improvements in
communication between agencies within the executive branch. At present,
executive agencies frequently enter into agreements with other nations but fail
to report the agreements to the Legal Advisor to the Department of State. As a
result, the agreements are often reported to Congress after-sometimes far
after- the sixty-day deadline established by the Act.
There are a few further steps that would improve transparency even
further. First, the Case-Zablocki Act reports should be made public at the same
time that they are provided to Congress. In other words, when an agreement is
313. A much more limited revision to the Case-Zablocki Act was in place in 2005, 2oo6, and 2007
(the revision lapsed in 20o8). It provided that
[i]f any international agreement, whose text is required to be transmitted to the
Congress pursuant to the.. . 'Case-Zablocki Act' . . . is not so transmitted within
the 6o-day period specified in that (Act], then no funds authorized to be
appropriated by this or any other Act shall be available after the end of that 6o-
day period to implement that agreement until the text of that agreement has been
so transmitted.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. 100-204, § 139(a),
1O1 Stat. 1331, 1347 (1987) (codified at i U.S.C. S 112b).
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reported to Congress, it should also be reported to the public.3"4 The Office of
the Legal Adviser at the Department of State has recently taken steps in this
direction, for which it deserves much credit. In recent years, the Legal Adviser
has been posting agreements that it has reported to Congress under the Case-
Zablocki Act on its website. It is therefore possible for members of the public to
read the agreement text and learn what agreements have recently been
concluded. That practice of rapid and accessible publication of executive
agreements should be continued.3"' Once again, however, the practice should
also be expanded and moved earlier in the process. It would be an important
step, in particular, to make agreements available to the public before they enter
into effect. This would allow public input into the process of international
lawmaking.3,
6
Second, there should be much more specific information made available
about the legal authority for the executive agreements- and it should be made
available to both Congress and the public at large. The Case-Zablocki Act
reports to Congress presently include brief background statements that
indicate the legal authority on which the President relies in making the
agreement. These statements, which are currently only informal and voluntary,
should be formalized as a statutory or regulatory requirement. They ought to
be significantly more detailed as well. At present, the statements of legal
authority in background statements are extremely rudimentary (for example,
"The United States Constitution Article II; and the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended.")."' This would not be an onerous obligation, as the
required information already exists in internal Circular 175 memos that the
Office of the Legal Adviser prepares on each international agreement. The
change would cure a fundamental problem in the present system: no one
314. As noted below, there should remain an exception for secret or classified agreements.
315. Since 2004, such publication has been required by law. See i U.S.C. § 112a(d). In the last
two years, however, the information was reorganized to make it much more readily
accessible to the public. Even more could be done-for example, creating a searchable
database.
316. Some other reforms would make the web interface more user-friendly and therefore more
useful. In particular, the addition of a search function would be an extremely useful
addition. A possible model is the web interface for the Thomas treaties database. In
addition, both databases would also very much profit from the addition of more past
agreements (the Case-Zablocki Act reports currently go back only a couple of years, and the
Thomas database only extends reliably to the 198os).
317. Letter from Laura Svat Rundlet, U.S. Dep't of State, to Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Comm. on
Foreign Relations Chair, U.S. Senate, 08-03 (Jan. 3, 2008) (on file with author) (containing
a background statement concerning the Agreement Amending the Strategic Objective Grant
Agreement for Basic Education of September 30, 2002, U.S.-Egypt, Sept. 30, 2007).
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outside of the Office of the Legal Adviser at the State Department knows the
precise legal basis under which most executive agreements exist. Making this
information available to Congress and the public would allow outside
observers to more accurately assess whether an agreement in fact falls within
the legal authority that is claimed. It would also allow Congress to better assess




Taking the first steps outlined above to improve notice to the public and
Congress about international lawmaking will open up proposed international
agreements to public scrutiny. Even without any further reforms, opening up
the process in this way will generate a public response that will enhance the
legitimacy of executive agreements and provide a greater base of information
on which government officials may draw. And, notably, many of the reforms
outlined above could be carried out by the Office of the Legal Adviser in the
absence of any new legislation. But the equation will not be complete without
the second half of the "notice and comment" process- that is, the opportunity
for public comment. Permitting public commentary on proposed legal rules is
just as important in international lawmaking as it is in domestic rulemaking for
ensuring transparency, securing the democratic legitimacy of the system, and
collecting information from members of the public who may be affected.
Rather than relying on informal feedback and outbursts of public attention,
there could be a much more careful and potentially useful system for soliciting
public feedback on proposed international agreements.
For reasons already mentioned, the process for receiving comments will
likely have to be highly modified in the international lawmaking process. It is
possible that it would be wise to collect commentary in the early stages of
negotiations with foreign partners, rather than after a text has been agreed
upon by the parties. Ideally, guidelines will be designed that will permit public
input in ways that can be helpful to negotiators- identifying issues that should
be considered, potential problems that may arise, or domestic interests that
may be affected.319 Moreover, substantive judicial review of the adequacy of
318. Making this information public would not impose an undue burden on the Office of the
Legal Adviser. The Department is already required to include an extensive discussion of the
legal basis for any agreement in the Circular 175 memo on that agreement. That discussion
may serve as the basis for the public statement of the legal foundation of the agreement.
319. One issue that will need to be resolved is the extent to which nonbinding agreements will be
subject to the new notice and comment procedures. Under the APA, nonbinding statements
are generally not subject to notice and comment. They must simply be published in the
Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. § 5 52(a)(1)(D). Nonbinding agreements are also not subject
to reporting under the Case-Zablocki Act. See 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a)(1) (2oo9) ("The parties
must intend their undertaking to be legally binding, and not merely of political or personal
effect. Documents intended to have political or moral weight, but not intended to be legally
246
119'.140 2009
PRESIDENTIAL POWER OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW
notice and comment may be more limited in the international context-both
because of time constraints and because of the international sensitivity of the
issues involved.
An important advantage of a modified system of notice and comment for
securing the legitimacy of the U.S. international lawmaking system is that it is
largely self-regulating. Those agreements that are more controversial or more
important to larger numbers of people will receive greater attention. When
such agreements are proposed to the public, actors in the political system that
oppose or support them will express their positions. This can lead to greater
scrutiny for those agreements that matter most to domestic constituencies.
Those agreements that are entirely uncontroversial or that are of little
significance, however, will likely receive less attention and hence less scrutiny.
In other words, the enhanced transparency of the system will enable a series of
informal monitoring mechanisms of the kind that currently operate in the
domestic realm to become more active in the international law arena.32" A self-
regulating system in which Congress and the public decide which agreements
binding, are not international agreements."). The danger of exempting nonbinding
agreements is that the exemption can create incentives to classify an agreement as
nonbinding in order to evade notice and comment procedures. That is a particular danger if
it is difficult to determine whether an agreement is, in fact, properly considered nonbinding.
Currently, the relevant regulations focus on the intention of the parties, which can be
extremely difficult to objectively discern. See id. If the current Case-Zablocki Act exemption
for nonbinding agreements is extended to the new notice and comment procedures, it will
be extremely important to establish much clearer guidelines for which agreements are
nonbinding and which are not-and those guidelines must be transparent and obvious to
the foreign party. The factors to be considered might include, among other things, clear
wording establishing that an agreement is nonbinding, such as "the title of the instrument;
the avoidance of mandatory language; the omission of treaty-type final clauses," ANTHONY
AUST, MODERN TREArY LAw AND PRACTICE 31 (2000), and, ideally, a clear statement of
intent of the parties to conclude a nonbinding agreement.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 266-270. To borrow McCubbins and Schwartz's famous
phrasing, it will allow "fire alarms" to be pulled by the public when a congressional response
is needed. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). In this way, the self-
regulating notice and comment process not only allows for public oversight, but it also
enhances informal congressional oversight. If there is significant controversy over a
particular executive agreement during the notice and comment process, Congress is likely to
take a second look to ensure that its delegation of authority is functioning as it intended. In
this way, the notice and comment process-and the judicial enforcement of its procedures-
allows Congress to harness the power of private actors to enhance its oversight capacity. See
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DuKE L.J. 377, 399-408 (2006) (discussing the
"administrative accountability paradigm"); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in
Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1749, 1770 (2007) ("[C]ourts force agencies to
comply with the procedures that facilitate fire-alarm oversight.").
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get closer attention is much more desirable than a system in which an executive
agency tries to determine in advance which agreements should receive more
process and which should receive less.
An additional benefit of the creation of a new administrative track is that it
would make explicit what is now implicit: that the bulk of executive
agreements are administrative in nature. This will, in turn, make it possible to
resolve issues of uncertain legal authority. As noted earlier,32' sole executive
agreements carry force only so long as they are not inconsistent with a federal
statute, unless they are intended to effect a treaty, in which case they have the
status of federal law. At the same time, a sole executive agreement that exceeds
the President's own constitutional authority is likely to be unenforceable. And
it is unsettled whether an ex ante congressional-executive agreement that
conflicts with an earlier statute is similarly enforceable.
If these agreements are instead treated as equivalent to federal regulations,
all ambiguities disappear.322 The relative legal status of regulatory rules is well
established. They receive less individualized scrutiny from Congress and enjoy
legal standing commensurate with that less formal process. Rules made in
accordance with applicable statutory procedures and within the scope of
authority delegated by Congress have been held by the Supreme Court to have
force and effect of federal law.3"3 As a consequence, such rules have been held to
321. See supra text accompanying notes 236-237.
322. It is not strictly necessary to include sole executive agreements within the scope of the APA
for international law. By definition, these agreements are concluded on the President's own
constitutional authority and hence do not require the same form of legislative oversight that
I argue should apply to agreements concluded using authority delegated to the President by
Congress. I nonetheless recommend that they be included within the new proposed system
for two reasons. First, the line between sole executive agreements and ex ante congressional
executive agreements has been blurred to the point that the differences between the two are
difficult, and sometimes impossible, to discern. Any system that exempts sole executive
agreements will therefore have to put in place a careful process for evaluating whether a
proposed agreement is truly within the President's own constitutional authority (and hence
exempt from the system) or not. If that line is not strictly policed, sole executive agreements
could provide an end-run around the approval process. Second, placing sole executive
agreements within the APA-like system would eliminate the legal ambiguity that can attach
to some sole executive agreements whose legal foundation is unclear. Any agreement that
receives approval through the new APA-like system could be relied upon by both parties to
the agreement. If sole executive agreements were exempted from the notice and comment
procedures, it would be still advisable to require them to adhere to the enhanced reporting
requirements outlined above.
323. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974) ("So long as this regulation is
extant it has the force of law .... So long as the regulation remains in force the Executive
branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States as the sovereign composed of the three
branches is bound to respect and enforce it.").
119:140 2009
PRESIDENTIAL POWER OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW
preempt inconsistent state law and are binding on federal agencies.3 4 Yet they
cannot preempt a prior statute. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources
Defense Council,32 if a statute conflicts with a regulation-even a regulation
enacted after the statute -the regulation will be struck down. Indeed, a central
purpose of judicial review of agency action is to ensure that the agency is
carrying out its duties in accordance with the will of Congress. If an agency acts
in accordance with an interpretation of relevant law that a court finds to be
erroneous - even though made in good faith - then the court will disregard the
agency's view and strike down any inconsistent rules.
Just like regulatory rules that undergo the process of notice and comment,
executive agreements that are approved through the administrative track will
have the status of federal law and hence will supersede inconsistent state law.
Yet, unlike agreements that proceed on the legislative track, they will not
supersede prior inconsistent legislation 6.3" Given the absence of express
congressional approval for the agreements, this is an appropriate result. It will
mean that it is necessary for presidents to proceed through the legislative track
if they intend to conclude an agreement that is inconsistent with a federal
statute-a result that will discourage presidents from using ex ante
congressional-executive agreements and sole executive agreements to make an
inappropriate end-run around Congress.
As with the domestic APA, judicial review will serve to ensure compliance
with the international APA. In particular, judicial review plays two important
roles in the international APA. First, it ensures that the executive branch
324. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 112-16 (2000) (holding that a legislative rule
can preempt state law); Hines v. United States, 60 F.3d 1442, 1449-50 ( 9 th Cit. 1995)
(holding that the post office is bound by rules, a holding that has been read to apply to
federal agencies more broadly), rev'd on other grounds by United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43
(2005). For more on the question of preemption-and debates surrounding it-see Stuart
Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federalism
Without Congress, 57 DuKE L.J. 2111 (2008); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative
Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DuKE
L.J. 1933 (2008); and Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DuKE
L.J. 2023 (2008).
325. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
326. This is consistent with current case law on sole executive agreements. See United States v.
Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953) (finding that an executive agreement
contravening provisions of import statute was unenforceable), affid on other grounds, 348
U.S. 296 (1955); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 cmt. c (1987).
This approach would resolve some remaining ambiguity about the proper legal standing of
ex ante congressional-executive agreements. Agreements approved through the legislative
process would, by contrast, continue to supersede earlier inconsistent statutes in what is
generally referred to as the "last-in-time rule."
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complies with the notice and comment requirements established in the new
statute for both sole executive agreements and ex ante congressional-executive
agreements. If, for example, the executive were to conclude an agreement
without providing prior notice and opportunity for comment, the courts could
invalidate the agreement until the notice and comment procedures are met.327
Second, for ex ante congressional-executive agreements, it serves to ensure that
the President acts within the scope of the authority delegated by Congress. The
traditional Chevron analysis would apply in this context.328 Under Chevron, a
court reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute must engage in a two-
part analysis of agency action-which in this case would be an ex ante
congressional-executive agreement. In this context, the court will begin by
examining whether the statute granting authority to the President to conclude
an ex ante congressional-executive agreement is clear and unambiguous. If it is
unambiguous, and the agency interpretation runs contrary to the statute (if, for
example, the agreement concluded clearly exceeds the authority granted in the
statute), the statute will prevail and the agreement declared invalid. If the
327. At a minimum, this would simply involve judicial review of whether the formal rules
regarding notice and comment have been observed -thus providing a more limited process-
focused review than in the domestic context. Whether the courts would engage in a more
detailed analysis of the adequacy of notice and comment depends on the specific rules
regarding notice and comment adopted under the APA for international law. The proposal
offered in this Article does not provide specific guidance on this question, leaving it to
Congress to determine in consultation with the President and relevant agencies, including
the Department of State. Depending on the notice and comment procedure adopted in the
statute, substantive review of notice and comment procedures may be appropriate. It is
likely, however, that more limited substantive review will be found to be appropriate in the
international context. For domestic law cases engaging in substantive review of the notice
and comment procedures, see, for example, NRDC v. EPA, 279 F. 3d 118o (9th Cir. 2002),
which discusses how different the final rule may be from its initial state, after comments are
taken into account; United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 24o (2d Cit.
1977), which requires the agency to adequately disclose the basis of its final regulation in
response to comments; and Chocolate Manufacturers Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1o98 (4 th Cir.
1985), which discusses what constitutes sufficient notice. If such challenges are permitted, it
would at a minimum be appropriate to adopt a strict deadline for them to be filed, to reduce
the possibility that international agreements might be declared invalid after they have
already entered into force.
328. This does not mean that Chevron-style deference would necessarily apply in other foreign
relations contexts, as advocated by Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein. See Eric A. Posner & Cass
R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007); cf. Derek Jinks &
Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230 (2007) (arguing
that Chevron-style deference is inappropriate for executive-constraining foreign relations
law).
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statute is ambiguous, the court will examine whether the agency's




The courts' traditional reluctance to intervene in cases involving questions
of presidential authority over international agreements is unlikely to pose an
impediment to judicial review under the APA for international law. The APA
for international law patterns the process of judicial review on a familiar
domestic law process and allows the courts to draw on existing and familiar
judicial doctrines, such as Chevron. This makes effective judicial review much
easier to achieve than it has been in the occasional, extraordinary cases in which
courts have been asked to rule on questions of presidential authority over
international lawmaking.33°
The central remaining concerns likely to be raised to the proposal made
here are as follows. First, the introduction of a modified notice and comment
procedure may lead to a longer process for creating agreements.331 This will
make the system less nimble and may lead other countries to be more reluctant
to embark on the process for making agreements with the United States.
Second, it may cause the United States to seek changes in or even to reconsider
an agreement that has been negotiated and signed by both parties. This would
be frustrating to the other party to the agreement and may, again, lead that
party to withdraw or to refuse to embark on the negotiating process in the first
place-and potentially even harm diplomatic relations. Third, some may worry
that greater public participation could have adverse effects on international
lawmaking, thanks to agency capture by interest groups or domination of the
new public conversation by those representing narrow interests that do not
reflect the public good.
329. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
330. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see
also, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 444 U.S. 996
(plurality opinion) (dismissing the case because the issue presented was a nonjusticiable
political question); Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing on
the grounds that the members of the House lacked standing because "plaintiffs have alleged
only an institutional injury to Congress, not injuries that are personal and particularized to
themselves," and that the "issue raised by these congressmen is a nonjusticiable political
question").
331. This is a version of the concern in the domestic rulemaking context about "ossification," a
term coined by E. Donald Elliott. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying"
the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992) (citing E. Donald Elliott, Remarks at the
Symposium: Assessing the Environmental Protection Agency After Twenty Years: Law,
Politics, and Economics at Duke University School of Law (Nov. 15, 199o)); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59 (1995); Mark
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To Modify Judicial Review
of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997).
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These are real concerns, but they can be alleviated by careful design. The
concerns about an overburdened and ossified administrative system can be
addressed by modifying the APA rules to provide for a curtailed comment
period, by soliciting congressional and public feedback earlier in the
negotiation process, and by making careful judgments about which portions of
a proposed agreement are subject to revision and which are so important to the
negotiating partner that any effort to revise them would spell an end to the
agreement. The worries about narrow interest group dominance in the public
discussion can be addressed by reducing the cost of participation in the
process.332 It is important to remember that well-financed interest groups
already have access (albeit limited) to the international lawmaking process.
Making the agreements more readily available to the public and allowing
public comment on them is likely to expand, not contract, the variety of views
heard by those involved in negotiating those agreements. Just as in domestic
regulatory affairs, however, those involved in designing the notice and
comment system for international lawmaking must be cognizant of the dangers
of agency capture and interest group politics and should seek to design the
system in ways that most effectively minimize these concerns.
The drawbacks just discussed will likely be offset by the benefits of a
reformed process that allows for broader participation. The United States will
benefit from a more open process because that process will lead to agreements
that are more legitimate, more consistent with American constitutional ideals,
and better tailored to the needs and interests of the American public. Moreover,
the inclusion of outside actors in the negotiating process can strengthen the
United States's position at the negotiating table. And both parties to the
agreement will benefit from the broader base of support that an agreement will
have at the end of such a process: the agreement that results from a more open
process is much more likely to endure than if the agreement were made by the
President acting alone in secret.
There may remain agreements that cannot be made public due to security
concerns. Between five and fifteen percent of current executive agreements are
classified as secret.333 Those agreements are subject to the Case-Zablocki Act
332. Mariano-Florentino Cudllar has shown that, contrary to conventional wisdom, comments
from the lay public make up a substantial proportion of total comments about some
regulations. He argues for a redesign of the notice and comment process that can better
involve the public in regulatory decisions and thereby further enhance the democratic
credentials of regulatory rules. See Mariano-Florentino Cullar, Rethinking Regulatory
Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 411,414-17 (2005).
333. Interview with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. staff, in Washington, D.C.
(Jan. 13, 2009).
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reporting requirements but are not published.'34 The process for rendering
executive agreements secret should be examined to ensure that it is not
overinclusive. Assuming it is not, however, it would be appropriate to continue
the current practice of reporting the agreements to Congress alone. Such
agreements would not be subject to the enhanced notice and comment process.
They should, however, receive close inspection by the congressional
committees that receive them-on the understanding that these agreements
will not receive the public attention that most of the rest do.33s It may also be
wise to include an exception for agreements that must be concluded quickly -
for example, a temporary status of forces agreement that would allow the
United States to provide immediate emergency assistance to another country in
the case of a natural disaster. Again, this exception should be clearly and
narrowly defined.
The administrative review process proposed here is intended to generate
closer scrutiny of executive agreements by Congress and the public at large.
The initial source of the problem identified in this Article nonetheless remains:
excessively broad delegations of authority from Congress to the President. It is
even possible that the stronger system of review advocated here could have a
perverse effect. If agreements concluded under delegated authority are subject
to greater scrutiny than they are now, members of Congress might conclude
that they could delegate away even more lawmaking power. That would,
however, defeat the intent of this proposal and expand, rather than contract,
the legitimacy concerns described here. To protect against this possibility,
therefore, I turn next to making the case for more limited delegations of
international lawmaking authority to the President.
2. Rethinking Delegations ofLawmaking Authority to the President
The new administrative framework discussed above governs agreements
that are concluded by the President under his own constitutional authority or
under authority delegated to him by Congress. In reforming the system, it is
not only important to develop a better process for overseeing the agreements
that the President concludes using this authority. It is also important to
334. 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (2006); 22 C.F.R. § 181.7(b) (2006).
335. In interviews with congressional staff, I learned that for more than one year, the State
Department failed to report secret agreements to Congress as required under the Case-
Zablocki Act. It was not until an agreement was leaked and reported in the press that the
omission (which all parties I interviewed agreed was not intentional) was discovered. Much
closer oversight by the relevant congressional committees is clearly in order. Interview with
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. staff, supra note 333.
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examine the statutes that delegate authority from Congress to the President-
thereby giving rise to the current imbalance of power over international
lawmaking. As described above, the broad statutory grants of authority from
Congress to the President are the end result of a long process of gradual -and
sometimes unintended- movement away from very narrow delegations. The
addition of a more effective oversight mechanism for executive agreements
does not obviate the need to reassess existing delegations, many of which have
been in place for decades.
As outlined in Part II, tracing the history of congressional-executive
agreements reveals that statutory delegations of authority to the President
evolved over the course of more than two hundred years from extremely
narrow to quite broad. What began with just a small trickle of narrow, highly
constrained agreements during the first century of the country's existence
became a steady flow in the late 189os, and finally became a gush of
agreements in the wake of the New Deal. And yet even then, Congress
continued to exercise some measure of oversight authority through the use of
the legislative veto. Indeed, the presence of legislative vetoes encouraged broad
delegations of authority, for Congress knew that it could reject agreements it
disliked. 316 With its decision in INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court pulled away
this last strand of congressional power over ex ante congressional-executive
agreements, leaving behind only the now-unsupervised broad delegations of
power from Congress to the President. Many of the statutory grants of
authority that currently empower the President to enter into executive
agreements were created in a pre-Chadha world. When Congress responded to
Chadha by simply removing the legislative vetoes, it left in place broad
delegations that Congress never intended to leave unsupervised.
Revisiting these broad delegations is an important step toward addressing
the imbalance of power in the international lawmaking system. Revising such
statutes, however, will take not only willpower on the part of Congress but also
cooperation from the President whose power would likely be curtailed by the
revisions. Hence it may be advisable to focus attention primarily on ensuring
that new delegations of power do not repeat the mistakes of the past. Any new
advance grants of authority to the President to conclude executive agreements
with foreign nations ought to be crafted with much greater attention to
336. Indeed, one of the critiques of the legislative veto offered to the Court was that it
"encourage[d] Congress to avoid the difficult task of devising clear standards and
provide[d] little guidance to an agency seeking to fulfill its statutory mandate." Richard B.
Smith & Guy M. Struve, Aftershocks of the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69 A.B.A. J. 1258, 1259
(1983) (describing an argument made in the ABA amicus brief to the Court in the Chadha
case).
119:140 2009
PRESIDENTIAL POWER OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW
detail.337 What precisely this will mean will necessarily vary from case to case.
The central point, however, does not: no delegation should be made without a
clear vision of the full range of agreements that may result from it.
Recognizing that each area of international law will require differently
tailored statutes, it is still possible to offer a general proposal for changing the
way Congress delegates authority to the President to conclude international
agreements: Congress can and should include sunset provisions for any new
grants of authority. As Table 2 shows, most of the currently active statutes that
grant authority to the President were enacted decades ago-several as early as
the 195os. We remain governed, for example, by a grant of authority to
conclude agreements on atomic energy made in 1954. 3"' It should go without
saying that the context has changed immensely since then. Locking Congress
into long-term delegations threatens to lock the country into decades-old
modes of thinking.
Moreover, the time-unlimited grants of authority undermine the legitimacy
of the delegations. It is one thing to say that it is legitimate for Congress to
grant some of its authority to the President in order to take advantage of
administrative expertise and flexibility. It is quite another to say that Congress
may bargain away not only its own power but the power of every Congress to
follow. Indeed, to return to the Atomic Energy Act example, not a single
member who served in Congress when it was enacted still serves today.339
Allowing a delegation to reach into the indefinite future is especially
problematic because, once given, the authority is extraordinarily difficult to
337. It is interesting to note that Germany's Basic Law allows legislative powers to be delegated
to the executive, but the authorization must be narrowly tailored and specifically determined
in content, purpose, and extent. See Grundgesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GGI
[Basic Law] May 23, 1949, art. 8o0(), translated in BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 74 (Christian Tomuschat & David P. Curry trans., 1998) ("The Federal
Government, a Federal Minister, or the Land governments may be authorized by a law to
issue statutory instruments. The content, purpose, and scope of the authority conferred
shall be specified in the law. Each statutory instrument shall contain a statement of its legal
basis. If the law provides that such authority may be further delegated, such subdelegation
shall be effected by statutory instrument.").
338. 42 U.S.C. S 2011.
339. At the time of this writing, the longest-serving member of Congress is Representative John
Dingell of Michigan, who has served in the House of Representatives since 1955.
Congressman John D. Dingell, http://www.house.gov/dingell/bio.shtml (last visited May 1,
2009). The longest-serving member of the Senate at present is Robert C. Byrd (D-WV),
who first joined the Senate in 1959. See U.S. Senate: Reference Home,
http://www.senate.gov/senators/Biographical/longest-serving.htm (last visited May 1,
2009).
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reclaim: any effort to curtail or revise the delegation in a way that contracts the
power given to the President is likely to meet with a presidential veto.
A sunset provision is a blunt but effective tool for alleviating these
problems. If a delegation of authority comes to an end in a definite period of
time (say five or even ten years), then Congress has the opportunity to
reconsider the delegation in light of changed circumstances. It may choose to
reauthorize the delegation as is, amend it, or allow it to lapse. The President
may still veto an amended delegation, of course, but the consequence of doing
so will be that he loses the delegated authority altogether. The sunset provision
thus changes the balance of power between the President and Congress,
making the consequences of inaction (or a presidential veto of a revised
delegation) fall on the President rather than on Congress.3 4
3. Eligibility for the Administrative Track
A key question remains: which agreements should be concluded through
the administrative track for international lawmaking?34' It is essential that the
340. A possible objection to the proposal here for more limited delegations of authority is
suggested by the expansive literature about statutory delegations in the domestic context.
Scholars have repeatedly pointed out the downsides of requiring specificity in statutory
delegations. There is a large literature describing many reasons to favor broad delegations
(and hence broad statutory grants of authority to the President), including managerial
efficiency, necessary expertise, political responsibility, electoral responsiveness, and stability.
See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION (3d ed. 1976); Steven G. Calabresi, Some
Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 58-70 (1995); Kenneth
Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713 (1969); Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331-37 (2001); Lawrence Lessig & Cass
R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 102-03 (1994);
Mashaw, supra note 272, at 81-82; Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008); Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2
POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887). Others have argued, in the spirit of Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892), that the broad statutes are not delegations at all but simply invitations to the exercise
of executive power. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002). Though these arguments offer reason for caution, it is worth
recalling that the most robust defenses of broad delegation to administrative agencies rest
on assumptions about the administrative rulemaking process that simply do not exist in the
context of congressional-executive agreements. Only if international delegations were to
enjoy the host of informal controls will such objections give pause to efforts to constrain
future delegations.
341. At present, the decision to conclude an international agreement as a treaty, a congressional-
executive agreement, or a sole executive agreement is made by the Office of the Legal
Adviser in the U.S. Department of State. It is guided by rules and regulations known as the
Circular 175 Procedure. See supra note 26. The procedure requires that a request for
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criteria be clearly specified to prevent the use of the more limited
administrative process to enact agreements that should instead be enacted as ex
post congressional-executive agreements or Article II treaties.
Agreements eligible for the administrative law track must fall into one of
two categories: (1) agreements authorized by an express delegation of authority
to the President by Congress in prior legislation, or (2) agreements that fall
within the President's own constitutional powers.3 42 The first category is
largely self-explanatory. It may be determined by reading and interpreting the
text of legislation granting authority to the President to conclude relevant
international agreements.3 43 The second category, however, will likely prove
more complex, requiring as it does a theory of the constitutional power of the
President. Outlining the details of those limits is beyond the scope of this
paper.344 Yet there are some clear limits that are nearly universally agreed upon.
For example, a President may not conclude an executive agreement that creates
a legal obligation to provide funds without congressional approval, because the
power of appropriation is not the President's alone. A President also may not
enter a binding international agreement to come to the military aid of another
country without congressional approval.34 s
authorization to negotiate or sign a treaty or other international agreement take the form of
an action memorandum that includes a discussion of the basis for the type of agreement
recommended -and it includes eight factors that are to be considered. As I have discussed
elsewhere, the existing criteria offer murky guidance, at best, and are affirmatively
misguided at worst. See Hathaway, supra note ii, at 1249-52. The criteria outlined here
should be specified in the legislation enacting the new administrative track and they should
be reflected, as well, in a revised Circular 175 process and its attendant regulations.
342. As noted above, including sole executive agreements in the administrative track may not be
necessary but is advisable. See supra note 322.
343. It is important to ensure that the agreements do not exceed the authority granted.
Moreover, even if a President is authorized to conclude an agreement by virtue of legislation
delegating authority to him, such an agreement should not be concluded through the
administrative track if the President is unable to meet the obligations it creates in the
absence of further legislative action.
344. For more on this question, see Oona A. Hathaway, Constitutional International Law (Sept.
30, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Current regulations allow
expansive scope for agreements concluded pursuant to the President's own constitutional
authority. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 26, § 723.2-2(c) ("Agreements Pursuant to the
Constitutional Authority of the President"). The regulation appears to adopt a much more
expansive use of the President's constitutional international lawmaking power than is
supported by the Constitution. This issue, however, remains unresolved.
345. See Memorandum from Louis Fisher, Specialist in Constitutional Law, to William D.
Delahunt, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (Nov. 10, 2008) (on file with author) ("Previous
administrations have understood that the President has no constitutional authority to
unilaterally make financial and military commitments with other nations. Such agreements
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Where the constitutional power of a President to conclude an agreement on
his own authority is uncertain or based on controversial theories of executive
prerogative, the best course of action is to submit the agreement for
congressional approval as an ex post congressional-executive agreement. Doing
so is more legally and democratically legitimate, for gaining the consent of
Congress where it is not necessary is far better than failing to gain the consent
of Congress where it is necessary. It is also likely to lead to a more effective
agreement. If a President concludes an executive agreement that arguably falls
outside his constitutional authority, he may be unable to ensure compliance
with that agreement. 46 That uncertainty, in turn, is likely to lead foreign
parties to be more reluctant to enter into executive agreements and thereby
undermine the President's international lawmaking authority.
Agreements that fall outside the two categories outlined above must be
approved through the legislative international lawmaking process discussed in
the next Section. In addition, there are several prudential factors that, if
present, point toward conclusion of an agreement as an ex post congressional-
executive agreement or Article II treaty. These factors strongly counsel against
the administrative international law track and in favor of the legislative track.
They are as follows: (1) the agreement must be enacted through legislation in
order to take effect; (2) the agreement does not expressly permit withdrawal by
the United States with a notice period of less than one year; or (3) a significant
number of members of either house of Congress has expressed a desire that the
agreement be concluded as a legislative international agreement.
The first factor-the agreement must be enacted through legislation in
order to take effect-requires that the agreement be concluded through the
legislative track. The President should not conclude an executive agreement
that cannot be carried out in the absence of subsequent legislation. That is
because doing so places Congress in an unacceptable position: if it refuses to
pass the necessary legislation, the United States is placed in violation of
international law. But if it passes the legislation to avoid placing the country
into violation of international law, it abdicates its constitutional authority over
the legislative process. 347
are binding and effective only to the extent that Congress provides support through treaties
or statutes.").
346. The agreement between the United States and Iraq that went into effect on January 1, 2009,
is a recent example of this problem. See supra note 4 (citing critiques of and congressional
hearings on the U.S.-Iraq agreement).
347. This factor is largely a restatement of the two categories noted above. An agreement that is
not authorized by an express delegation of authority to the President by Congress and that
falls outside the President's own constitutional authority must necessarily be enacted
through legislation.
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The second factor - the agreement does not expressly permit withdrawal by
the United States with a notice period of less than one year-is not decisive but
it is instructive. If an agreement creates a long-term commitment, such an
agreement ought to be subjected to more thorough review before being made.
This is especially true for international agreements that create commitments
that cannot easily be revoked. For even though a subsequent statute by
Congress could undo the commitment as a matter of domestic law, the
commitment will remain binding as a matter of international law and the
country may suffer sanctions from the international community as a
consequence of its failure to continue to abide by the agreement's terms.
The third factor-a significant number of members of either house of
Congress has expressed a desire that the agreement be concluded as a
legislative international agreement-is again instructive. As a matter of
convention and law, the decision as to the form that an international agreement
will take belongs to the President and his legal advisers (though they must, of
course, work within applicable legal constraints). Yet the President should
allow himself to be guided in this decision by the expressed will of Congress.
Even if an agreement may legally be concluded as an executive agreement
through the administrative track, if Congress objects, it might undermine both
the willingness and ability of the country to meet its commitments under that
agreement. International commitments, after all, create an obligation for the
entire country. If a substantial contingent in Congress expresses a view about
the proper way to make that commitment, those voices should be heard even
though they need not be obeyed.
Agreements that are not authorized by an express delegation of authority to
the President by Congress in prior legislation or that do not fall within the
President's own constitutional powers are not eligible for the administrative
track outlined in this Section. Moreover, agreements that must be enacted
through legislation cannot be concluded thorough the legislative track. Finally,
agreements that do not permit withdrawal by the United States in less than
one year, or for which a significant number of members of Congress has
expressed an interest in being involved in the approval process, should not be
concluded on the administrative track. They may instead proceed on the
"legislative track" for making international agreements. That track is the
subject of the next Section.
B. An Expanded Model ofLegislative International Lawmaking
The legislative track of international lawmaking includes three separate
types of agreements that require congressional approval. First and most
obvious, there is the Article II process for creating treaties through the "advice
and consent" of two-thirds of the Senate. Second is the Article I process for
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creating ex post congressional-executive agreements through the approval of
negotiated agreements by both houses of Congress. To this existing list, I add a
third: an expanded "fast track" process that would offer a streamlined system
for congressional approval of international agreements. This addition, which is
the central focus of this Section, promises to make legislative approval of
international agreements both more efficient and more effective.
i. Article II Treaties
Article II treaties-that is, international agreements concluded by the
President and approved by a two-thirds supermajority in the Senate -remain a
viable means of concluding international agreements. I have discussed Article
II treaties extensively elsewhere and will not repeat that analysis here. 34 8 Suffice
it to say that Article II treaties may be concluded on any topic as long as the
agreement is consented to by the United States and a foreign nation, is the
subject of genuine mutual interest by the parties, and is not concluded for the
sole purpose of allowing one or both parties to circumvent domestic legal
rules.349 Such treaties are subject to the constitutional limits that apply to all
exercises of federal power-most notably, the prohibitions in the Bill of
Rights.3"' They may, however, exceed the powers of the federal government
enumerated in Article I of the Constitution. Indeed, Article II treaties are the
exclusive means for making such agreements- including agreements to cede
territory of the United States and extradite U.S. citizens.35 For all other
agreements, an available-and, I have argued, preferable -alternative is the ex
post congressional-executive agreement." 2
2. Ex Post Congressional-Executive Agreements
Ex post congressional-executive agreements are negotiated by the President
in precisely the same way as Article II treaties. But they are approved by
majority votes in both houses of Congress. Unlike ex ante congressional-
executive agreements, ex post congressional-executive agreements must receive
348. See generally Hathaway, supra note 11 (discussing the origins and historical use of the Article
II treaty clause and arguing that Article II treaties are less desirable than ex post
congressional-executive agreements in most cases).
34. See id. at 1344-45.
350. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889); HENKIN, supra note 216, at 185.
351. See Hathaway, supra note ii, at 1344-49.
352. For more on the reasons for favoring ex post congressional-executive agreements over
Article II treaties, see id. at 1307-38.
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the approval of Congress after the agreement is negotiated.31 3 I have argued
elsewhere that such agreements may be used in almost any area of international
law.354 Indeed, nearly all agreements that are currently concluded as Article II
treaties and all agreements currently concluded as an ex ante congressional-
executive agreements may be concluded as ex post congressional-executive
agreements instead.
Not only is it legally permissible to conclude most international agreements
as ex post congressional-executive agreements, it is also often preferable. Such
agreements have many advantages over both Article II treaties and ex ante
congressional-executive agreements. First and foremost, ex post congressional-
executive agreements are more democratically legitimate than either Article II
treaties or ex ante congressional-executive agreements. Article II treaties
exclude the House of Representatives from the lawmaking process and allow a
small and unrepresentative minority in the Senate to veto international
agreements. 3ss Ex ante congressional-executive agreements also fall short. They
satisfy the form, but not the function, of interbranch cooperation: because
Congress relinquishes its international law power in advance, it has little or no
ongoing involvement in the actual process of creating the international
commitments. Ex post congressional-executive agreements, by contrast,
require true cooperation between Congress and the President. Rather than
353. This proposal bears some similarities to requirements that apply to agency rulemaking in
the domestic context, but is different in one especially significant respect. The Congressional
Review Act of 1996, passed in the wake of the Republican Revolution, is expressly aimed at
"wresting back power from the agencies and the executive branch." Cindy Skrzycki, Reform's
Knockout Act, Kept out of the Ring, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at Di. The Act requires that
before a new rule goes into effect, the issuing agency must submit a report on the rule to
each house of Congress and the Comptroller General. 5 U.S.C. § 8oi(a)(1)(A) (2006). No
"major rule" can go into effect until at least sixty days after submission of the report. Id. §
8o1(a)(3)(A). Finally, there is an expedited review process for rules: Congress may pass a
joint resolution preventing a rule from taking effect. The resolution must be introduced
within sixty days after the agency submits its report to Congress and is considered under
special procedures meant to speed consideration. See id. § 802(c)-(d). The provisions for
legislative oversight have been successfully utilized only once. There have been thirty-seven
joint resolutions of disapproval (out of more than 41,ooo nonmajor rules and 61o major
rules reported), but only one has become law. Skrzycki, supra. This is likely due at least in
part to the fact that the President retains veto power over the joint resolutions of disapproval
that the Act authorizes. The proposal outlined above takes a distinctive approach, providing
not for a joint resolution of disapproval, but instead a joint resolution of approval.
354. The only agreements that must be concluded as Article II treaties are those that provide for
the extradition of U.S. citizens, that cede territory of the United States, or that address
disabilities of aliens. See Hathaway, supra note ii, at 1344-48.
355. For more on the democratic advantages of ex post congressional-executive agreements over
Article II treaties, see Hathaway, supra note ii, at 1308-12.
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delegate its authority to approve international agreements to the President in
advance, Congress retains the power to approve or deny an international
agreement. As a result, the President is more likely to involve Congress in
shaping the agreement from the very start and to take concerns raised by
Congress into account during the negotiation process.
Second, ex post congressional-executive agreements create much more
reliable commitments than either Article II treaties or executive agreements not
expressly approved by Congress. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Medellin v. Texas356 declared longstanding core Article II treaty commitments of
the United States to be unenforceable in federal court because they were not
self-executing. As a result, there is now a great deal of uncertainty about the
reliability of the United States's Article II treaty commitments. Similarly,
executive agreements not expressly approved by Congress enjoy tenuous legal
standing. As noted earlier, 35 7 sole executive agreements carry force only so long
as they are not inconsistent with a federal statute. It is as yet not entirely settled
whether an ex ante congressional-executive agreement that conflicts with an
earlier statute is similarly unenforceable.
By contrast, ex post congressional-executive agreements are
unambiguously directly and automatically enforceable as a matter of federal
law. Congress's approval of the agreement places the full weight of the federal
government behind it. This, in turn, is likely to make such agreements more
attractive to foreign partners. The transformation of sole executive agreements
and ex ante congressional-executive agreements into ex post congressional-
executive agreements thus not only holds the promise to improve democratic
accountability and interbranch cooperation in U.S. international lawmaking,
but can also lead to stronger, more reliable international legal commitments." 8
356. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (20o8). Indeed, it appears that some countries are concerned about the
fragility of U.S. international commitments. Libya recently insisted that an agreement
between it and the United States be approved by Congress through enactment of a statute,
rather than being concluded as a sole executive agreement or Article II treaty. See Libyan
Claims Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 110-301, 122 Stat. 2999 (20o8). For an outstanding
discussion of the judicial enforcement of treaties that presents a somewhat more hopeful
view of Medellin, see Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REv. 599 (2008).
357. See supra text accompanying notes 236-237.
358. Any statute that tightens the rules for executive agreements must consider three additional
issues. First, it may be necessary to make express allowances for temporary or provisional
agreements between executives in cases where they are necessary-for example, for military
alliances in the course of active hostilities. Second, it is important that rules be crafted in
such a way that they are not evaded by an expansion of so-called nonbinding or insignificant
agreements. At the present, only significant, binding agreements need be reported to
Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act and attendant regulations. See supra note 159. Those
262
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There are a few obvious objections to the proposal to subject more
executive agreements to the express consent of both houses of Congress. First,
one might worry that the process would be more cumbersome, time-
consuming, and inefficient. Instead of simply negotiating an agreement and
signing it to put it into effect, the President would have to submit the
agreement to Congress and receive its approval before the agreement enters
into effect. Second, a procedure that allows Congress to request or demand
revisions after an agreement has been negotiated by the President might pose
daunting negotiation difficulties. The President, having negotiated a text that
is acceptable to him and to the foreign party or parties, may be unable to obtain
congressional approval of an agreement that is the result of long and difficult
negotiations with foreign partners unless he demands-and wins-further
revisions to address concerns raised by Congress. These back-end difficulties
are also likely to cause problems on the front end. Negotiating partners,
recognizing that the process will take longer and that the President and his
representatives cannot definitively negotiate the terms of the agreement, may
prove more intransigent in negotiations in order to retain some bargaining
power or may even be discouraged from entering negotiations in the first place.
These are real and legitimate concerns. It is worth noting, however, that
the benefits of congressional consent to an international agreement -that is, a
democratic and reliable agreement-will frequently outweigh the costs of a
more cumbersome process for concluding the agreement. Moreover, the costs
can be alleviated by the creation of a new "fast track" mechanism for
congressional-executive agreements- a proposal to which I now turn.
3. An Expanded "Fast Track"
The so-called fast track procedure has been used extensively for trade
agreements,35 9 and in that context has allowed Congress to approve agreements
categories are ill-defined, however, and may have led to failure to report agreements. There
would be much greater incentive to define agreements to fall outside the Case-Zablocki Act
requirements if the proposal suggested here were adopted. Third, and finally, there would
need to be a separate procedure put in place for the approval of classified agreements.
Classified agreements must be reported to Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act, but they
are not made public. Once again, it would be important that the requirements of the statute
not be evaded by an expanded use of classified agreements.
359. "Fast track" authority is also called trade promotion authority. The laws that created fast
track appear in the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 151-154, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001-08
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §5 2191-2194 (2oo6)). The Trade Act of 2002 extended
and conditioned their application. Pub. L. No. 107-210, §§ 2103-2105, 116 Stat. 933, 1004-16
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 38o3-38o5 (Supp. 20o6)).
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negotiated by the President through a streamlined process. Here, I propose
expansion of the fast track model beyond the trade area.
To begin with, it is worth exploring what fast track entails. Fast track
authority was first enacted through the Trade Act of 1974.36 ° Under the fast
track process, which has since expired, the leaders of the House and Senate
were required to introduce any trade legislation proposed to Congress by the
President "on the day on which a trade agreement or extension" was submitted
or, if a house was not in session, then "on the first day thereafter." '' The
legislation could not be amended,362 and the committees in each house were
required to report an implementing bill or approval resolution no later than
"the close of the 4 5th day after its introduction.", 61 A full house vote was
required "on or before the close of the 15th day" after the bill or resolution was
reported out of committee. 64 Debate on the legislation was limited to "not
more than 2o hours" in each house., 61 Filibusters were not permitted in the
Senate, and the legislation was subject to passage by a simple majority vote in
each house. 66
Although fast track was developed to ease the process of approval for trade
agreements, there is no legal reason why it must remain limited to this narrow
area of international law. The Senate and House could adopt simplified
procedural rules to speed the process of approval of international agreements in
any area of international law. Because "fast track" simply involves the
modification of House and Senate procedural rules, it can be done by
36o. 19 U.S.C. § 2101-2476 (20o6). For a discussion of the role of fast track in U.S. trade policy,
see Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
143 (1992). Koh effectively responds to what he calls the "democracy objection" to fast track
authority. Id. at 161. That objection carries less force in this context, where the central aim is
to move agreements away from the less democratic ex ante congressional-executive
agreement process toward a more democratic process that involves congressional approval -
albeit with streamlined fast track procedures. Nonetheless, Koh's discussion of the issue is
instructive.
361. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(C)(1).
362. Id. § 2191(d).
363. Id. § 2191(e)(1).
364. Id. If the bill involved revenue (for example, if it provided for a raising or lowering tariffs,
which is quite common in a bill relating to trade), the legislation was to originate in the
House of Representatives. Id. § 2191(e)(2). Once the bill was passed in the House, it would
continue to the Senate, which was required to act quickly (usually, the assigned committee
was required to act within fifteen days, and the full Senate to vote fifteen days after the bill
or resolution was reported out of committee, for a total of no more than thirty days in the
Senate). Id.
365. Id. § 2191(f)-(g).
366. Id.
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legislation and does not require constitutional amendment. The simplified
rules would likely include, at a minimum, tight reporting deadlines,
restrictions on floor debate, and a prohibition on the use of the filibuster in the
Senate. The fast track procedure could be adopted on a narrow substantive
basis (for example, for all agreements regarding nuclear materials) or more
broadly (for all international agreements proposed during a given year).
The adoption of a fast track process, however broad or narrow, might on
first glance appear disadvantageous to Congress. It does, after all, limit
Congress's ability to amend and debate an agreement. Yet to the extent a more
streamlined approval process encourages presidents to bring international
agreements to Congress that might have otherwise been concluded without
affirmative congressional assent, it will result in an expansion of congressional
power over international law rather than a reduction. Moreover, if Congress
authorizes fast track authority on a periodic basis, it could better ensure that
the authority is not abused. A President who uses the authority in ways that are
regarded by Congress as abusive would see the authority disappear shortly
thereafter. That would provide an incentive for the President to communicate
effectively with Congress and to use the fast track authority in a responsible
and judicious manner.
There are other possible modifications to the current fast track process that
could be considered. For example, a procedure could be put in place for
permitting agreements to be voted through Congress in groups, rather than
individually. At present, agreements are reported by the State Department to
Congress in batches. As an alternative to the administrative track outlined
above, Congress could approve uncontroversial regulatory agreements in the
same manner-voting them through in batches rather than individually. If
such a "batch" method of approval were adopted, there could be a simple
procedure for removing an agreement from the batch before the batch is put
forward for approval. Specifically, an agreement might be removed pursuant to
a majority vote in both houses (and would not be subject to approval by the
President) .367 While these procedures would limit congressional power to
revise agreements once negotiated, they would ensure significantly more
congressional input and influence than presently exists with ex ante
congressional-executive agreements.
367. The removal of an agreement from the set of agreements to be put up for approval by
Congress is not a legislative veto. A legislative veto exists only when either or both houses of
Congress can modify or block an action by the executive branch that would, in the absence
of the veto, take effect. For discussions of other possible modifications to fast track rules,
see, for example, Koh, supra note 36o; and Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for
International Trade Agreements, 5 FLA. INT'L L. J. 471 (1990).
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The proposal outlined here for comprehensive reform of the international
lawmaking system around two tracks of international lawmaking-one
administrative and one legislative-offers a path toward more effective,
efficient, and democratic international lawmaking in the United States. By
bringing international lawmaking within the bounds of more familiar domestic
law structures, the proposal offers the prospect of a more seamless and effective
integration of the United States's international legal commitments into
domestic law. In doing so, the reform responds to criticisms of international
law as out of step with the U.S. democratic political process, while at the same
time rendering the country's new international legal commitments more
reliable and effective.
CONCLUSION
In 1967, Senator William J. Fulbright rose in the Senate to raise the alarm
about the "constitutional imbalance" in the making of national commitments
to foreign nations. Pointing to a gradual but inexorable erosion of
congressional power over the making of international agreements since World
War II, Fulbright concluded that the President's power to make agreements
was not effectively checked by Congress. He encouraged his fellow Senators to
reassert the power of Congress - and especially the Senate - to take up their
constitutional responsibility to participate in making commitments to other
nations.
Although Fulbright eventually succeeded in obtaining the Senate
Resolution he sought, the problems to which he pointed remain just as
pressing today as they were in 1967. Indeed, the intervening decades have if
anything seen continuing erosion of congressional power over the process of
making international law. Today, the vast bulk of international lawmaking is
done through executive agreements negotiated by the President using
authority that was delegated to him by Congress many years -and in some
cases many decades- earlier. These ex ante congressional-executive agreements
are used to make international commitments on everything from defense
matters to trade to telecommunication to energy and are not subject to formal
approval by Congress. Congress, in fact, typically does not even learn of the
agreements until months after they have entered into effect.
The international lawmaking process of today would have been entirely
unfamiliar to the Founding generation. International law, as they knew it, was
made almost entirely through Article II treaties negotiated by the President and
consented to by two-thirds of the Senate. There were occasional executive
agreements, but they were confined to very limited subjects. Ex ante
266
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congressional-executive agreements were then used almost exclusively to
manage international mail carriage.
This Article has traced how and why the process of international
lawmaking has changed over the centuries since the Founding. It shows that
the growth of unilateral presidential power was gradual and was driven by a
complex interaction of legal, political, and geopolitical forces. The United
States, which was at the time of its creation a small and relatively insignificant
entity in world politics, was by the 194os a dominant economic, military, and
political force. This generated significant demands on the country to embed
itself in a web of international agreements. In the face of these pressures, the
President sought ever-growing flexibility to create international commitments.
Congress responded by delegating authority to the President to make a wide
array of international agreements. It did so in small incremental steps, none of
which was significant by itself, but which together amounted to a major
transfer of lawmaking authority from the legislative to the executive branch.
The Supreme Court, for its part, simply stood above the fray, refusing to
intervene to stop the transfer of authority between the political branches. In the
rare instances in which it did weigh in, it simply affirmed the agreements
created under the new rubric. In doing so, it opened the door to ever-greater
transfers of authority. It also, perhaps unwittingly, put the nail in the coffin of
congressional oversight of international lawmaking by prohibiting the use of
the legislative veto in the 198os, which was at that point the only significant
lever to which Congress had held fast.
The imbalance of power that has resulted from the gradual shift toward
presidential unilateralism in international lawmaking is more worrisome today
than ever before. In a world that grows "flatter" by the day, the line between
domestic and international law is increasingly blurry. Taxes,
telecommunications, environmental regulations, employment, fisheries -
international agreements on these topics and many others necessarily constrain
domestic policy choices. The transfer to the President of unfettered power over
international lawmaking therefore means that the President increasingly has
unilateral power over issues that affect the day-to-day lives of ordinary
Americans.
The problems are not simple and the solution will not be easy. Reforming
an international lawmaking system first designed for the eighteenth century to
meet the challenges of the twenty-first will require comprehensive and broad-
based changes in the way the country makes its international legal
commitments. Today-unlike during the Founding-there are two very
different kinds of international agreements. There are now hundreds of
agreements that look a great deal like agency-issued regulations alongside
numerous agreements that create new commitments of a more legislative
character. The international lawmaking system must accommodate this new
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reality and provide a system for making international agreements that
recognizes these differences. And it should do so in a way that allows
international law to be more seamlessly integrated into domestic law. These
reforms promise to improve the democratic legitimacy, efficiency, and
reliability of the international lawmaking system and allow the United States to
more successfully meet the global challenges it faces as a new century dawns.
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